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Abstract 
This thesis explores whether a decision to withhold an impending motor 
action can be initiated unconsciously. There is much evidence to suggest 
that both voluntary actions and reactions to external events can be initiated 
without consciousness. However, there is some debate as to whether 
inhibition or control of behaviour can occur unconsciously. Libet et al. 
(1985) proposed that while consciousness is not required to initiate an 
action, it may be essential in allowing the action to be vetoed. Similarly, 
evidence from tasks involving response conflict points to a close association 
between inhibition/control of behaviour and conscious awareness. In 
particular, both fMRI and EEG correlates of control are seen to be absent 
when response conflict is unconscious. 
The research in this thesis aimed to clarify whether the no-go N2 and P3, 
ERP correlates of the no-go response, can be modulated by an unconscious 
prime. In each of five EEG experiments, target-related N2 and P3 
components were significantly affected by the nature of the unconscious 
primes. More specifically, when the unconscious information coded for a no­
go response, N2 and P3 amplitude was significantly reduced, suggesting that 
inhibition of the imminent response was primed by the unconscious stimuli. 
In addition, there was evidence that the unconscious primes were able to 
directly engage frontal inhibition/control mechanisms. In experiments 1, 2 
and 5 early ERP differences were observed over frontocentral electrodes 
that were entirely dependent on the nature of the unconscious prime. 
Furthermore, experiment 5 showed that this early modulation of ERP activity 
was directly related to the extent to which the participants were influenced by 
the unconscious primes. These findings suggest that inhibition of an 
impending motor action can be initiated by an unconscious stimulus. These 
conclusions are discussed in relation to previous research, and the possible 
role of consciousness in behaviour. The limitations of the current research 
and suggestions for future work are also considered. 
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Outline
These first three chapters will give an introduction to the research question
addressed in this thesis. The first chapter provides a theoretical background
for the research presented in this thesis, focusing on the question of the role
of consciousness in control of behaviour. The second chapter will provide a
more detailed introduction to EEG methodology and in particular provide a
background to ERP correlates of motor preparation and inhibition. The final
chapter of this introduction will review experimental work on the ability of
unconscious stimuli to influence preparation and inhibition of a motor
response.
Conscious Free Will
The experience that our conscious mind influences our actions through the
expression of free will was most famously put forward by Rene Descartes
(1596-1650; cf. Velmans 2000). He proposed a separation between
substances extended in space (res extensa) and a fundamentally different
substance, which thinks (res cogitans). He suggested that sensory
stimulation leads to perceptions in the soul by way of movements in the
pineal gland. Conversely, free will is exercised by the soul through nerve
cells from the pineal gland to the muscles. In this explanation the non-
physical mind and the physical brain were assumed to be different
substances that interacted via the pineal gland in the brain. Eccles (1980)
led a group of modern philosophers who share this view that the non-
physical mind influences the physical world through the expression of
conscious will. Despite the many philosophical problems with such a
perspective (see Velmans, 2000), the folk psychological notion of free will is
perhaps still largely informed by the notion that our conscious minds directly
controls our behaviour in the world. As Velmans (2002) suggests, in our
everyday life we take it for granted that we have control of our actions and
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that it is the conscious mind that exercises this control. However a series of
experiments conducted by Libet and colleagues began to question the notion
that the conscious decisions are the causes of one's actions.
Libet's initial experiments focused on the neural conditions necessary to
produce a conscious experience (see Libet 2003b). Libet, Alberts, Wright,
Delattre, Levin and Feinstein (1964) showed that a minimum of 500ms of
direct electrical stimulation of the somatosensory cortex (at a liminal
intensity) was required to produce a conscious experience. They showed
that when the later part of this processing is disturbed either by anaesthetics
or presentation of a second stimulus (retroactive masking), a participant is no
longer able to consciously report the sensation (Libet, Alberts, Wright and
Feinstein, 1967). Retroactive masking consists of presenting a second
slightly stronger stimulus in order to mask the experience of the first stimulus.
Libet et al. (1967) were able to show that using an inter stimulus interval (lSI)
of up to 100ms was successful in masking the conscious experience of the
initial stimulus. These findings together suggest that incoming sensory
information requires a period of unconscious brain processing (between 100
and 500 ms) before it reaches consciousness.
Libet et al. (1983) then investigated whether the same period of "neural
adequacy" was required to experience a decision to initiate a motor act.
Based on Kornhuber and Decke's (1965) observation that a 'readiness
potential' (RP) is recordable on the scalp prior to voluntary action, Libet et al.
(1983) were interested in where, in relation to RP onset, one becomes aware
of the urge to move. This would allow comparison of the time at which
individuals were conscious of preparing to move in comparison to when the
brain begins preparation to move. The RP was recorded with an electrode
placed on the vertex (over the motor cortex) on the scalp (see Chapter 2 for
further information regarding the RP). Participants were asked to flex their
wrist spontaneously (without pre-planning), whilst at the same time watching
a clock face revolve on a ray oscilloscope at the rate of one revolution per
2.56 seconds. After their action they were then asked to retrospectively
report where the clock hand was at the time that they felt the wish to perform
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the action. Libet termed this the W judgement for want, the time of the
appearance of conscious awareness of wanting to flex one's wrist. This
judgement was also described as an 'intention' to act, a 'decision' to move or
an 'urge' by some participants. In addition to the W judgements, Libet asked
the same participants to report the time at which they performed the action
(M judgements) as well as the time of a near threshold stimulus to the skin (S
judgements). These three different types of judgements were performed in
separate blocks, with practice trials on the particular judgements preceeding
each block. The S judgement was to be used as a control task to check the
accuracy of the clock reporting method and was found to produce accurate
reported times of the stimulation with around 50ms of error.
When comparing the average time of W judgements to the onset of the RP,
Libet et al. (1983) found that for unplanned acts the RP preceded the wish to
act by 350ms. The remarkable conclusion from such an investigation was
that even so called freely initiated acts are not actually instigated by
consciousness, but rather are initiated unconsciously. This supports and
extends Libet's previous findings that a period of neural processing in the
brain is required for the appearance of the conscious experience associated
with that processing. There is also some independent evidence that activity
in the supplementary motor area (SMA), from where the RP is thought to
originate, is causally involved in the experience of the urge to move. Fried,
Katz, McCarthy, Sass Williamson, Spencer and Spencer (1991) inserted
electrodes on to the SMA during evaluation for surgical treatment of patients
with intractable epilepsy. Their primary interest was to explore the
somatotopic organisation of this area. However, they also noted that direct
stimulation some parts of the SMA produced both experiences of movements
in the absence of actual movements and experiences of the urge to move.
In addition, at some of these sites where an "urge" was reported in response
to light stimulation, further electrical stimulation of the same site was
sufficient in producing a movement (although often in a slightly different
location to where the urge had been reported). This evidence supports
Libet's conclusion that the activity recorded by the RP is the unconscious
antecedent of the subjects conscious experience of wanting to move.
20
In one of only two replications of Libet's experiment Haggard and Eimer
(1999) used an identical methodology to that employed by Libet et al. (1983),
with the exception that they varied the response hand in order to allow
calculation of the lateralised readiness potential (LRP). The LRP is
calculated by measuring the activity over the primary motor cortex (1 cm
anterior to electrode points C3 and C4), and subtracting activity from the
hemisphere ipsilateral to the response from activity of the hemisphere
contralateral to the response hand (see chapter 2 for more details). This will
result in a marker of motor preparation of movement of a particular side of
the body and is thought to better reflect the onset of specific motor
programming. Haggard and Eimer (1999) found that the onset of the LRP
occurred approximately 300 ms prior to electromyogram (EMG) onset, with
the wish to act occurring around 200ms prior to action. Furthermore, they
found concomitant variation between the LRP and the judgement of the time
of the wish, such that early LRP onset was associated with an earlier wish
judgement (and vice versa). Such concomitant variation, that was not
evident with RP onset, strongly suggests a causal relationship between the
LRP and the wish to perform an act. This provides strong support for Libet's
(1982) conclusion that motor acts are initiated unconsciously and suggests
that the LRP is causally involved in producing the conscious wish to act.
Trevena and Miller (2002) have argued that the calculation of the RP and
LRP is subject to a smoothing bias in which the onset is disproportionately
shifted towards the onset in the earliest trials. This would result in an LRP
onset that reflects the earliest onset time for all subjects, rather than the
average onset time. They collected new data using the same methodology
as that employed by Libet and examined the effect of this calculation bias on
Libet's findings. To counteract the bias in LRP and RP calculation they
compared the onset of the two components in relation to the earliest reported
wishes. They found that none of the wishes occurred prior to RP onset and
thus concluded that RP onset consistently occurred prior to the conscious
wish to act. However, when examining LRP onset in relation to the W
judgement they found that in 20% of trials the wish to act occurred prior to
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the LRP onset. Since the LRP onset is smoothed towards the earliest LRP
onsets Trevena and Miller conclude that "the LRP always started after the
conscious decision to move". Regardless of this, the finding that RP onset
still occurred significantly earlier that the W judgement provides further
evidence that non hand specific motor preparation is initiated prior to the
conscious desire to act now.
There have been countless commentaries and reanalyses of Libet's data,
including a special edition of consciousness and cognition (2002; issue 11)
and commentaries to his 1985 behavioural and brain sciences target article
(Libet, 1985). A number of authors have questioned whether it is possible to
introspect on ones internal mental states in the manner described by Libet
(e.g. Rugg, 1985; Vanderwolf, 1985) and even that the instructions to
participants may have resulted in the experience of an intention immediately
prior to action that does not occur in natural voluntary movements (Ringo,
1985). There has also been much criticism of the clock method used to
measure the time of conscious awareness of wanting to act, suggesting that
its use in retrospectively reporting the conscious decision to act is subject to
a number of different biases (Breitmeyer, 1985; Rollman, 1985).
Pockett (2002) provides a complete reinterpretation of Libets data,
suggesting that rather than taking 500ms for a conscious experience to be
generated in the brain, it takes around 80ms. She suggests that the reason
for Libet's conclusion is that he used electrical stimulation at liminal intensity
and that facilitation of the signal was in fact responsible for his findings.
Pockett also applies this logic to Libet's findings that when asked to report
their Sand M judgements, there appears to be an error of around 50 - 85ms.
She suggests that if it takes 80ms for stimuli to reach awareness then their
experience of the clock hand at position x would actually correspond to x
minus 80ms. Therefore they experienced moving when they did move, but
because of the delay of experiencing the clock, they reported moving at x
minus 80ms. This reinterpretation thus not only supports the shorter period
needed for conscious awareness, but also suggests that reporting of
experience using the clock method is subject to error of around 80ms, such
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that events would be judged as occurring 80 ms before they actually
occurred. This would imply that the time of the decision to perform an act
was also judged to have occurred earlier than it really did, thus giving even
more weight to the claim that the RP precedes the conscious wish.
Van De Grind (2002) suggests that in fact this error may be the opposite way
round. He reviews evidence of the flash lag effect (MacKay, 1958) in which
a switch of attention results in a delay of around 80-100ms in reporting the
location of a moving object at a specific point in time. He suggests that in
Libet's experiment, since initial attention is focused on the clock and
participants are told to look out for conscious awareness of the decision,
there will be a delay in the reporting of the conscious decision to act. Thus
he suggests the bias is actually likely to shift the conscious decision 80 ms
later than it truly occured. Gomes (2002) also points out that the use of
feedback to participants regarding their S judgements during training makes
any interpretation of the findings very difficult, since the effect of any
attempted correction of the bias is difficult to discern. He also suggests that
when attributing awareness to act we usually only have a unitary experience
of wanting to act, and do not judge the wish and the actual time of action
separately. Therefore the instructions to participants to distinguish between
these two events, and the suggested order of them, will also influence their
relative latencies. Instead he suggests that the occurrence of the RP so far
in advance of action (-500ms) contrasts sharply with the fact that we feel a
wish occurring immediately prior to an action, and that this is adequate to
conclude that motor acts are initiated unconsciously.
Conscious control of action
Despite some severe methodological problems with the original Libet
experiments, the general conclusion that voluntary acts appear to be initiated
before the conscious urge to act appears, is strongly supported by the
research discussed above. More recent research combining masked priming
with EEG has also reached a similar conclusion, that a stimulus that remains
unconscious directly initiates preparation for action (Dehaene et aI., 1998;
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Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998). These experiments
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3. Despite these conclusions,
rather than concluding that consciousness is not the cause of behaviour,
Libet has suggested that consciousness is able to veto an unconsciously
initiated action (Libet et aL 1983, Libet 1985, Libet, 2003). Libet et al, (1983)
conclude by suggesting that "there could be a conscious 'veto' that aborts
the performance of 'spontaneous' self-initiated acts" (page 641). In support
of this claim, they point out that some subjects reported having felt an urge to
act but that they were inhibited before the action could occur.
There have been a number of objections to the idea of conscious veto on
theoretical grounds. Danto (1985) for example says Libet's suggestion that
we can consciously veto our unconsciously initiated action is "incompatible
with everything he had up to that point been at pains to show" (Danto, 1985,
page 541). He goes on to argue that this claim seems remarkable in light of
his earlier work which showed that conscious awareness of both internally
generated (e.g. wish to act; Libet et al., 1982) and externally generated (e.g.
tactile stimuli; Libet et al., 1967) events are subject to a minimum of around
100 - 500 ms of neuronal adequacy. The natural question then to ask is
does a veto decision have its own unconscious brain correlate? A number of
commentators (e.g. Danto, 1985; Merickle & Cheesman, 1985) in Libet's
(1985) target article suggest precisely this; that any conscious veto is likely to
have its own unconscious physiological correlate, that begins well in advance
of the actual experience of the veto. Libet (1985) responds by simply
suggesting that there is presently no evidence against such a control function
acting consciously. In response to a similar criticism from Velmans (2002),
Libet (2003a) suggests that unconscious processes leading to the conscious
urge to act (the RP) may include content of the factors that affect a veto
decision and that no new unconscious processing is required for the
conscious veto to be applied. However, Libet (1985) also describes this
conscious control function as "evaluating" and "deciding" on whether to veto
that action as well as suggesting that vetoes often occur when the initial urge
to act involves some socially unacceptable consequence (Libet, 2003b). As
Velmans (2003) points out this leaves something of a strange asymmetry
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between a "conscious" decision to act and a "conscious" veto, such that the
relatively simple decision to perform a motor action requires some 350ms of
unconscious neural activity, a conscious veto occurs in just 150ms. This
despite the fact that the veto would likely involve access to long term
memory for assessing possible consequences of action, comparison with the
need to perform the current action in reference to ones current goals, which
is possibly a more complex decision than the initiation of the act itself.
Libet often states that the "existence of a veto possibility is not in doubt"
(Libet, 2003b, page 141). He suggests that we often feel urges to do
something and then for various reasons consciously decide not to do it.
However, simply because we feel that we consciously veto a decision this
does not mean that consciousness has initiated the veto (Velmans, 2003).
As discussed above, Libet's own research has shown that "voluntary"
movements are initiated unconsciously despite the fact that people feel the
acts to be consciously initiated, so to take these experiences as fact in the
case of the veto seems to go against the main implications of his research.
Libet, Wright and Gleason (1983) attempted to explore the possibility of the
conscious veto in more detail by asking subjects to veto a voluntarily initiated
act. However, due to technical restraints when averaging trials together for
EEG exploring the veto is rather difficult. Due to the poor signal to noise
ratio of the RP, this EEG component is not visible on single trials. It is
therefore necessary to average together a large number of trials for the RP
to become visible. In Libet et al. (1983) trials were averaged together with
respect to the onset of the muscle movement. However, in the absence of a
muscle movement, or any other cue as to when the action would have been
performed (in a veto condition) it is impossible to know when the RP should
occur and thus form an appropriate average. Libet et ai, (1983) were
therefore forced to create a rather unusual situation where participants were
instructed to pre-prepare a movement when the clock reached a particular
point, and then to veto this action 150-200ms before its execution. In some
blocks (M series), subjects were instructed to perform the action at the pre-
specified time, whilst in other blocks (M-veto series) subjects were to veto
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the action at the final moment. The use of this method allowed averaging of
the EEG with respect to the time at which the action had been pre-specified
and thus allowed calculation of RPs in the absence of overt motor
responses.
Libet et al (1983) found that the RPs under these two conditions were
remarkably similar until around 150ms prior to the point at which the action
was to be performed. Libet concludes that this RP might reflect general "non
consummated urges to act" (Libet et al. 1983, page 371) and that the final
decision to act now would be controlled by the conscious veto. Libet (1985)
admits that this is a limited test of the veto; however it is worth noting some
recent research which might provide an alternative explanation to his
findings. It has become increasingly evident that activation in the motor
system occurs not only when performing an action but also when observing
actions (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 1996; Fadiga, Craighero &
Olivier, 2005) and imagining actions (Galdo-Alvarez & Carrillo-de-Ia-Pena,
2004). When observing or imagining an action our "mirror-neuron" system
stimulates the exact movements below the threshold which would cause us
to perform the action (Fadiga et aI., 2005). Of particular note to Libet's
findings, Galdo-Alvarez and Carrillo-de-Ia-Pena (2004) showed that
imagining hand movements produced LRPs of a similar onset to actual
movements but with lower amplitude. This further confirms that as well as
controlling actions, the motor system represents imagined and observed
actions, and that these representations are reflected in LRPs. Under such
an explanation the RP observed for M-veto series in Libet et al.'s (1983)
experiment would simply reflect a representation of the action which they
were instructed to prepare for but not actually perform. It is difficult to tell
from Libet's data whether the amplitude of the RPs was smaller for M-veto
compared to M series trials but it would appear to be, at least in some of the
subjects (he provides no statistical analysis of this). Furthermore, the failure
to find a difference between RP's recorded at the vertex does not rule out the
possibility that a veto may have unconscious antecedents that occur
elsewhere in the brain.
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Unconscious control triggered by an external stimulus
The research presented in this thesis will attempt to further explore the
question of whether a decision to inhibit (veto) an impending action requires
consciousness. Given the problems with examining the conscious veto
using Libet's paradigm a different experimental approach will be employed.
The relation between conscious awareness and preparation or inhibition of
action will be explored using a combination of go/no-go tasks and masked
priming. The onset of electrical activity associated with preparation/inhibition
of action will be established by instructing participants to proceed or withhold
an action upon presentation of different types of stimuli. The use of masked
priming will allow exploration of the effects of an unconscious stimulus on
participants' responses to the relevant target stimulus. These techniques
and the ERP components associated with them will be the focus of chapters
2 and 3.
It is important to note that some might argue that such responses to external
stimuli can not be relevant to free will, since they do not reflect voluntary
processes. Patrick Haggard (2001) for example, suggests that when
studying the psychology of action one should only use action initiated
internally since action prompted by external events lack the psychological
components of generation of an action. Haggard and Clark (2003) point to
evidence that the brain networks involved in performing a self-initiated act
only partially overlap with those areas involved in responding to an external
stimulus. More specifically, while self-generated action shows activation in
the basal ganglia and SMA, externally triggered actions are associated with
activation of the cerebellum and premotor cortex before the two types of
action converge in the primary motor cortex. Whilst it seems clear that there
are differences between actions triggered by external stimuli and internally
generated actions, it is not clear how exactly this related to the question of
intention and free will. For example, Jahanshahi, Jenkins, Brown, Marsden,
Passingham and Brooks (1995) compared movements where subjects raised
their right index finger whenever they wished to do so, with trials where
subjects moved the same finger in response to a tone. While the authors
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themselves do not make any claims with regard to the intention of the
subjects during these movements, Haggard and Clark (2003) make it clear
that whilst the self-initiated movements are intentional and voluntary, the
reactions to the stimuli are unintentional and involuntary. Mele (2004)
argues that both of these acts are clearly intentional. He suggests that the
confusion stems from the fact that Haggard and Clark believe that in deciding
to perform the act at a specific time, this makes their action intended, and
without such a decision the act can not be intentional. However, as Mele
(2004) argues, we often act intentionally without having explicitly made a
decision to act, such as when I unlock my office door in the morning; I clearly
intend to open my door and enter my office but I did not explicitly form a
decision to do so.
Furthermore, Bennett and Hacker (2003) point out that Libet's conception of
free will is somewhat confused. They suggest that in reality not only are
voluntary acts not preceded by an urge or intention to act, but also that when
interacting with the outside world we commonly act in reaction to events
around us, but this does not make those actions any more 'automatic' or less
under the influence of free will than internally initiated actions. They suggest
(as others have, see above) that the instructions to introspect on an intention
prior to an action may have caused such an experience to have occurred
when it otherwise would have no role in the everyday sequence of events
leading to action. They argue that "the most interesting results of these
experiments is that people, when asked to report such bizarre things as 'a
feeling of intention to move one's hand', one will find such a feeling to report,
even though it is more than a little doubtful whether there is any such thing"
(Page 230).
Keller and Heckhausen (1990) present some data to support the suggestion
that the instruction to introspect on an action was responsible for making a
normally unconscious process appear in consciousness. They recorded RPs
in response to both conscious and unconscious movements. Unconscious
movements were those in which subjects were not asked to introspect on
their urge to move and reported no such urge prior to movement. Keller and
28
Heckhausen (1990) found that unconscious movements produced RPs with
a similar latency to conscious movements. While RP amplitude was greater
for movements where subjects were asked to look out for the urge to move,
the authors suggest that this increased activity reflects utilisation of the
supplementary motor area following conscious detection of an unconsciously
initiated movement. They suggest that movements were initially
unconsciously initiated in response to muscular tension and then only
entered consciousness when participants were looking out for the urge to
move. In this sense they argue that these movements are internally
triggered making them rather similar to externally triggered actions observed
in reaction time experiments.
In addition to these criticisms of the purported presence of an intention or a
decision prior to a freely initiated act, it is fair to say that the experimental
paradigm designed by Libet et al. (1983), Haggard and Eimer (1999) and
Trevena and Miller (2002) actually consists of very little free choice. The
specific action is fixed and the hand of action is fixed, the only thing left open
to choice is when to act. Perhaps the most parsimonious strategy would be
to forget talk of 'willed action' and 'intention' and simply to focus on how an
individual acts in a given situation, in response to either internal or external
cues, and whether it is necessary that these cues are conscious, or if they
may be influenced without consciousness. However, it is still important to
note that the actions performed in the current series of experiments are very
different to those explored by Libet et al. (1983), and the conclusions and
generalisations of these results should be limited to only these types of
scenarios.
Limitations to the current research program
In addition to the limits of the generalisability of the results to externally
triggered actions discussed above, it is also important to note that the
research in this thesis does not provide evidence on a number of other
suggestions that have been made in relation to the role of consciousness in
behaviour. For example, Gomes (1998) suggests that although the veto may
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also have preconscious neural processing of its own, it is in a sense
controlled by consciousness since even any preconscious processing of the
veto can only be initiated after conscious awareness of the decision. Under
such an interpretation a 'veto' of an action could not occur unless the initial
intention had become conscious.
Similarly, a number of authors (Mele, 2006; Gallagher, 2006; Pacherie, 2006;
Searle, 1997) have made a distinction between future directed intentions
(distal intentions in Mele's or prior intentions in Searle's terminology) and
proximal intentions (or intentions in action). Future directed might be
something like "I intend to go to the beach this afternoon", while a proximal
intention is involved with the actual movements I produce when the time
comes for me to go to the beach. In a similar framework to this, Zhu (2003)
claims that all of Libet's participants had formed a prior conscious intention to
perform the specific actions at the beginning of the experiment. Libet (1985)
is sensitive to this point, but suggests that "without an overt motor
performance any volitional deliberation ....does not constitute voluntary
action" (page 530). Gallagher (2006) argues, however, that such an
argument misses the point of the larger framework in which the action takes
place. Whilst he agrees that the movement and the control of the movement
is intimately connected with action, actions themselves are specified in
relation to the goals of those actions and not in the precise movements one
has to make in order to achieve those goals. The current research will not
address this debate directly, but rather, in a similar sense to Libet's research
will focus on the process of performing (or vetoing) an action, and the role of
consciousness in that process.
Summary
Research by Benjamin Libet and Colleagues has found that an internally
triggered action is initiated in the brain 350 ms before we become conscious
of the urge to perform this action. Despite a number of criticisms of the
methodology employed in these experiments, the conclusion that a motor
action is initiated unconsciously appears to be supported by the vast majority
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of evidence. However, Libet attempts to salvage a causal role for
consciousness by suggesting that we might still be able to consciously veto
the unconsciously initiated action. Whilst there are a number of theoretical
problems with this position, there is no evidence to bear on the issue of
whether a veto is always conscious. The research presented here will
attempt to provide evidence on the question of whether consciousness is
required to inhibit an impending action. This will be assessed using
responses to external stimuli, whilst manipulating conscious awareness of
these stimuli. Whilst this approach is rather different to that employed by
Libet and others, it will provide useful insight into the possible functional role
of consciousness in control of behaviour.
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Event-Related Brain Potentials
Outline
This chapter will provide a more detailed introduction to
Electroencephalography (EEG) and Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) with
particular focus on ERP correlates of motor preparation and inhibition. This
will include a short introduction to the source of the EEG signal and
derivation of ERPs and a literature review of studies exploring ERP
correlates of motor behaviour, as well as other ERP components of interest
for the current thesis.
Electroencephalography and Event-Related Potentials
Hans Berger (1929) was the first to report that electrodes placed on the scalp
were able to pick up electrical activity from the human brain (cf. Luck, 2005).
Although this discovery was initially rejected as an artefact from muscle
movements, it soon became increasingly clear that EEG could provide a
"window on the mind" (Nunez & Srinivasan, 2006, page v). EEG signals
recorded at the scalp are a direct measure of activity of a large number of
cortical neurons unlike hemodynamic measures such as fMRI which
indirectly measure brain activity through measuring levels of oxygenated
blood in the brain (Otten & Rugg, 2004). In order for electrical activity of
neurons to be detected at the scalp a large population of neurons must be
synchronously activated (Ward, 2006). In addition this population of neurons
must be aligned so that they summate rather than simply cancelling each
other out (Ward, 2006). However, due to volume conductance of the signal
from many different cortical sources to the scalp the resulting EEG signal is a
conglomeration of many different neuronal sources of activity. The signal
recorded from a single scalp electrodes contains synaptic activation from
between 100 million and 1 billion neurons (Nunez & Srinivasan, 2006).
Despite this it is possible to extract activity associated with cognitive, sensory
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and motor events from this signal by means of simple averaging of the signal
(Luck, 2005).
Event-related Potentials (ERPs) are fluctuations in EEG voltage associated
with some physical or mental event (Picton, Bentin, Berg, Donchin, Hillyard,
Johnson, Miller, Ritter, Ruchkin, Rugg and Taylor, 2000). ERPs are
generated by averaging a large number of trials under a particular condition
with reference to the onset of a stimulus or a response. The logic for this
method is that whilst some of the activity in the EEG is associated with the
current task (for example reading, memorising, preparing a movement), a
large amount of the signal will reflect spontaneous activity of neurons that do
not relate to the task (Ward, 2006). By averaging together many trials where
the participant is performing a specific task it is possible to isolate the activity
that is related only to that task, under the assumptions that spontaneous
EEG changes will vary from one trial to the next and therefore cancel out.
ERP waveforms are always presented relative to a baseline period.
Normally an ERP is averaged relative to the onset of a particular stimulus
(stimulus-locked ERPs). In this case the period immediately prior to the
stimulus onset is usually used as a baseline. This baseline correction is
applied to remove any artifactual differences (such as slow shift in the EEG)
between conditions so that at the period that the stimulus appears, the ERP
amplitude is the same for all conditions. ERP waveforms will therefore
normally be at around zero amplitude in the baseline period and will then
show a response to the stimulus. It is important to note that baseline
correction procedures may actually introduce artefacts to the data if pre
stimulus differences reflect differences due to the experimental manipulation.
A simple way of overcoming such a problem is to have different conditions
appear in a random order such that the participant will not know the condition
until the stimulus has appeared. However, this is not possible when
exploring ERP responses based in subsequent self grouping of trials, for
example when asking participants to rate their ability to perceive a particular
stimulus. In such a situation pre-stimulus factors, such as attention and
arousal may predict subsequent perception of the stimulus (Hanslmayr et
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aI., 2007) and therefore the pre-stimulus baseline EEG will likely be
influenced by such processes.
In addition, EEG is always recorded relative to a particular reference point to
give a relative value of the electrical signal. EEG is typically recorded
relative to the mastoids (the bone behind the ear), the earlobes or the tip of
the nose. If a large number of electrodes are used (typically at least 64)
EEG may also be referenced to an average of all the scalp electrodes. It is
possible to re-reference EEG data to a different location off line once the
recording is complete. If comparing results from one experiment to another it
is normally advised to use the same reference where possible (Picton et aI.,
2000) since the choice of reference will dramatically influence the topography
of the ERP effect.
In the 1970s and 80s a great number of ERP papers were published which
outlined 'components' associated with different cognitive functions (Luck,
2005). While there is no universally agreed definition of a component, they
are often defined both with reference to their functional significance and their
proposed underlying neural sources (Otten & Rugg, 2004). Components are
normally described in terms of their specific scalp distribution and in terms of
their relationship to experimental variables. However the ERP waveform
represents the sum of a number of underlying components indexing different
cognitive processes involved in completing a particular task, therefore a
particular peak or trough in the raw ERP waveform is not a pure measure of
a particular component (Luck, 2005). For this reason ERP components are
often defined as differences between particular experimental conditions
rather than in terms of particular parts of the raw ERP waveform (Luck, 2005;
Otten and Rugg, 2004). The no-go N2, for example, discussed in more
detail below, is defined as a negative deflection for no-go trials in comparison
to go trials occurring around 200ms after stimulus onset. By carefully
designing an ERP experiment such that only the process that you are
interested in exploring differs between conditions it is possible to isolate
components associated with particular cognitive processes despite the fact
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that the raw ERP contains a combination of peaks and troughs which do not
normally relate to a particular cognitive event.
Perhaps the earliest component to be defined was the contingent negative
variation (CNV), a negative shift observed prior to a stimulus to which a
subject must respond which was absent when passively viewing the stimuli
(Walter et aI., 1964; cf. Luck, 2005). The presence of this component only
when a response was required led to the suggestion that the CNV was
associated with preparation or anticipation for the need to make a response.
A number of other components have since been identified associated with
many cognitive and motor functions, some of which will be discussed in more
detail in the following sections of this chapter.
A major strength of EEG and ERPs is that they provide information on
cognitive processing with a temporal resolution of milliseconds (Nunez &
Srinivasan, 2006; Luck, 2005; Otten & Rugg, 2004). This allows for the
measurement of continuous changes over time as opposed to just a single
reaction time measure (Ward, 2006), as well as for determining the locus of
an effect. For example, by determining which ERP component is affected by
a particular manipulation you can determine how it is influencing the
participants' performance of the task. Similarly, by manipulating the
response hand dependent on a particular stimulus dimension you can
determine the order in which different aspects of a stimulus is processed by
monitoring how it affects the latency of ERP components associated with
preparation for a motor response. This will be discussed in more detail later
with particular reference to the lateralised readiness potential.
However, perhaps the greatest limitation of EEG is the poor spatial resolution
which it affords. Due to the spatial averaging of signals from volume
conductance of activity from many different areas of the brain, it is not easy
to localise the source of an ERP component (Otten & Rugg, 2004). While
methods exist for estimating the sources of particular ERP signals these
remain simply estimates. Although a specific source configuration produces
a particular scalp topography, the converse is not the case. There are almost
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an infinite number of possible combinations of generators that could lead to a
particular effect observed at the scalp (Slotnick, 2004). It is possible to
constrain the solution in ways that depend on prior empirical knowledge, for
example knowledge gained from more spatially accurate techniques such as
fMRI and single unit recordings can guide predictions of possible sources of
ERP signals (cf. Slotnick, 2004). However it remains the case that the
strength of ERPs is the temporal resolution they afford and not their spatial
resolution.
An ERP waveform at a single electrode is normally represented graphically,
with the x axis usually signifying time in milliseconds (ms) and the y axis
reflecting amplitude in microvolts (!-.N). A vertical line intersecting the x axis
is normally presented to show the time of stimulus onset. Waveforms can be
plotted with either positive or negative potentials pointing upwards, and there
is no general consensus as to which is preferable (Picton et aI., 2000). In
addition to the single waveforms, a topographic distribution is often
presented to show how the activity presented in the waveforms is distributed
across the scalp. This is important as it enables one to demonstrate that a
component has a similar distribution to that which has previously been
described in the literature (Picton et aI., 2000). Electrodes are normally fixed
and specified in terms of the international 10-20 electrode system where
central electrodes are prefixed with the letter C, parietal with P, frontal with F
etc. and all left hemisphere electrodes are designated odd numbers (with 1
closest to the centre) and right hemisphere electrodes designated even
numbers (ct. Picton et aI., 2000). For example an electrode placed over a
left central site would be named C1 or C3, depending on its distance to the
centre. As well as single electrode waveforms, it is also common for
difference waveforms to be presented, which can either represent a
difference between conditions, or a difference between electrodes (see LRP
and N2 below). Difference waveforms can be a good way of isolating
components associated with particular cognitive processes (Luck, 2005) by
showing which ERP measures are sensitive to particular changes in the
experimental design.
36
ERP components
The following section will provide a literature review of the ERP components
of interest for this thesis. After a brief overview of the early visual
components and the P300 component, the main focus of this section will be
the ERP correlates of motor preparation and inhibition which will be used to
asses the ability of unconscious information to initiate inhibition of a motor
response.
Visual and attention related ERP components
The early ERP components measured over posterior electrodes are normally
considered to reflect the primary visual response to the presentation a
stimulus (L. Wang, Kuroiwa, Li, Wang, & Kamitani, 2001). This visual
evoked response normally includes an early negative deflection (termed C1),
followed by a positive deflection (P1) and a further negative deflection (N1).
The C1 component occurs around 50 to 80ms after stimulus onset and
appears to be sensitive to whether a stimulus is presented in the upper or
lower visual field (Clark, Fan, & Hillyard, 1995). Di Russo, Martinez, Sereno,
Pitzalis and Hillyard (2002) showed using both EEG and fMRI that this
component is generated in primary visual cortex. The P1 component
partially overlaps the C1 component, occurring around 70 to 120ms after
stimulus presentation (Clark et aI., 1995), and is followed by the N1
component (120 to 190ms). These later visual ERP components are thought
to be generated in extrastriate cortical areas (Di Russo et aI., 2002). The
amplitude of P1 and N1 components at lateralised visual electrodes is
modulated by the side of stimulus presentation, such that a greater P1 and
N1 will be observed over electrodes contralateral to the side of stimulus
presentation (Clark & Hillyard, 1996). Moreover, unlike the C1, the P1 and
N1 are sensitive to attention amplification (Clark & Hillyard, 1996; Hillyard,
Teder-Salejarvi, & Munte, 1998). More specifically, when a cue directs
attention to a lateral visual target, the N1 and P1 response is increased over
the contralateral hemisphere, in comparison to when a cue directs attention
to the opposite visual field (Clark & Hillyard, 1996). Thus the N1 and P1
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reflect visual responses to stimuli that can be modulated by the degree to
which they are attended (Eimer, van Velzen, & Driver, 2002).
In addition to these increases in visual ERPs when a stimulus is attended, a
number of later components have also been recently identified which are
thought to reflect control of spatial attention. These components were first
described by Harter, Miller, Price, Lalonde and Keyes (1989). They
recorded ERPs in response to a cue which reliably (on 75% of trials)
predicted the subsequent location of the stimulus. They found an early
lateralised effect over occipital electrodes from 200 to 400ms after stimulus
onset, with increased negativity contralateral to the side to which attention
was cued. This effect was termed the early directing attention negativity
(EDAN). A second effect was observed over posterior electrodes from
around 500 to 700 ms after stimulus onset, with increased amplitude
contralateral to the attended direction (the late directing attention positivity;
lDAP). A number of later studies have also shown an increased frontal
negativity contralateral to the direction of the attentional shift (anterior
directing attention negativity; ADAN; Nobre, Sebestyen, & Miniussi, 2000).
These components are thought to reflect successive steps in the control of
covert spatial orienting.
Another lateralised posterior component, the N2pc has also been strongly
linked with spatially selective visual processing. This component is
characterised by an increased negativity over occipito-parietal electrodes
contralateral to a target stimulus. Unlike the EDAN and lDAP, the N2pc
responds selectively to target-related visual information (Eimer, 1996). In the
visual search task, this component is exhibited contralateral to the side of the
target in an array of distractors (Woodman & luck, 2003). In a recent
attempt to determine the exact nature of this component, Kiss, van Velzen
and Eimer (2007) recorded ERPs in response to targets and non-targets
following a cue which informed participants as to the location of the
upcoming target. As expected they found ADAN and lDAP components in
response to the cue stimulus, suggesting that the cue was successful in
directing attention toward the cued location. Crucially, they found that the
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N2pc was present even in situations where participants' attentional focus
was cued to the location of the target. Therefore, they suggest that rather
than reflecting shifts in spatial attention, the N2pc reflects spatially specific
processing of task relevant features of the stimulus.
The P300 component
The P300 (also known as P3 or P3b) component is a large positive ERP
component measured maximally over posterior electrodes. Coles et al.
(1995), suggest that it is the most commonly reported of all ERP
components, perhaps because it is large and is often evident even on single
trials. Despite this popularity there remains a great deal of debate as to the
exact functional significance of this component (Verleger, Jaskowski, &
Wascher, 2005). The most common way to elicit a P300 component is in the
oddball paradigm (Coles et aI., 1995). In this task, participants are asked to
look out for infrequent target stimuli presented in a sequence of non-targets.
The P300 component is typically larger for the infrequent target stimuli than
the frequent non-target stimuli. This has led to the interpretation that the
P300 reflects the updating of a stimulus representation. Under this
interpretation, each stimulus is compared to the previous stimulus and only
when the stimulus is different and requires some mental or physical
response is there a need to update the memory representation of the
stimulus context. The context updating theory of P300 suggests that this
component reflects this updating process (Polich & Criado, 2006).
In addition, the latency of the P300 is often used as a marker of stimulus
evaluation time in part due to its purported role in context updating, since in
order for context updating to occur the stimulus must have been fully
evaluated (Coles et al. 1995). A number of studies have attempted to show
that P3 latency is a marker of stimulus evaluation that is independent of
response processing (see Verleger, 1997 for a review). Central to this claim
is the suggestion that while P300 latency is sensitive to manipulations of
availability of stimulus information, it is insensitive to manipulations of
stimulus-response compatibility (Coles et aI., 1995). However, in a thorough
review of the literature Verleger (1997) finds that while with extreme cases of
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stimulus evaluation and response selection processes this claim holds - i.e.
P300 amplitude is only modulated by manipulations of stimulus evaluation -
for intermediate stages P300 latency does not appear to be a reliable
measure of stimulus evaluation time. In addition, Verleger et al. (2005)
showed that P300 amplitude was as large in response locked ERPs as in
stimulus-locked ERPs, suggesting that it is equally time locked to both
stimulus and response processes. They suggest that rather than being a
pure measure of stimulus evaluation, P300 reflects the transition from
stimulus processing to response processing, perhaps monitoring whether the
decision to classify a stimulus is successfully translated into an action.
ERP correlates ofMotor Preparation
Kornhuber and Deecke (1965) were the first to show a movement related
EEG potential occurring prior to voluntary movements. They found a central
negativity beginning several hundred milliseconds before a voluntarily
initiated movement, which they called the Bereitshaftspotential or Readiness
Potential (RP). However, it is not entirely clear whether this RP reflects the
execution of a specific act, or a more general readiness or preparatory state
(Kutas & Donchin, 1980). Deecke, Scheid, and Kornhuber (1969) outlined a
number of different sub-components of RP; they reported that when
performing voluntary finger movements the onset of the RP was around
850ms prior to movement onset. They also reported two separate pre-
movement components, a pre-movement positivity around 90ms before
movement onset, and a surface negative motor potential around 55ms prior
to movement. In addition to these extra components, Shibasaki and Hallet
(2006) point out that the RP clearly divides into late and early components,
with a sharp increase in the negativity occurring around 400ms prior to
movement.
Kutas and Donchin (1980) also point out that the RP can overlap with the
CNV, which has been found to be associated with general readiness or
anticipation and not a specific motor program. However, they also show that
the late section of the RP, which is lateralised to the contralateral
hemisphere to the response hand, appears to be motor specific. They asked
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participants to squeeze a dynamometer either at their own pace or in
response to a stimulus, which was sometimes preceded by a warning signal
and at other times occurred unpredictably. The response hand was varied
from one block to the next so that following the warning cue participants
could begin to prepare a hand-specific response. They found that the
asymmetry in the RP began significantly earlier in the conditions where the
response hand could be prepared further in advance of the movement (the
self-paced and warned conditions) in comparison to the unwarned condition.
This strongly suggested that the later part of the RP, which shows increased
contralateral amplitude, reflects preparation to respond with one hand or
another.
Coles (1989) was the first to formalise the calculation of this lateralised motor
related activity and named it the lateralised readiness potential (LRP). Coles
derived a method to isolate the activity in the EEG solely related to the
lateralised motor preparation. Rather than simply exploring raw EEG activity
over the contralateral hemisphere (following Kutas and Donchin, 1980),
Coles suggests averaging the increased activity recorded over the right
motor cortex during a left hand response with the increase in activity in the
left hemisphere during a right hand response. The formula for this
calculation is shown below, where C'4and C'3 are 1 cm anterior to electrodes
C3 and C4. The critical aspect of this calculation is that any non motor
related asymmetries will sum to zero, since the measure shows the average
difference between the two hemispheres for responses with both the left and
right hand (Coles, 1989).
LRP = [Mean(C'4-C'3) left-hand movement + Mean(C'3-C'4) right-hand movementl/2
Since the RP is a negative going waveform and a greater negativity is
observed contralateral to the response hand, the resulting LRP will be
negative going for activation of the correct hand and positive going for
activation of the incorrect hand. Gratton, Bosco, Kramer, Wickens, Coles
and Donchin (1990) validated this measure by showing that activation of the
correct and incorrect hand was dependent on the validity of a pre-cue which
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informed the subject which hand would be required for the target stimulus.
When a valid cue was presented, the LRP began to exhibit a readiness to act
with the correct hand, while when the cue was invalid the LRP showed an
opposite deflection, suggesting activation of the hand cued by the invalid pre-
cue. No LRP activation was observed in response to a neutral pre-cue. In
another experiment, Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen and Donchin (1988)
showed that the LRP was directly related to the readiness to act by
separating trials with fast response latencies from those with longer response
latencies. They found that the LRP onset was earlier for the fast responses
than the slower responses. In addition they found that a response appeared
to be executed when the LRP amplitude reached a particular amplitude.
This suggests that when the LRP reaches a response threshold, an overt
response will be executed. A number of experiments with intracranial
recordings in animals (see Coles, 1989; Coles, Smid, Scheffers and Otten,
1995) and magnetoencephalography (MEG; see Coles et aI., 1995) have
shown that the LRP is generated in the motor cortex.
ERP Correlates ofMotor Inhibition
ERP correlates of inhibition are usually explored using variations of a go/no-
go task. The simplest form of the go/no-go task involves participants
responding to one stimulus, whilst withholding a response to another
stimulus (Pfefferbaum, Ford, Weller, & Kopell, 1985). Sometimes the go/no-
go stimulus is preceded by a warning signal, which in some variations of the
task also contains certain information about the impending response (Eimer,
1993). A further variation on this task is the stop signal paradigm (Logan,
1994). This procedure involves inserting a stop signal on a small percentage
of trials, a short time after the primary task signal (in a speeded choice
reaction time task). This allows calculation of the so called stop-signal
reaction time, i.e. the amount of time before the response the stop signal
must appear to win the race and prevent the response.
Falkenstein, Hoornmann and Hohnsbein (1999) suggest that the no-go N2
and no-go P3 are the most widely reported correlates of no-go trials in the
go/no-go task. They report that the no-go N2 is measured maximally at
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frontal electrodes and that it may reflect a frontal lobe inhibition/control
mechanism (Jodo & Kayama, 1992). A number of animal studies have
suggested that the origin of the no-go N2 may be the caudal-dorsal principal
sulcus. Sasaki, Gemba and Tsujimoto (1989) found that direct stimulation of
this area 150 ms after a go stimulus caused inhibition of the response.
Falkenstein et al. (1999) cite a number of studies in which the no-go N2 has
been identified using visual go/no-go tasks, but suggest that it appears
somewhat less reliably for auditory go/no-go tasks. The absence of the no-
go N2 for auditory no-go trials is evidence against its role in inhibition.
Falkenstein et al. (1999) conducted a series of go/no-go trials using both
auditory and visual stimuli. They instructed participants to attend to one of
the two sensory domains for different experimental blocks, so that the
focused attention to the auditory domain in some blocks should increase the
likelihood of obtaining a reliable no-go N2. In order to assess the
interpretation of the no-go N2 and P3 components as inhibitory processes
they divided participants into those with high false alarm rate and low false
alarm rate. If either of these components reflect inhibition they should be
greater in the subjects with the low false alarm rate, since they would be
more likely to successfully inhibit an inappropriate response.
As predicted, in both auditory and visual domains participants with fewer
false alarms exhibited a greater difference between go and no-go N2
components than participants with a greater number of false alarms.
However, these differences were considerably smaller in the auditory than
the visual sensory domain. The no-go P3 appeared to be insensitive to the
same performance differences. They also found that focusing attention on
auditory signals and ignoring the visual information increased no-go N2
amplitude, providing support for their assumption that visual attention bias
may account for the lack of reported auditory no-go N2s in previous
experiments. Falkenstein et al. (1999) suggest that the difference in
amplitude between the auditory no-go N2 and the visual no-go N2 may imply
that although the N2 appears to reflect inhibition in both modalities it may
stem from generators specific to each modality. Support for this conclusion
is offered by the finding that in monkeys, while the visual N2 appears to stem
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from the cordal principal sulcus, the auditory N2 originates in the dorsal bank
of the principal sulcus (Gamba & Sasaki, 1990, in Falkenstein et aI., 1999).
The authors thus suggest that the no-go N2 reflects modality specific
inhibition and therefore is likely to occur prior to specific motor programming.
However, the functional significance of the no-go N2 and P3 has been the
subject of intense debate in recent years. Niewenhuis, Yeung, Wildenberg
and Ridderinkhof (2003) showed that a no-go N2 was observed on go trials
when they were less frequent than no-go trials. The presence of the no-go
N2 on go trials rather than no-go trials is clearly a problem for the hypothesis
that the N2 reflects inhibition, since inhibition would not be present on a go
trial. They suggest that the N2 on these trials reflects triggering of conflict
monitoring when one is required to overcome a predominant response. They
source localised this component to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), an
area that is known to be activated during monitoring for conflicts during
response selection (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Similarly, Donkers
and Van Boxtel (2004) showed that a similar N2 was observed in a go/GO
task to that observed in a go/no-go task. In the go/GO task subjects were
required to make a normal response on go trials and a larger amplitude
response on GO trials. When a go stimulus was presented on 80% of trials
an N2 was observed for GO trials. The authors argue that such a finding is
very difficult to explain in terms of inhibition since inhibition should not be
present when participants were required to make a stronger response than
usual. In contrast, this result would be predicted by the conflict monitoring
hypothesis, since subjects were required to overcome the predominant
response force for that block of trials.
However, both Donkers and Van Boxtel (2004) and Botnovik et al. (2004)
found a slight difference in the latency of the N2 for situations involving
conflict monitoring, such that the N2 associated with conflict situations
appears to occur around 50ms earlier than the N2 associated with motor
inhibition. Falkenstein (2006) also suggests that while it is clear that the N2
does reflect conflict monitoring in the ACC, there is also much evidence to
suggest that at least part of the component is generated in prefrontal cortex
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and is associated with inhibition. Support for this claim comes from Lavric,
Pizzagalli and Forstmeier (2004) who found that when go and no-go are
equally probable the N2 is localised to ventral and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, concluding that the N2 does indeed partly reflect inhibition. Further
support for the inhibition hypothesis comes from the finding that inhibitory
strength is also correlated with the no-go N2, such that when one is required
to inhibit a high amplitude response the N2 is greater than when one is
required to inhibit a smaller response (Nakata, Inui, Wasaka, Tamura,
Akatsuka, Kida & Kakigi, 2006). Falkenstein (2006) suggests that whilst the
debate about the N2 is not yet finished, it seems likely that the N2 reflects
overlapping activity from the ACC (conflict monitoring) as well as another
frontal source associated with inhibition.
In addition to the N2, the P3 has also been presented as a candidate for a
correlate of response inhibition (Falkenstein et aI., 1999). Like the N2, the
no-go P3 is normally observed maximally over frontocentral electrodes.
Donkers and Van Boxtel (2004) showed that, unlike the N2, the no-go P3
was only present for no-go versus go trials, and not GO versus go trials,
suggesting that the no-go P3 rather than the N2 reflects inhibition of the
response. Similarly, Smith, Johnstone and Barry (2007) showed that the
amplitude of the no-go N2 was smaller following a no-go cue than a go cue
despite the fact that the go cue was successful in increasing participants'
readiness to respond to the upcoming target. This finding provides evidence
against both the inhibition and conflict monitoring hypothesis of the N2, since
both would predict a greater N2 in a situation where a response was
expected but then withheld. Smith et al. (2007) did however show that the
P3 component was of greater amplitude for no-go trials following go cues
than those following no-go cues. Thus, the authors suggest that the no-go
P3 reflects inhibition and/or conflict monitoring.
However, Falkenstein et al. (1999) point out that although the reliable
presence of the no-go P3 is not in doubt, even its onset is too late to reflect
inhibition mechanisms as it often occurs later than the response itself in go
trials. They suggest that rather than reflecting the process of inhibition itself,
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the no-go P3 may reflect the reset or closure of a preceding inhibition
process. Similarly, Dimoska, Johnstone and Barry (2006) suggest that the
P3 on successfully stopped trials (in the stop-signal paradigm) reflects the
outcome of inhibition of the response in the primary motor cortex. However,
Falkenstein et al. (1999) point out that interpretation of the P3 is confounded
by its overlap with motor-related activity, and it might therefore simply reflect
the fact that in one condition a motor response is programmed while in the
other it is not (see also Verleger, Paehge, Kolev, Yordanova, & Jaskowski,
2006). The latter problem is often overcome by exploring the P3 only on
trials where no response is made, dependent on the information in a cue
prior to the target stimulus (Eimer, 1993; Smith et aI., 2007). By comparing
the P3 in situations where a response is present in both conditions, the
resulting difference can not simply be due to motor-related activity.
Fallgatter and Strik (1999) developed an ERP index of motor inhibition which
utilises this increased frontal P3 for no-go trials. They calculated the no-go
anteriorisation as a measure of the degree to which the P3 component
becomes more anteriorly distributed for no-go trials. Participants completed
a number of blocks of the continuous performance task, which involves
presenting a continuous string of stimuli and asking participants to make a
response following a certain stimulus sequence. Fallgatter and Strik (1999)
asked participants to respond when the letter 0 was directly followed by an
X. In this way, the 0 acts as a warning stimulus which is then followed by
either a go stimulus (an X) or a no-go stimulus (anyone of 10 letters). They
found that the normally parietal P3 (discussed earlier) becomes more
frontally distributed on no-go trials, where it shows more positive amplitude
than go trials. They termed this change in topography of P3 for no-go trials
the no-go anteriorisation.
In summary, both the no-go N2 and P3 components, which are maximal over
frontocentral electrode locations have been strongly linked to frontal
inhibition/control mechanisms. While the exact functional significance of
these components still requires some clarification, it is clear that the N2/P3
complex reflects activity in the pre-frontal cortex related to conflict monitoring
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or cognitive control/inhibition mechanisms. Evidence from fMRI has points to
a role for dorsolateral and ventrolateral pre-forntal cortex, ACC and pre-SMA
in inhibitory control (Garavan, Hester, Murphy, Fassbender, & Kelly, 2006).
In addition, a number of studies have reported a right lateralization of pre-
frontal activity in the go/no-go task (cf. Garavan et aI., 2006). However, EEG
source analysis has also revealed a left frontal source for activity related to
no-go trials (Verleger et aI., 2006), while all the studies cited above show the
no-go N2 and P3 to be maximal at midline electrodes.
Motor Cortex Inhibition
De Jong, Coles and Gordon (1995) investigated motor inhibition in three
different situations to test the hypothesis that there are two different systems
responsible for inhibition of movement. In a previous experiment (De Jong,
Coles, Logan & Gratton, 1990) they had explored ERP's using the stop-
signal paradigm in a speeded reaction task and found that on a large
proportion of trials where the response was successfully inhibited, activity in
cortical motor structures exceeded the threshold normally associated with
movement onset. They suggested that such a finding is consistent with the
idea that a peripheral non-motor system is able to successfully inhibit a
movement even if it has been fully programmed by motor structures. A
distinction between central and peripheral motor inhibition structures has
also been proposed by Bullock & Grossberg (1988) and has some empirical
support (Jennings, van der Molen, Brock, & Somsen, 1992).
De Jong et al. (1995) explored situations in which complete inhibition of a
pre-prepared response was required, with situations in which participants
were asked to selectively inhibit a particular response, whilst continuing with
another response. They suggest that only a central (motor cortex) motor
inhibition process would allow such selective inhibition, since the peripheral
inhibitory system (prefrontal cortex) is assumed to work in a largely non-
specific manner (Bullock and Grossberg, 1988). De Jong et al. (1995)
hypothesised that the peripheral inhibition system is faster and all other
things being equal successful inhibition is most likely to occur via this
system. A second prediction was that in situations where central motor
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inhibition processes successfully inhibited a response, the LRP would fail to
reach a level associated with action, while for a peripheral control
mechanism successful inhibition may still occur downstream from the motor
activation commands.
De Jong et al. (1995) used the stop-signal procedure to explore these
predictions. This procedure involves inserting a stop signal a short time after
the primary task signal (a speeded choice reaction time stimulus). The
shorter the stop-signal delay, the more likely successful inhibition will be
achieved. De Jong et al. (1995) employed this paradigm in four different
experimental conditions: stop-all; stop-change; selective-left hand; and
selective-right hand. Participants were required to make speeded responses
with the left and right hand to the letters M, N, V and W, with each response
hand specified by two of the target letters. In the stop all condition
participants were instructed to abort any response on trials with a stop-signal
(an auditory stimulus). In the stop change condition participants were
required to abort the hand movements and make an alternative movement
with their foot. In the selective-left hand and selective-right hand the stop
signal required participants to abort the responses only with the specific
hand. These four conditions were administered in separate blocks, with a
stop-signal presented on 50% of trials. The delay between the warning signal
and the stop signal, known as the stop signal delay, was initially set to 250
ms, but was then adjusted individually for each participant to result in
inhibition success rate of around 50% in each condition.
De Jong et al. (1995) found that in all three conditions (stop-all, stop-change,
and selective-stop) the LRP appeared significantly diminished on the trials
where stop signals were present. This suggests that central inhibition
mechanisms were operating in all three conditions. Further analysis showed
that there were no significant differences in LRP for go trials in the different
experimental conditions, providing support for the notion that a response is
activated when the LRP reaches a certain threshold. This LRP amplitude at
movement onset (LRP threshold) for go trials was then compared to the
LRP's associated with successfully inhibited trials in each condition. For the
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stop-all and selective-stop conditions the maximum LRP exceeded this
threshold value, whilst in the stop-change condition the LRP failed to reach
the amplitude required to initiate movement. This suggests that whilst a
central motor inhibition was responsible for successful inhibition in stop-
change blocks, peripheral inhibition was more likely associated with inhibition
in the other two conditions. A possible electrophysiological correlate of such
a peripheral inhibitory mechanism is the N2 negativity reviewed above. De
Jong et al. (1995) suggest that this mechanism operates downstream from
the motor cortex and can inhibit motor responses that are above the
threshold of motor activation in the motor cortex, such as was observed in
the stop-all and selective-stop conditions.
This description of a frontal peripheral control system operating downstream
from the motor cortex is contrary to the interpretation provided by Falkenstein
et al. (1999), who suggest that N2 related inhibition measured over frontal
electrodes operates upstream from motor systems. Band and Van Boxtel
(1999) also discuss the difference between central and peripheral
mechanisms and come to similar conclusions to Falkenstein et al. (1999).
They suggest that De Jong et al.'s (1995) conclusion rest too much on the
assumption that movement onset is subject to a threshold in the LRP, and
that a peripheral system of motor control operating upstream (prior) to motor
programming (in the motor cortex) equally well describes their data.
Whichever interpretation is correct it seems evident that there is an important
interplay between motor cortex activation and frontal cortex inhibition (such
as indexed by the N2), and that future research should focus on recording
and interpreting both components in parallel.
Summary
The current chapter outlined the background to the use of EEG in
psychology and cognition and presented evidence regarding ERP
components associated with preparation and inhibition of a motor response.
Preparation for a response has been strongly associated with the readiness
potential (RP) measured over the motor cortex. Whilst this component is
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thought to reflect a general readiness to respond, a more specific component
has also been identified which measures specific activity related to the
readiness to respond with one hand. This lateralised readiness potential
(LRP) has been identified using choice reaction time tasks in which one hand
is cued in advance of the target stimulus. Components associated with
inhibition of a motor response have been identified using various forms of the
go/no-go task. Two components seem reliably associated with response
inhibition in these tasks, the N2 and P3. While there is still some debate as
to whether these components reflect inhibition per se, or conflict monitoring
processes, it seems likely that at least part of the no-go N2 P3 complex
reflects activity associated with inhibiting a motor response.
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Chapter 3
Introduction to Subliminal Priming
Outline
This chapter will provide a more detailed introduction to subliminal priming
and its use as a method for studying unconscious processing. This initial
part of the chapter will focus on the methodology and the theoretical
considerations concerning unconscious perception. The latter part will
provide a literature review of research exploring unconscious processing in
motor preparation and inhibition. This will lead directly on to the hypotheses
for the research in the current thesis.
The origins of subliminal priming
The word subliminal means below the threshold (of consciousness) and
comes from the word sub meaning below and limen meaning threshold.
Subliminal perception first burst onto the scene in 1957 when James Vicary
called a press conference to announce that he had successfully influenced
cinema goers in New Jersey to buy popcorn and cola by briefly flashing
"Drink Coca-Cola" and "Hungry? Eat popcorn" during the film (d. Brannon
and Brock, 1994 and Karremans, Stroebe and Claus, 2006). Despite the fact
that the audience were unaware of these messages, Vicary claimed a
substantial increase (of up to 60%) in sales of popcorn and cola when the
messages were presented. Although Vicary later admitted to having falsified
the results in order to promote his advertising business the myth of
subliminal advertising is still present in public perception and many countries
have banned its use (Karremans et aI., 2006).
Although some recent evidence from Karremans et al. (2006) suggests that
subliminal stimuli may influence choice of a drink when participants are
thirsty, the majority of evidence suggests that, in the form often used in self-
help audio tapes and in advertising, subliminal messages are largely
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ineffective (Brannon and Brock, 1994). In addition to their use in subliminal
messaging and advertising, subliminal stimuli have been utilised in the
scientific study of unconscious perception. However, this area of research
also been the subject of much controversy (d. Erdelyi, 2004; Reingold &
Merikle, 1988).
The earliest reports of perception below the threshold of awareness
compared the ability of subjects to make some kind of (unconscious)
discrimination, with their subjective report of the stimulus. Perhaps the
earliest of all of these was an experiment described by Peirce and Jastrow
(1885) where they showed that subjects were able to make fairly accurate
judgements of relative brightness of stimuli, despite the fact that they
reported no confidence in these judgements. In this experiment the
subjective report is proposed to be the measure of conscious awareness,
while the results from the discrimination task are meant to show that despite
being unaware of the differences between different stimuli the subjects were
able to reliably judge their relative brightness. In an early review, Adams
(1957) suggested that the ability to make some discrimination between
stimuli in the absence of awareness was a highly replicable effect.
However, despite this early optimism a number of important theoretical
issues still required clarification. Most importantly, Eriksen (1960) has
questioned the assumption that a lack of subjective confidence equates to a
lack of consciousness of a stimulus. Similarly, Snodgrass and Shevrin
(2005) have argued that denials of awareness may simply reflect a lack of
confidence rather than indexing a boundary between conscious and
unconscious. An alternative approach to the subjective measure of
conscious awareness has been to assess consciousness with objective
measures. This typically involves asking participants to perform a two
alternative forced-choice task either requiring them to detect the presence or
absence of a stimulus (detection task) or to determine whether a stimulus
belongs to one group of stimuli or another (recognition task or identification
task). Participants' performance on such a task is then compared to chance,
either by comparing their percentage of correct responses with the number
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that would be predicted by chance, or by calculating a measure derived from
signal detection theory (d), which gives a measure of the ability to
discriminate the possible alternatives that is independent of response bias
(ct. Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).
Reingold and Merikle (1988) suggest that any measure of conscious
awareness should be both exhaustive and exclusive for it to be an
appropriate index of consciousness. The exhaustiveness criterion states that
the measure must be sensitive to all the information in consciousness. The
exclusiveness criterion states that the measure must be a pure measure of
conscious information and must therefore not be influenced by unconscious
information. A subjective measure of consciousness likely violates the
exhaustiveness criterion, since it only appears to be sensitive to conscious
information of which the participant is highly confident. In contrast, an
objective measure may violate the exclusiveness criterion since performance
on a forced-choice task may be influenced by unconscious processes. This
has led Reingold and Merikle (1988) to argue, along with others (e.g. Erdelyi,
2004), that since it is impossible to know whether a measure of
consciousness meets both of these criteria it is inappropriate to use a single
index of whether a stimulus reached consciousness. This problem is
highlighted by the fact that while early studies (such as Peirce & Jastrow,
1985) used a discrimination task to index unconscious processes, the very
same task is now often used to measure whether participants are conscious
of a stimulus (Dehaene, Naccache, Le Clec, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene-
Lambertz, Van de Moortele & Le Bihan, 1998; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998).
Reingold and Merikle (1988) suggest combining a subjective measure of
conscious awareness with an objective task that shows a qualitative
difference between conscious and unconscious stimuli, such that whilst a
conscious stimulus will have an effect in one direction an unconscious
stimulus will produce the opposite effect (Merikle & Cheesman, 1985).
While a number of important theoretical and methodological obstacles
remain, the use of objective measures of awareness is now widely regarded
as an appropriate tool for exploring unconscious cognition (Snodgrass &
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Shevrin, 2005). These measures are normally utilised in combination with a
priming task in a procedure known as masked priming. This involves the
brief presentation of a prime followed by a mask, which further reduces
visibility of the prime (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). Immediately after the
mask, the target stimulus is presented. Participants are required to make a
judgement or response to the target stimulus, with the influence of the
subliminal prime assessed by means of how it affects participants' response
to the target. Typically, conscious awareness of a stimulus is assessed by a
two alternative forced-choice task that presents the same sequence as that
used in the masked priming task, but participants are now asked to respond
to the prime rather than the target. This methodology has also been called
subliminal priming and unconscious priming as well as "indirect without direct
effect". The first two names reflect the fact that the unconscious influence is
observed through the presence of an unconscious prime, and is measured
by its effect on a target stimulus. Similarly, the label of direct without indirect
effect reflects the fact that whilst the prime was able to influence participants'
responses when they were responding to the target (indirect effect) it
disappears on the control task where subjects are required to directly
respond to the briefly presented prime. One of the earliest examples of
unconscious perception using this method was reported by Marcel (1983),
who showed that masked words (primes) were able to influence participants
preference for a subsequent word (targets), despite the fact that they
performed at chance level when asked to discriminate the different primes.
However, a further problem with this methodology is that in order to show
that a priming effect is unconscious it is necessary to accept the null
hypothesis. For example, when conducting a control task to assess
participants' awareness of the stimulus, performance at chance level is
deemed to be sufficient to show that subjects were not conscious of the
stimulus. The problem with such a position is that it is not possible to
conclusively know that the null hypothesis (i.e. that subjects did not perform
significantly better than chance) has been supported, since the failure to
reject the null hypothesis may reflect measurement error with the subjects
true performance exceeding chance (ct. Erdelyi, 2004; Greenwald Klinger
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and Schuh, 1995; Reingold and Merikle, 1988; Snodgrass, 2004).
Greenwald et al. (1995) propose a method to overcome this problem. Their
approach is to calculate the regression between the direct and indirect
measure and to determine the point at which the regression line crosses the
y axis. They suggest that this gives a measure of the indirect without direct
pattern, i.e. the amount of priming that would be present when there is zero
delectability of the stimulus. This allows a statistical test of this value, which
will then provide a rejection of the null hypothesis if priming is observed in
the absence of awareness. However, as Snodgrass and Shevrin (2005)
point out, since the direct performance still contains measurement error
which will be reflected in the regression slope, this does not entirely solve the
problem. The significant advantage of this procedure though is that when
prime visibility is above chance, it is possible to assess to what extent the
observed priming effect is due to the visibility of the prime (Kouider &
Dehaene, 2007).
While Snodgrass and Shevrin (2005) accept that the null sensitivity problem
remains difficult to overcome, they propose that if the priming effects
observed on the direct task reflect residual awareness of the prime, then
participants performance on the task should be correlated with performance
in the visibility task. They suggest that showing a negative correlation
between performance on one task, sensitive to unconscious information, and
a visibility task would provide a qualitative difference between conscious and
unconscious processing. The two most common tasks used to assess the
visibility of a stimulus are stimulus detection and stimulus identification.
Since stimulus identification requires first detection, and then categorisation
of a stimulus, the threshold for detection of a stimulus is lower than it is for
identifying it. Therefore, if priming is caused by residual awareness of the
prime, one would expect priming to be greater at the identification threshold
than the detection threshold. Snodgrass (2004) reviews the literature and
find in fact that priming appears greater at the detection threshold than at the
identification threshold. They suggest that this negative relationship between
priming and prime visibility constitutes a qualitative difference between
conscious and unconscious processing. Snodgrass, Bernat and Shevrin
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(2004) argue that when conscious influences are completely absent (at the
objective detection threshold) the unconscious information is free to influence
behaviour without contamination from conscious access to the prime. In
contrast when conscious information is relatively weak, but nonetheless
present (between the detection and the identification thresholds), the
availability of the information to consciousness reduces its ability to influence
the prime. In this window the conscious effect is only large enough to
produce very small priming effects, with the priming effects from the
unconscious perception completely abolished. Once the primes become
fully conscious they are able to exert a greater influence on behaviour and
thus priming increases again when signal strength is above the identification
threshold.
Holender and Duscherer (2004) have challenged the data on which
Snodgrass et aL (2004) base their recommendations. They suggest that
many of the studies quoted by Snodgrass as showing the necessary
negative relationship between priming and prime visibility are unlikely to be
replicable under more stringent conditions. They also question the general
approach to the study of unconscious perception and suggest that no
evidence exist of truly unconscious effects on behaviour. Despite their
pessimism, others are more optimistic that the wealth of research into
unconscious cognition has not been in vain. Merikle, Smilek and Eastwood
(2001) review over one hundred years of research on perception without
awareness and conclude that regardless of which particular method was
used for determining consciousness of the stimuli, there is overwhelming
evidence in support of unconscious cognition. With the increase in interest in
consciousness in recent years the study of unconscious perception is
currently enjoying a boom period, where the majority of people believe that
the appropriate methods exist to allow successful investigation of the effects
of unconscious events on individuals' behaviour (ct. Koudier & Dehaene,
2007). While some (e.g. Merikle et al., 2001) still prefer to assess
consciousness via subjective measures, the vast majority of recent research
(e.g. Neumann and Klotz, 1994; Leuthold and Kopp, 1998; Eimer and
Schlaghecken, 1998; Dehaene et al., 1998) compares performance on an
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indirect task with that on a forced-choice task where subjects are asked to
respond directly to the unconscious stimulus (prime). Since objective
measures are thought to be more conservative than subjective measures
they are likely to persuade more sceptics that participants in such
experiments were unaware of the subliminal prime (Merikle et aI., 2001).
The exact forced-choice task used in the literature varies. While some
research has reported priming in the absence of detection of the stimulus
(e.g. Dehaene et al. 1998) many assess awareness with identification tasks
(e.g. Leuthold and Kopp, 1998; Eimer and Schlaghecken 1998). Since the
indirect task normally involves classifying the stimulus as one type or another
it seems appropriate to use a similar classification task (identification task) to
assess consciousness, since one is interested in whether participants were
able to extract the appropriate information from the prime consciously, not
simply whether they were able to see the prime (detection task). In the
experiments described in this thesis awareness of the primes was assessed
using objective measures in addition to subjective reports from subjects. In
most experiments participants are asked to identify the prime, but in some
experiments they also performed a detection task.
Masked priming and motor preparation
Neumann and Klotz (1994) were the first to show that completely masked
stimuli are able to exert some influence over motor preparation. Fehrer &
Raab (1962) showed that whilst subjective reports of the visibility of a
masked stimulus change in accordance with the stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) between prime and mask, reaction times were unaffected. Neumann
and Klotz (1994) were interested in exploring whether this observed
dissociation between awareness and motor priming was observed when
prime visibility was below the objective threshold of identification. These
experiments were designed to asses their hypothesis of direct parameter
specification, inspired by the work of Wilhelm Wundt and his student Hugo
MOnsterberg who had suggested that our motor apparatus does not wait for
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consciousness before starting to prepare a response (Neumann & Klotz,
1994).
Neumann and Klotz (1994) conducted five experiments to explore the limits
of direct parameter specification, in other words to explore the situations in
which one can observe a dissociation between conscious awareness of a
stimulus and a motor response to the stimulus. All experiments utilised a
metacontrast masking sequence. Metacontrast masking involves the
presentation of the prime followed by a target, which also acts as a mask. In
this procedure the prime stimulus normally fits into a space left in the centre
of the target stimulus (the mask). In the first experiment the target stimuli
consisted of one diamond and one square. The participants were asked to
respond with the left key when the target (diamond or square,
counterbalanced across subjects) was on the left and to respond with the
right hand for a right sided target. Unknown to the participants smaller
replicas of the stimuli (the primes) were presented in advance of the target.
On a congruent trial the primes were the same as the target stimuli, on
incongruent trials the side of the diamond and square were reversed and on
neutral trials two of the non-target stimuli were presented. Following the
reaction time (RT) part of the experiment participants were asked to
determine whether the target contained a small replica of the target. This
amounted to an identification task, since rather than detecting if a prime was
present, participants were asked to determine if the mask was congruent
with the target stimulus. The sequence of stimuli for this part was identical to
the RT part of the experiment. The results of this first experiment showed
that despite showing a d' that was not significantly different from zero,
participants were on average 50ms quicker to respond to a stimulus with a
congruent prime than a stimulus with an incongruent prime.
A second experiment replicated this basic effect of the first with slightly
different stimuli. In this experiment subjects were asked to respond with the
appropriate hand when one of two lateralised stimuli were flanked by
horizontal bars. Once again a congruent prime was found to improve RT on
this task despite zero d' in the identification task. Two further experiments
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extended these findings to incompatible response mappings and to situations
where response mappings could vary from one trial to the next. Finally,
experiment 5 showed that when a prime was located in a third location its
effect on behaviour was dependent on the response mapping of the three
stimuli such that when this middle location acted to guide a right hand
response, facilitation for a subsequent right sided stimulus was observed.
The authors argued that this shows that the priming of the responses is
dependent on the specification of the motor response and not simply from
visual effects of the prime. They conclude from these experiments that direct
parameter specification from an unconscious prime is a robust and replicable
effect and thus that a stimulus can guide a motor response independent of a
participants awareness of the stimulus. This finding is in line with the data
discussed in chapter 1 using a very different paradigm, and suggests a
similar conclusion; that motor preparation can begin in advance of conscious
awareness of an intention to act or conscious discrimination of a priming
stimulus.
Leuthold and Kopp (1998) have since examined the theory of direct
parameter specification in more detail combining behavioural and
electrophysiological measures. They asked subjects to respond with one
hand when a stimulus above fixation was flanked by vertical bars and with
another hand when the stimulus below fixation was flanked by vertical bars.
When the unconscious primes were congruent with the target, reaction times
were faster than on incongruent trials. Critical to the hypothesis that the
unconscious primes were able to directly initiate motor preparation was the
evidence provided by the lateralised readiness potential. Leuthold and Kopp
(1998) reasoned that if the unconscious prime was able to directly initiate
motor processes then early LRP activity should be determined by the
subliminal prime. If the prime is able to directly program the motor response
then hand specific motor preparation, as indexed by the LRP should begin in
response to the prime. Leuthold and Kopp's (1998) result was entirely
consistent with this hypothesis. They found that following an incongruent
prime the LRP showed initial activation of the incorrect hand. For congruent
trials the LRP began its prime-related activation in the correct direction,
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before continuing to increase in response to the conscious target stimulus.
This difference in early partial activation of the LRP then led to an earlier
onsetting LRP for congruent trials, which in turn was likely responsible for the
behavioural priming effect. Despite this difference in motor related electrical
activity, early visual ERP components did not appear to be modulated by the
unconscious prime, supporting Neumann and Klotz's (1994) suggestion that
the unconscious primes are able to directly specify the motor codes without
modulation by perception.
Dehaene et al. (1998) have also shown that pattern masked number words
(e.g. ONE, FOUR) can influence activity in the motor cortex recorded by both
EEG and fMRI. In their experiments they asked subjects to respond to
numerals above five with one hand and below five with the other hand.
Unknown to the participants number words were presented prior to the target
in between forward and backward masks consisting of random letter strings.
Despite performance on detection and identification tasks not differing from
chance modulation of reaction times and lateralised motor activation was
seen in response to the prime. This further supports the assumption that
motor activation can be initiated unconsciously, and in this example that it
may be initiated by primes that are semantically related to targets and not
visually related (e.g. ONE primes a response to 1).
Masked priming and motor inhibition
Eimer & Schlaghecken (1998) have reported evidence that unconscious
primes can drive exogenous motor inhibition. In a typical subliminal priming
experiment, an unconscious prime normally produces a positive compatibility
effect, such that reaction times are reduced when the unconscious prime is
congruent with the target, and increased when an incongruent prime is
presented (Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Neumann & Klotz, 1994). However,
Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) found that masked primes in such a task
produced a negative compatibility effect (NeE), such that congruent masked
primes impeded responses. In this experiment, primes were presented for
16ms, immediately followed by the mask for 100ms and then the target for
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100ms. Primes and targets were typically double left and double right
pointing arrows «<, »; or >< and <> for neutral primes), and masks were
the two stimuli overlapped (~~). Participants were asked to respond to left
pointing arrows with a left hand key press and right pointing arrows with a
right hand press. Reaction times were fastest when an incongruent prime
was presented prior to the target (e.g. a left pointing prime presented prior to
a right pointing target). Similarly, RTs were greatest following a congruent
prime. This surprising result of increased RTs on congruent trials was
interpreted as being caused by automatic inhibition of the unconsciously
activated response. In support of this assumption, they reported that ERP
components associated with preparation to respond with either the left or
right hand (LRP) showed an initial activation on congruent trials, followed by
a reversal of this activation. This reversal was interpreted as reflecting a
temporary, automatic inhibition of the unconsciously initiated response. They
suggest that such a mechanism may prevent us from responding
automatically to small insignificant changes in our environment.
Eimer and Schlaghecken have replicated this NeE using a number of
different stimulus parameters, and other research groups (Klapp & Hinkley,
2002) have also published similar findings. In one experiment, Eimer (1999)
manipulated the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the masked
primes and the target stimulus and measure participants' reaction times.
When the SOA was short (Oms and 32ms) a positive compatibility effect was
present such that congruent primes improved reaction times, but when SOA
was longer (96ms and above) a negative compatibility effect was evident.
Eimer (1999) suggests that this finding provides further evidence of the
"activation followed by inhibition" hypothesis since with a low SOA the
stimulus would come while the masked prime is still partially activated, but
for a long SOA the target stimulus would begin to be processed while the
initial primed response was being automatically inhibited. They suggest that
such an automatic inhibition of unconsciously initiated responses that are no
longer online is evolutionarily advantageous as it prevents us responding
automatically to every small insignificant change in our environment. When
the primes are not masked (and thus become available to conscious
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introspection) the negative compatibility effect disappears and only
endogenous inhibition can then prevent movement. Klapp and Hinkley
(2002) claim that this shows a qualitative difference between conscious and
unconscious processing.
Aron et al. (2003) showed using a similar paradigm in an fMRI scanner that
initial unconscious response activation initiated by the masked primes is
associated with increased activity in the hand area of the primary motor
cortex contralateral to the direction of the prime. This provides further
evidence of initial unconscious motor activation, and highlights a likely neural
basis for this effect. When exploring the subsequent inhibition of this
unconsciously initiated act they found significant increases in activity in the
posterior parietal cortex and in several sub-cortical areas. Notably they did
not find any activation of prefrontal areas thought to be responsible for the
type of endogenous inhibition associated with the N2 ERP component as
described in chapter 2.
The inhibition hypothesis of the NCE has been widely disputed in recent
years. L1eras and Enns (2004) suggest that it might be due to perception of
the difference between the prime and the compound mask rather than motor
inhibition. They suggest that updating of the visual scene leads to
processing of the change between the prime and the mask (the prime-mask
effect). Since Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) used a mask that was formed
from a compound of the two possible stimuli, the presentation of the mask
effectively involved the addition of two arrows in the opposite direction, which
cued a response opposite to that cued by the actual prime. L1eras and Enns
(2004) suggest that it is this change between the prime presentation and the
mask presentation that is responsible for the NCE. Similarly, Verleger,
Jaskowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe and Groen (2004) conducted a series of
experiments to explore the possibility that the NCE is caused by a specific
interaction between the prime and the mask. They showed that when using
a checked mask rather than the compound of the two possible targets, a
positive compatibility effect was observed, such that congruent primes
facilitate motor preparation. They also found that no LRP reversal was
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observed on trials with the checked mask. These findings suggest that the
NCE observed by Eimer and Schlaghecken may be the result of the
particular prime-mask combination.
While Schlaghecken and Eimer (2006) have conceded that with related
masks, the NCE is most likely caused by object updating, they present new
data to show that it is still possible to obtain an NCE even when using
unrelated masks. Jaskowski (2007) and L1eras and Enns (2006) suggest
that rather than reflecting automatic inhibition caused by the prime, the NCE
in these studies reflect what they call mask induced inhibition. They show
that a combination of physical, spatial and temporal similarity combine to turn
a positive compatibility effect into an NCE. Each of these factors appear to
be additive in reducing the positive priming effect, eventually resulting in a
strong NCE when a central, related mask is presented immediately after the
prime. Jaskowski (2007) suggests that the mask acts as a distracter, that
inhibits the response associated with the prime. He shows that even when a
related stimulus is used as a flanker rather than a mask; it still produces an
NCE, even though there is no spatial overlap with the prime. This provides
evidence against a simple perceptual object updating mechanism.
While the exact mechanism that causes the NCE is still under dispute it
seems likely that some kind of inhibition of the primed response is involved in
reversing the priming effect. Eimer and Schlaghecken (2003) suggest that
whilst this exogenous inhibition is initiated unconsciously as defence
mechanism against automatic response activation, endogenous inhibition
(such as in a go/no-go task) can only be initiated with conscious awareness:
"This endogenous inhibition is voluntary, optional, and is presumably
mediated in prefrontal cortex. Since endogenous inhibition depends on the
conscious detection of task-relevant signals, it is not available when stimuli
are presented subliminally". (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003; page 8).
However, they only point to indirect evidence in support of this assumption.
They suggest that evidence for this hypothesis comes from negative priming,
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the Stroop effect and shifts of spatial attention. However, the inhibition
involved in each of these processes is very different to inhibition of a motor
act currently under preparation. Negative priming for example assesses the
influence of a stimulus that was previously to be ignored and now acts as the
target. Participants typically respond more slowly to such a stimulus, than to
a stimulus that had not previously been ignored. This effect disappears
when the stimulus is masked during its original presentation as a to-be-
ignored stimulus (Lalchandani, Loula, & Carrasco, 2003). However such
inhibition of a response in negative priming is in fact more like an automatic
process to inhibit information that was recently deemed irrelevant, than
voluntary and conscious inhibition. Similarly, success in the Stroop task
relies on the ability to inhibit an automatically initiated interference, a very
different process to inhibition of a motor action.
Eimer and Shlaghecken (1998) also point out that the N2 ERP component
appears somewhat atypical when found in unconscious priming paradigms.
The N2 component is a frontal negativity around 200 ms after stimulus onset
typically found in conflict tasks such as the flanker task (Kopp, Rist, &
MaUler, 1996) and in go/no-go tasks (Falkenstein et al., 1999) and is thought
to reflect inhibition (Falkenstein et al., 1999) or cognitive control
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). Importantly, when conflict between two
responses is induced by an unconscious stimulus, this negativity appears to
have a parietal, rather than frontal topography (Leuthold & Kopp, 1998).
Eimer & Schlaghecken (2003) suggest that this topographic difference may
reflect the fact that only exogenous inhibition can be initiated unconsciously.
They suggest that whilst a parietal N2 may be observed in response to
unconscious conflict, a true frontal no-go N2 indexing inhibition can not be
modulated by unconscious primes.
The suggestion that frontal control mechanisms require conscious
awareness is supported by research using a number of different paradigms.
Dehaene et al. (2003) explored activation of the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) in patients with schizophrenia and normal participants. They
presented participants with subliminal primes that were either congruent or
64
incongruent with a target stimulus. Primes consisted of the words ONE,
FOUR, SIX and NINE. Targets consisted of the numbers 2, 4, 6 and 9.
Participants were asked to press one hand in response to targets above five
and another for targets below 5. Both the masked and unmasked primes
produced behavioural conflicts, manifested in increased reaction times to
incongruent trials. However, ACC activation (measured using fMRI) was
recorded in response to conscious response conflicts, but not in the
subliminal conflict condition. Dehaene et al. (2003) argue that this shows
that the ACC is activated exclusively for resolving conscious conflicts.
Similarly, Praamstra and Seiss (2005) showed that no genuine frontocentral
N2 was elicited by conflicts induced in the NCE, suggesting that unconscious
response conflicts were regulated from within the motor system.
Praamstra, Turgeon, Hesse, Wing, and Perryer (2003) explored the error
related negativity (ERN) in response to errors that were consciously detected
and those that were not detected. Like the N2, the ERN is thought to reflect
activity in the ACC related to the detection of response conflict on trials
where participants make the incorrect response (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen,
2004). Praamstra et al. (2003) showed that while conscious errors were
associated with an ERN, unconscious errors did not seem to engage frontal
conflict detection processes. Similarly, Niewenhaus, Ridderinkhof, Blom,
Band and Kok (2001), showed that the error positivity (analogous to the no-
go P3) was only present when participants were aware of having made an
error. Mayr (2004) reviews a number of studies that explore fMRI or EEG
correlates of ACC activity in response to conscious and unconscious conflict
and conclude that conscious awareness seems to be crucial for many kinds
of ACC-related activity.
In a prominent recent theory of consciousness, Dehaene, Changeux,
Naccache, Sackur and Sergent (2006) outline a neuronal workspace model
in which sensory inputs compete for access to a neuronal workspace. They
suggest that sensory information only enters the neuronal workspace, and
therefore becomes conscious, when it is sufficiently strong and when it
received top-down attention. They claim that subliminal stimuli fail to reach
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consciousness because they do not have sufficient bottom-up strength but
may still produce feedforward activation leading to unconscious priming of
behaviour. Crucially, they suggest that subliminal activation does not lead to
durable activation of fronto-parietal brain circuits, once again highlighting the
association between consciousness and engagement of processing in frontal
brain regions.
Summary
This chapter introduced the technique of masked pnrrunq as a way of
studying unconscious perception. Despite the difficulty in measuring whether
a participant is conscious of a stimulus, the research described in this
chapter convincingly shows that a number of processes can occur in the
absence of consciousness. In support of the research outlined in Chapter 1,
evidence from subliminal priming studies suggests that motor preparation
can be initiated unconsciously. Furthermore, the research supporting a link
between inhibition and control mechanisms and consciousness provides
some support for Libet et al.'s (1985) claim that consciousness may have a
role in vetoing unconsciously initiated acts.
General Summary and Aims of Current Research
The research outlined in these three introductory chapters highlights an
important association between consciousness and inhibition/control of
behaviour. Libet et al. (1985) suggested that while consciousness does not
initiate a voluntary action it may be required if one decides to veto that
action. The research presented in this thesis aims to directly explore the
association between frontal inhibition/control mechanisms and
consciousness. While previous research in masked priming has focused on
activity associated with response conflict or error processing, no research to
date has explored possible modulation of ERP components associated with
inhibition of a response in the go/no-go task. Since this task is known to
produce a no-go N2/P3 complex, combining this task with a masked priming
paradigm will allow exploration of possible modulation of these components
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dependent on the unconscious information. Therefore, this task will allow
direct exploration of Libet et al.'s (1985) suggestion that consciousness is
required to inhibited an imminent action. Due to the excellent temporal
resolution of EEG the current research will also attempt to determine if these
frontal inhibiton/control mechanisms can be directly elicited by the
unconscious primes. Leuthold and Kopp (1998) showed that LRP activity
shows initial modulation that is entirely dependent on the unconscious
primes. In a similar way, the current research will assess if subliminal primes
are able to directly engage frontal inhibition/control mechanisms indexed by
the no-go N2. If the N2 shows an early modulation dependent on the prime
type, then this would support the hypothesis that inhibition of an impending
action can be initiated unconsciously.
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Chapter 4
General Methods
Outline
This chapter will provide a more in-depth account of the experimental
methods used in this thesis. In particular it will focus on the precise
behavioural tasks employed as well as the way in which the behavioural data
was analysed. In addition it will outline the basic EEG recording parameters
for all the experiments as well as details of how this data was processed and
analysed.
General procedure
In each experiment participants were recruited by means of poster
advertisement. This consisted either of posters around the university
advertising for volunteers, or posters targeted at first year undergraduate
students aiming to collect course credits for a participation recruitment
scheme. Participants received either course credits or £15 compensation for
each experimental session. Only right-handed individuals between the ages
of 18 and 40 were eligible to participate in the experiments. Participants
were not informed of the exact nature of the study in which they were
participating. They were simply informed that the experiment was exploring
EEG correlates of motor preparation and inhibition. This was so that they
would not guess about the presence of the unconscious stimuli.
When participants expressed an interest in participating, they were sent an
information sheet describing the EEG procedure and any associated risks.
They were given the opportunity to ask questions about the procedure before
confirming that they would like to participate. Participants were also asked to
complete a consent form at the beginning of the session which confirmed
that they had fully understood the description of the procedure, as well as
being asked a number of medical questions. Any individuals with a history of
epilepsy or currently taking any psychoactive drugs (such as anti-
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depressants) were excluded from the study. Participants with corrected
vision were asked to wear glasses or contact lenses during the experiment.
After completing the consent forms the participants were prepared for the
EEG recording. Further details of the EEG recording procedure are
described in a later section of this chapter. Participants were then seated in
an electrically shielded, dimly lit room for the duration of the experimental
session. In each experiment the participants were seated 100cm from the
stimulus presentation screen. At the beginning of the session the distance
from the participant's head to the computer monitor was measured and the
seat moved so that they were the correct distance. Participants were asked
to move as little as possible during the experiment, so as to maintain the
correct distance from the screen (as well as to avoid movement related EEG
artefacts). The behavioural tasks were presented using E-prime version 1.1.
Screen refresh rate was set to 60Hz. Stimulus presentation was
synchronised with this refresh rate such that stimulus presentation was
always in multiples of 16ms (one screen refresh). The timing of the
sequence was verified by an external light meter connected to the EEG
recording system. Additional timing data was also obtained from E-prime.
In each of the five experiments participants completed a go/no-go and a two
or three alternative forced-choice task. Experiment 1 was conducted over
two sessions, with the sessions separated by exactly 24 hours. Experiments
two to five were conducted in a single experimental session. At the
beginning of the experiment participants received instructions regarding the
go/no-go task and were given the opportunity to ask any questions. The
go/no-go task was combined with a masked priming paradigm such that
unconscious masked primes were presented prior to the target stimulus. In
addition to the go/no-go task a forced-choice task was used to assess
visibility of the primes. In the first experiment the participants completed
blocks of the forced-choice tasks during each of the two sessions of the
experiment. This meant that they were aware that the primes were being
presented when they were completing the go/no-go task. In each of the
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other four experiments participants were blind to the presence of the primes
until all go/no-go trials had been completed.
The Go/No-Go Task
In this task participants were asked to simply press a button in response to
one stimulus and refrain from responding to another stimulus. In each
experiment participants were required to respond to go trials as quickly as
possible without sacrificing accuracy. In addition, to ensure that they were
actively preparing to make a response, all go responses were required to be
within 500ms. This was to ensure that participants would begin readying
themselves for a response in advance of stimulus identification, and would
then need to inhibit this imminent response on identification of a no-go target.
In experiments one to four, participants were required to respond within
500ms of a go stimulus. In experiment 5 this was reduced to 450ms. In
each experiment response hand varied on a block by block basis such that in
one block participants were required to make a left hand button press to a go
stimulus and in the next block they were asked to make a right hand
response to a go stimulus. The starting hand was counterbalanced across
participants. In experiment 3, left and right hand responses were included in
each block by asking participants to respond with a different hand for two of
the stimulus mappings and to make no response to a third mapping (no-go
trials). The inclusion of trials with both left and right hand responses was
required for calculation of the lateralised readiness potential (LRP; see later
section on EEG analysis). For each experiment the stimuli requiring go and
no-go responses were counterbalanced from one participant to the next (or
one session to the next). For example in the final experiment half the
participants were required to make a go response to left pointing arrows, the
other half made a go response to right pointing arrows.
Masked primes were presented prior to the target stimuli on the go no-go
task. These prime were congruent, incongruent or neutral with respect to the
target stimulus. For example a no-go prime followed by a no-go target would
be classed as a congruent no-go condition. Table 4.1 shows the
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combinations of different prime and target combinations used for the
experiments. This basic structure was similar for all five experiments with
the exception that in experiment 3, additional conditions were present due to
the manipulation of response hand. Experiment 1 also included the addition
of no prime trials which were excluded from future experiments in order to
maintain sufficient trial numbers in the other conditions.
T bl 4 T' I fa e .1: na types or experiments 1,2,4and 5
Target Prime Type
Type Go No-Go Neutral No Prime*
Go
Congruent Incongruent
Neutral Go Go*
Go Go
Incongruent Congruent Neutral No-
No-Go No-go*
No-go No-go go
*No prime trials were only presented In experiment 1
The go/no-go task was largely the same in each of the five experiments. In
each experiment the sequence always began with a fixation cross (+),
presented in the centre of the screen for 700-800milliseconds (ms). Primes
were always presented for 16ms (one screen refresh) and the target stimulus
was presented for 100ms. The exact sequence between these two events
varied from one experiment to the next depending on the particular masking
stimuli that were used and will be outlined in more detail in the experimental
chapters.
Visual feedback was presented on each trial for correct responses (hits) and
incorrect non-responses (misses) to go trials, as well as incorrect responses
(false alarms) and correct non-responses (correct rejections) to no-go trials.
After an incorrect response participants were presented with MISS for
misses or INCORRECT for false alarms; after all correct responses
CORRECT was presented in the centre of the screen. Following the visual
feedback a blink pause was presented before the commencement of the next
trial. This blink pause varied in length from 800ms to 1200ms for the five
experiments. Participants were informed that they should avoid blinking
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during the trial and that they should try to blink only in the blink pause. This
was to ensure that the EEG was not contaminated by blink artefacts.
Assessing Prime visibility
In experiment 1, participants were informed prior to the experimental
sessions that a masked prime was presented on some trials. Participants
were asked to report whether they could see the masked primes. In
experiments two to five, participants were not informed of the presence of the
masked primes until after all go/no-go trials had been completed.
Immediately following the go/no-go task participants were asked the
following questions about the primes: (1) did you notice that there were
stimuli presented prior to the target stimuli? (2) Could you tell what they
were? (3) Did you notice anything flicker on the screen? The exact
sequence of stimuli was then presented to the participants in slow motion
with at least one of each prime condition presented. Following this slow
motion sequence participants were again asked if they had seen these
primes during the go/no-go task.
It was then explained to the participants that in the subsequent task they
would be presented with this same sequence (except in some cases with the
target omitted) and that their task was now to respond to the prime. In all
five experiments participants were asked to complete a prime identification
task, where they had to choose which prime had been presented on each
trial. In addition, in experiment 1, participants were asked to complete a
prime detection task, where they had to detect whether or not a prime of any
sort had been presented on each trial, or if no prime was presented. In each
of these tasks participants were able to respond without time restriction and
had to make a choice on each trial. Participants were informed before the
task that although it may seem very difficult, many people are able to
successfully identify the prime despite believing that they had not seen it.
Participants were told to keep focused on the task and that if they were
unsure about how to respond, to let their instincts guide them into making a
response. Feedback was presented on each trial to help keep participants
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interested in the task and to ensure that they were able to use any visual
cues from the primes to help them reliably identify the correct response. The
precise details regarding the number of trials in each block and the number
of blocks varied from one experiment to the next and will be specified in the
relevant experimental chapters. Following the prime identification task
participants were asked to report whether they had been able to see the
primes during this part of the experiment.
Stimuli
The precise stimuli varied from one experiment to the next. This was the
major difference between each of the experiments. Full justification for the
use of the different stimuli will be given in the experimental chapters.
However, this section will provide a brief introduction to the different classes
of stimuli used in the different experiments. Experiment 1 and 5 utilised
pattern masking stimuli. With these stimuli the mask is presented
overlapping the prime. The mask normally consists of a complex pattern that
makes the features of the prime more difficult to extract. The first experiment
used a mask that shared all physical characteristics with the prime, so that all
of the lines present in the prime were also present in the mask. The use of
this type of mask is particularly effective in reducing visibility of the prime
(Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000; L1eras and Enns , 2004) In experiment 5, two
different pattern masks were generated that consisted of random
chequerboard type patterns made up of two shades of grey as well as black
and white. These patterns formed a rectangle which covered the area in
which the primes were presented. These masks were presented both before
and after the prime.
In experiments two, three and four, metacontrast masking stimuli were used.
The mask in metacontrast masking differs somewhat from that used in
pattern masking. In metacontrast masking the mask does not actually cover
any part of the prime; rather the internal contours of the mask just touch the
external contours of the prime. The simplest example of such a stimulus set
up is a prime consisting of a small circle, with the mask consisting of a
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doughnut shape (a larger circle with a small circle cut out). The prime would
then fit exactly into the shape in the centre of the mask. In experiments two
and three, two stimuli were presented on each trial. These stimuli were
either diamond shapes or square shapes. Unbeknownst to the participants
primes were presented in advance of these stimuli such that they filled the
spaces inside the contours of the target shapes. One major difference
between this procedure and the procedure employed with pattern masking is
that no additional mask is presented - the target stimulus acts as both the
mask and the target. In experiment 4 a metacontrast paradigm was also
employed but on this occasion a single stimulus was presented in the centre
of the screen. In addition, in this experiment a separate target stimulus was
presented which did not act as a mask, making the sequence more similar to
experiments one and five.
Another difference between metacontrast masking and pattern masking is
that the former usually produces U-shaped masking functions while the latter
normally produces monotonic masking functions (cf. Breitmeyer & Ogmen,
2000). This means that for metacontrast masking procedures, optimal
masking is normally achieved at non-zero inter-stimulus intervals between
the prime and the mask. There is some debate as to the exact cause of this
U-shaped masking function (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000; Francis, 2000;
Herzog, 2007), which can also be observed in certain situations using pattern
masks. In this thesis, experiments two and three included a 49ms inter-
stimulus interval between the prime and the mask and experiment 4 used a
16ms interval. In each experiment this inter-stimulus interval was found to
be sufficient in eliminating awareness of the mask both in pilot testing and in
the experiments themselves.
Behavioural analysis
Initial behavioural analysis in each experiment focused on the visibility of the
primes. Subjective measures of awareness are presented in tables outlining
the number of participants responding yes and no to the questions described
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above. Objective measures of prime visibility were analysed using
participants raw scores on the forced-choice task, which were compared to
chance performance using single sample t-tests. In addition, d' values were
calculated in excel using the formula found in Stanislaw & Todorov (1999).
These values give an estimate of discrimination performance independent of
response-bias. For example if a participant performs at 51% accuracy but
responds with a left button on 90% of trials, this calculation will account for
the response bias by weighting the d' value dependent on the asymmetry of
the response distribution. Thus in most cases d' will give a similar measure
of discrimination performance, but it will be more sensitive to occasional
correct discrimination when a participant responds predominantly with one
hand. A d' of zero indicates that performance on the discrimination task was
at chance, thus d' scores were compared to zero using single sample t-tests.
Analysis of performance on the go/no-go task includes tables showing mean
reaction times for go trials as well as error rates for both go and no-go trials.
One-way ANOVA was conducted on reaction times for go trials and error
rates for go and no-go trials separately. Initial analysis focused on the
results obtained with all participants before further analysis excluding those
people who were deemed to have some residual awareness of the primes
(where appropriate). Finally in order to show that any effects were
independent of consciousness of the stimulus, correlations were computed
between performance on the prime identification task, and the amount of
priming observed in the go/no-go task. Prime identification performance was
measured using the raw accuracy scores and d' scores, as well as absolute
measures of both these variables. The absolute values were calculated to
provide a measure of the difference from chance regardless of whether the
participant was slightly above or below chance. For d' values this simply
involved taking the absolute values of d', while for the raw accuracy scores,
each participant's score was compared to chance (50%), with the absolute
value of this difference then calculated. Priming measures were calculated
as the pair-wise differences between each of the conditions (e.g. congruent
go vs. incongruent go, congruent go vs. neutral go and neutral go vs.
incongruent go) for both reaction times and error rates. In addition, the
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results between 'aware' and 'unaware' participants were compared checking
whether priming effects were maintained even when excluding those
participants who may have had some residual awareness of the masked
primes.
EEG recording and processing
EEG was recorded from 64 scalp electrodes and a further six external
electrodes using the BioSemi Active Two system. External electrodes were
attached to the left and right mastoids, with the other four electrodes
attached to the left, right, above and below the right eye for measuring eye
movement and blinks. Data was recorded unreferenced and unfiltered at a
digitisation rate of 1024 Hz. All data was filtered offline with a 0.3 Hz high
pass filter and a 30Hz low pass filter. Data was segmented relative to the
onset of the target stimulus, with the 100ms preceding prime onset used as a
baseline. All data was re-referenced to the average of the two mastoid
electrodes prior to analysis. All segments containing blink or other artefacts
were removed prior to averaging. This artefact rejection was completed in a
semi-automated manner such that an initial amplitude criterion of +/- 80 IJV in
the vertical electro-oculogram identified possible blinks. After visual
inspection this criterion was adjusted independently for each participant and
trials on which EEG amplitude exceeded this criterion were removed. A
second semi-automatic rejection criterion of +/- 50 IJV maximum amplitude
and a maximum gradient of two IJV per sampling point was applied to the
horizontal electro-oculogram to detect horizontal eye movements. Finally all
scalp electrodes were checked against a criterion +/- 120 IJV as well as a
maximum difference within a segment of 150 IJV and a gradient of three IJV
per sampling point. This final check was to remove any trials containing
large hardware artefacts such as slow drifts or spikes in the EEG. In
addition, all go trials with no response within 500ms of stimulus onset and all
no-go trials containing a response within 600ms of stimulus onset were
excluded from analysis. This was so that only correct go and no-go trials
would be included. EEG pre-processing was completed using Brain Vision
Analyzer, with later grand averaging and data handling completed using
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custom built Matlab scripts. Statistical analysis was conducted using
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).
ERP Figures
In each experiment ERP waveforms are presented from 400ms prior to
stimulus onset until 600ms after stimulus onset. The values on the y-axis
represent the amplitude of the ERP measured in IJV with positive values
plotted upwards. The values on the x-axis represent time relative to stimulus
onset measure in milliseconds. The x-axis and y-axis intersect at target
onset (Oms) and at 0 IJV. Additionally, a dashed line is presented
intersecting the x-axis representing the time of the onset of the prime.
Topographic maps are presented showing average amplitudes (in IJV) for the
time window specified below the map. Specific effects in subsequent
analyses are often supplemented by bar graphs showing average amplitude
in a particular time window. In these figures the average amplitude is plotted
on the y-axis (in IJV), with the different electrodes on the x-axis. Different
conditions are signified by bars shaded in different tones.
EEG Analysis
LRP analysis
LRP was calculated by averaging the difference in activity between electrode
C3 and C4 for left and right hand responses using the equation below.
LRP = [Mean (C4-C3) left-hand movement + Mean (C3-C4) right-hand movement]/2
LRP onset was determined using a 50% relative criterion method in
combination with the jackknife procedure. The 50% relative criterion method
takes the point at which the LRP reaches 50% of its maximum, as the onset.
The jackknife procedure involves applying this method to an average of all
participants minus one participant at a time, rather than taking the onset from
each individual participant (Miller, Patterson and Ulrich, 1998; Ulrich and
Miller, 2001). These values are then used in the statistics, with the final F
value corrected for the decreased error term produced by the procedure. It
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is necessary to adjust the F value, since applying the jackknifed onset values
to the factorial analysis will result in much smaller estimates of the standard
error, and thus a much larger F value. This adjustment simply involves
dividing the observed F value by (n-1 )2, where n is the number of participants
(see Ulrich & Miller, 2001 for a proof). Similarly, for subsequent t-tests the
error term was adjusted according to the formula presented in Miller et al.
(1999). This procedure is used due to the particularly low signal to noise
ratio of the LRP, since attempting to calculate measures of onset for
individual participants may result in criterion being falsely met due to noise,
or alternatively not being met at all in some participants (Miller et aI., 1998).
Morkadoff and Gianaros (2000) have run a number of simulations for
different methods of determining the onset of an LRP and found that the 50%
relative criterion method combined with the jackknife procedure gave the
most accurate measure of significant differences between LRP onsets. It is
important to note that since the onset is given as 50% of the amplitude it will
give a rather late estimate of the onset of the LRP. However, while this
measure provides a somewhat inaccurate estimate of the actual onset, it is
effective at determining the difference in onset between conditions (Miller et
ai, 1999). In addition to onset analysis, amplitude analysis was also
conducted for the LRP to explore any early separations in the LRP that were
not picked up by the onset analysis.
Frontal no-go N2 and P3 analysis
Initial analysis in each experiment focused on the specific hypothesis that the
no-go N2/P3 complex would be influenced by the unconscious primes. N2
difference waveforms are presented at electrode FZ as the difference
between each condition and the neutral go condition. Since the neutral go
condition always contained a prime that was neither congruent nor
incongruent to the target, it should not influence the onset of activity
associated with target processing. Thus computing the difference waveform
between all other conditions and the neutral go condition should reveal any
early differences related to the go and no-go primes alongside the normal
no-go N2. The neutral no-go difference ERP provides a baseline, since it is
the comparison of neutral no-go and neutral go trials and thus will reflect
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go/no-go differences where no relevant unconscious information was
presented. The congruent and incongruent difference waveforms should
reveal any early differences associated with the processing of the prime, as
well as any modulation of the target-related ERP components. These no-go
difference waveforms were subjected to amplitude analysis focused around
the peak of the N2 and P3 components to determine if the average
amplitudes varied as a function of the unconscious prime.
N2 and P3 topographies were initially explored by computing scalp maps for
the time windows where these components were evident, with further
analysis conducted as part of the more comprehensive analysis across the
scalp (see below). N2 onset was determined by a segmented regression
technique (see Falkenstein et aI., 1999). This technique involves fitting two
regression lines to the N2 waveforms. The start of the first regression line is
fixed to the onset of the prime. The end of the second regression line is fixed
to the time at which the N2 reaches its maximum amplitude. The remaining
four parameters (the time at which the two lines intersect and the amplitude
at this point, as well as the amplitude at the beginning of the first line and the
end of the second) are allowed to vary until the two regression lines have the
minimum residual sums of squares. The time at which the two lines intersect
is then given as the onset of the component. This procedure was conducted
on each individual participant for every condition to determine the onset of
the N2. This procedure was conducted using custom built scripts in Matlab.
To determine if any observed modulation of the no-go N2 and P3 was
associated with conscious awareness of the prime, correlations were
calculated between performance on the prime identification task and the
amount of priming observed in the ERP components. As with the
behavioural analysis, prime identification performance was defined both in
terms of raw scores and absolute scores for d' and accuracy. Similarly,
priming measures included all pair-wise comparisons for N2 onset and
latency and P3 latency. Furthermore, participants with higher identification
performance were compared with those with lower performance to confirm
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the absence or presence of priming effects using only those participants who
showed no discrimination in the identification task.
Early visual ERP effects
Early ERP effects were analysed at electrode Oz as well as lateral
electrodes 01/02 and POl/P08. Initial analysis focused on the early P1 and
N1 peaks observed at Oz to determine if any differences were evident
dependent on the congruency of the prime with respect to the target
stimulus. Since in each experiment (except Experiment 3), the target that
was allocated to go or no-go was counterbalanced across participants the
grand average waveforms would not show any effects of specific target type
or prime type. However, if there is an effect of prime congruency on either
the N1 or P1 then this should show up in the grand average ERP waveforms.
To explore specific effects of the physical prime and target stimuli, grand
average ERPs were calculated reflecting the physical stimuli presented on
each trial. For example, in Experiment 1 congruent go trials for participants
instructed to respond to a right pointing arrow consisted of a right arrow
prime followed by a right arrow target. For those participants who were
instructed to respond to a left pointing arrow, this same stimulus
configuration (right arrow prime followed by right arrow target) was present
for congruent no-go trials. Therefore, ERPs that reflected right-right
conditions where formed from congruent go trials for some participants and
congruent no-go trials for others. Similarly left-left trials were computed from
these same two conditions but this time using the participants from the
alternative response mapping. Right-left and left-right ERPs were formed in
a similar way using incongruent go and incongruent no-go conditions. This
analysis would allow disentangling of ERP effects associated with left and
right pointing primes and targets.
For each condition, difference waveforms were calculated between electrode
01 and 02 as well as electrode POl and P08. These difference waveforms
thus reflect the difference in activity between the left and right hemisphere
over occipital and parietal electrodes. This is particularly important since in
80
many of the experiments participants were responding to stimuli presented in
one visual field or the other. Since these difference waveforms were
computed for each condition, this analysis comprised a repeated measures
ANOVA with prime type (left, right, neutral) and target type (left, right) as
repeated measures factors. However, in order to explore whether response
mapping also influenced the relationship between the physical stimuli a
between participants factor of response mapping was also included. A
significant interaction between prime type, target type and response mapping
would signify that any posterior asymmetries were dependent on the
meaning of the prime and not simply its physical attributes. For example, a
left prime may produce a significant right sided component only when the
right prime acts as a go stimulus and not when it acts as a no-go stimulus.
Such an observation would suggest that prime-related asymmetries were
dependent on whether the stimulus was a target or not and therefore might
reflect an N2pc component, exhibited contralateral to target stimuli (see
Chapter 2). Similarly, a target by response mapping interaction would reflect
an N2pc to the target.
Go/no-go differences
Go/no-go differences were explored in more detail in each experiment by
presenting ERP waveforms at a number of electrodes across the scalp to
show the topographic distribution of the effects. Statistical analysis was
conducted by means of repeated measures ANOVA with five factors. The
first two factors were typically prime type (go, no-go, neutral), target type (go,
no-go). Two further factors: anterior-posterior (Frontal polar, Frontal, Fronto-
Central, Central, Parietal and Occipital), and hemisphere (left, right) explored
the spatial distribution of the effects. The fifth factor in the analysis was time,
where the data entered into the ANOVA was the average amplitude at each
electrode site for the specified time window. In experiment 1 there were four
time windows which were explored to capture effects of the prime, prime-
mask effects, and N2 and P3 time windows. In experiments two to five, three
time windows explored early prime-related effects, the N2 and P3
respectively. If the initial ANOVA showed no effects involving hemisphere
then further analysis was conducted at midline electrodes only. All ANOVA
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effects are reported with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied. As Dien
and Santuzzi (2004) point out, ERP factorial analysis often violates the
sphericity assumption for repeated measures ANOVA. By correcting the
degrees of freedom using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for all ERP
comparisons, this should reduce the effect of this possible violation. Where
effects of hemisphere were observed, follow up analysis was conducted to
determine their precise nature. Where a significant four way interaction was
observed at midline electrodes this was followed up with separate three-way
ANOVA for each time window. Significant effects in these time windows
were then explored using contrasts and t-tests with uncorrected p values
greater than 0.001 accepted as significant.
LRP and go/no-go differences
Finally, since in each experiment the major go/no-go differences were
explored collapsed across right and left hands it is possible that go/no-go
differences could be an artefact from lateralised movement-related activity
over the motor cortex (see Praamstra and Seiss, 2005); consequently LRPs
were calculated separately for each response hand to show that the effects
persist over central and lateral electrode sites for both response hands.
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Chapter 5
Experiment 1 - An EEG investigation of go/no-go
inhibition in the negative compatibility effect.
Introduction
The aim of this experiment was to adapt Eimer and Schlaghecken's (1998)
masked priming paradigm to a go/no-go task to explore possible
unconscious modulation of the no-go N2 and P3. Eimer and Shlaghecken
(1998) presented participants with left or right pointing double arrows and
asked them to make a right hand response to right pointing arrows and a left
hand response to left pointing arrows. Unconscious masked primes were
presented 116ms in advance of the target stimulus. Surprisingly they found
a negative compatibility effect (NCE); such that when the prime was
congruent with the target (i.e. pointed in the same direction), reaction times
were slower than when the primes were incongruent with the target. They
suggested that this reversal of priming is accounted for by exogenous
inhibition of the unconscious prime. They present evidence from the
lateralised readiness potential in support of their claim. Initial activation of
the LRP for the primed hand was quickly replaced by an opposite going LRP.
Since the LRP measures hand specific response preparation, they argue that
this reversal shows inhibition of the primed response. Such a mechanism
could work to prevent automatic responses to insignificant changes in the
environment by inhibiting partial response activation that is no longer on line.
However, the exact mechanism behind this NCE has been questioned in
recent years (see also chapter 3). L1eras and Enns (2004) suggest that the
reversal of the priming effect is caused by an interaction between the prime
and the mask, whereby the physical characteristics of the mask reverse the
effects of the prime. Since the mask is a compound of left and right pointing
arrows (see figure 5.1), the onset of the mask effectively involves the
addition of the arrows pointing in the opposite direction to those presented in
the prime. L1eras and Enns (2004) argue that it is the updating of the visual
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scene from the prime presentation to the mask presentation which causes
the reversal of priming effect. Similarly, Verleger et al. (2004) showed that
the reversal of the LRP was only evident when using related masks and not
when using unrelated masks. In addition, they show that for related masks
the LRP reversal appears to be accounted for by an increased activation
over the motor cortex contralateral to the uri-primed hand following the onset
of the mask. They claim that this shows that rather than reflecting inhibition,
this LRP reversal indexes preparation of the un-primed hand caused by the
interaction between the prime and the mask.
Pramstraa and Seiss (2005) also measured EEG during a similar task to that
employed by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998). They explored whether an
N2 was observed for congruent go trials. An N2 here would reflect the
conflict induced by the reversal of the initial prime effect. They found no
genuine N2 on these trials and thus concluded that the inhibition involved in
producing the NCE is not mediated by frontal control mechanisms. They
suggest that the NCE is caused by reciprocal inhibition between the
response alternatives and that it is regulated from within the motor system. It
is also noteworthy that they did find a pseudo N2 over central electrodes
which appeared to be caused by averaging together right and left hand
responses. Since in the final stages of motor activation an asymmetry is
observed in the negative readiness potential (indexed by the LRP), an
increased negativity would be expected over the left hemisphere for trials
with a right response, and over the right hemisphere for trials with a left
response. When averaging together these two responses this produces an
impression of negativity over central electrodes.
The experiment described in this chapter explored behavioural and ERP
priming effects in a go/no-go task to allow more direct examination of
unconscious modulation of frontal inhibition/control mechanisms (see chapter
2 for more details). Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as
possible to arrows in one direction, and refrain from responding to arrows
pointing in another direction. The stimuli (see figure 5.1) were identical to
those originally employed by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998). As discussed
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above, this particular prime-mask combination is known to produce a
negative compatibility effect where the mask causes the reversal of the
activation induced by the prime. In this chapter the initial effect of the prime
will be described as the prime effect and the reversal of this effect will be
termed the prime-mask effect.
Table 5.1: Prime/prime-mask effectsandhypotheses for experiment 1
Target
Prime/Prime-Mask Effect (Hypotheses)
No
Type Go/No-go No-Go/Go Neutral
Prime
Congruent Gol
Incongruent Gol
Incongruent Go
Congruent Go
Go 81. Slower reaction times. Neutral8 2. Faster reaction times. Go
Go
E1. Early N2 associated
E2. Early N2 associated
with no-go prime-mask
with no-go prime.
effe ct.
Incongruent No-gol
Congruent No-gol
Congruent No-go
Incongruent No-go
83. Fewer false alarms.
84. More false alarms.
No-Go Neutral No-go
E1. Early N2 associated
E2. Early N2 associated
No-go
with no-go prime-mask
with no-go prime.
effect.
E3. Reduced target-related
E4. Increased target-
related N2.
N2.
Table 5.1 shows the prime effect and the prime-mask effect for the different
conditions in this experiment. The prime type and prime-mask congruency
are written in black with the prime-mask effect in red. Since neutral and no
prime trials have no initial prime effect, they also have no prime-mask effect.
However, for the two conditions with active primes the initial effects of the
prime are reversed. In all analysis and figures in this chapter, conditions are
labelled relative to the prime congruency not the prime-mask effect. Where
conditions are described and interpreted in terms the prime-mask effect, they
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will be labelled as such (for example no-go prime-mask effect). Each cell
also contains the main hypotheses for that condition with respect to the
neutral prime condition. Hypotheses B1 to B4 outline the predicted
behavioural priming effects, while hypotheses E1 to E4 specify the predicted
ERP effects.
Hypotheses
Reaction times and error rates are predicted to follow the NCE with fastest
reaction times to incongruent go trials and slowest reaction times to
congruent go trials (Hypotheses B1 and B2 in figure 5.1). Similarly false
alarm rates should be reduced for incongruent no-go trials and increased for
congruent no-go trials (Hypotheses B3 and B4 in figure 5.1). In addition, if
the unconscious primes are able to facilitate inhibition or control functions
then they should affect the no-go N2/P3 complex. If this effect is related to
unconscious modulation of the frontocentral no-go N2/P3 complex, then
these components should be maximally distributed over frontocentral
electrodes. This modulation could occur either in terms of latency of these
components, or in terms of amplitude. For example, if the unconscious
information (the prime-mask effect) codes for a go response while the target
codes for a no-go response (congruent no-go condition) one might expect
greater N2 amplitude, reflecting the fact that inhibition was more difficult to
achieve, since the response was already partially activated (Hypothesis E4
in table 5.1). Conversely, N2/P3 amplitude should be reduced for
incongruent no-go (congruent no-go prime-mask effect) trials in comparison
to neutral no-go trials, if the prime-mask effect was successful in initiating the
processes associated with these components (Hypothesis E3 in table 5.1).
Similarly, if the unconscious prime in combination with the mask codes for a
no-go response then this might shift the N2 or P3 earlier in time (Hypothesis
E1 in table 5.1). Importantly, if the unconscious information in the prime is
able to directly initiate these components, rather than facilitating performance
through priming of processing of the target stimulus then there should be
some modulation of the ERP waveforms at frontocentral electrodes which is
entirely determined by the nature of the prime, regardless of the target
(Hypotheses E1 and E2 in table 5.1).
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Method
Participants
Sixteen paid volunteers (eight male and eight female) were recruited by
means of poster advertisement. Participants received £15 in compensation
for their time. All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected
to normal vision. The mean age of participants was 24 years and nine
months, with a range of 18 to 32 years.
Experimental Procedure
All participants completed 16 blocks of the go/no-go task and two blocks of
the prime detection and prime identification trials in each of the two
experimental sessions. The two sessions were always separated by exactly
24 hours to ensure that they were both conducted at the same time of day,
and not too far apart. There were four practice blocks at the beginning of
each session; two go/no-go, one prime identification and one prime
detection.
The go and no-go stimuli were left and right pointing double arrows (» and
<«). These were presented in black on a white screen positioned 1OOcm
from the participants, and measured 3.5cm across and 1.9cm from top to
bottom. Each stimulus was used as go in one session and no-go in the other
session, with the order counterbalanced across participants. The
participants were informed that that they had a time limit of 500 milliseconds
(ms) to respond to the go stimuli and that they should react as quickly as
possible without sacrificing accuracy. Masked primes were presented prior
to some of the target stimuli. These were congruent with, incongruent with,
or neutral «> or ><) to the target stimulus. There were an equal number of
each of these trial types and trials with no prime presented. The primes were
masked by the two stimuli superimposed over one another (3g~). The
precise sequence of stimuli is presented in figure 5.1. Each go/no-go block
contained 64 trials (16 from each condition) presented in a random order.
The response hand was varied from block to block, with the starting hand
counterbalanced across participants.
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Fixation Prime Mask Target Blank Feedback Blink
A8 B B B DB "'''''"''
B8BBBDB "U"'~,,
c8 B B B DG "'''''"''
700 16 100 100 500 500 1000
Figure 5.1: Stimuli for experiment 1. (a) an incongruent trial (b) a congruent trial and (c) a
neutral trial. The feedback screens signify the three different types of feedback received
during the task.
In the prime detection task one of the primes «<, », >< or <» was
presented on half the trials and no prime was presented on the other trials.
Participants were required to indicate, without time restriction, whether the
prime was present or absent. The timing of the stimuli was identical to that
used in the go/no-go task, but no target stimulus was presented (in
accordance with the procedure employed by Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998).
In the prime identification task participants were required to choose whether
the prime was left pointing or right pointing. Half the trials contained the left
pointing arrow prime and half contained the right pointing arrow prime. As
well as the trials where the prime was presented for 16ms, some longer
prime presentation trials (48ms) were included. In addition to recording the
responses on these tasks the participants were asked at the end of the block
whether they felt they could see the masked primes.
Behavioural Results
Awareness of Primes
Of the sixteen participants only two reported any ability to detect or recognise
the masked primes when presented for 16ms. All other participants
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indicated that they were randomly guessing the answer. T-tests showed that
d' values for the prime detection and prime identification tasks using all
sixteen subjects did not significantly differ from zero. Prime detection d'
values ranged from -0.51 to 1.84 with a mean of 0.219 (t(15)=1.556,
p=0.141). Prime identification d' values ranged from -1.57 to 0.91 with a
mean of -0.283 (t(15)= -2.033, p=0.06). Despite the fact that the overall d-
values did not significantly differ from zero, a number of individual scores
were high enough to suggest some awareness of the primes. Participants
(n=8) with prime identification d-values more than 0.16 away from zero, or
prime detection d-values more than 0.51 away from 0 were classed as
'aware' (this corresponded to approximately 47% to 52% correct and 45% to
55% correct for the two tasks respectively). This left a total of eight
participants who had no awareness of the primes; these were classed as 'not
aware'. T-tests for prime detection (t(7)=1.107, P =0.31) and prime
identification (t(7)=0.79, P =0.45) showed no significant deviation from zero in
these participants. Prime detection rates for the aware participants
significantly differed from zero(t(7)=2.683, p<0.05), with prime identification
performance approaching significance(t(7)=-2.15, p =0.069).
Performance on the long duration primes (measured by d') did not
significantly differ from chance (M=-0.6; t(15)=-0.7, p=0.5). However on
closer examination of participants' scores it appeared that while some
subjects were performing significantly above chance, others were performing
below chance, with only two subjects performing near to chance (40% to
60% correct). Nine subjects appeared to perform well below chance, with
the other seven performing above chance. A further t-test was run on the
absolute d' scores to give the difference from chance independent of whether
this was above or below chance. This test confirmed that performance on
the task was significantly better than would be expected by chance (M=3.83;
t(15)=5.6, p<0.001). Similarly, splitting the group between above and below
chance performers and running t-tests on the two groups separately using
their forced-choice scores showed that the above chance group performed
significantly greater than 50% (M=83%; t(6)=8.8, p<0.001) and the below
chance group performed significantly below 50% (M=13%; t(8)=-3.2, p<0.05).
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It is important to note that dividing the groups based on whether they
performed above or below chance is likely to substantially increase the
probability that these groups differ from chance regardless of their actual
performance. The t values must therefore be treated with some caution, but
examination of the mean scores of the two groups at 83% and 13% show
that these scores were not simply marginally above or below 50%
performance and are therefore unlikely to be merely due to natural variation
from chance.
Priming
The behavioral results on the go/no-go task replicated Eimer and
Schlaghecken's (1998) NeE, with fastest reaction times (in milliseconds) for
incongruent go trials and slowest reaction times for congruent go trials with
reaction times to neutral trials and no prime trials in between (see table
5.2.1). A 2x4 mixed ANOVA with prime congruency as a four level repeated
measures factor and awareness as an independent measures factor
revealed a significant main effect of prime congruency (F(3,42)=91.1,
p<0.001). However, there was no main effect of awareness (F(1,14)=0.05,
p=0.84) and no significant interaction between awareness and prime
congruency (F(3,42)=1.42, p=0.25). Subsequent t-tests (corrected for
multiple comparisons) revealed that all four prime congruency conditions
were significantly different from the other three conditions with the exception
that no prime trials did not significantly differ from neutral prime trials (t(15) =
2.1, p>0.05). In addition, reaction times were not significantly different for the
two different types of neutral trials (t(15) = 1.1, p=0.31).
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Table 5.2.1: Mean Reaction times (and Standard Deviations) for co trials
Congruent Incongruent Neutral No prime
All 395 (21) 338 (25) 359 (23) 362 (22)
Aware 401 (15) 337 (22) 360 (13) 360 (13)
Not
Aware
390 (25) 338 (29) 358 (30) 363 (29)
Table 5.2.2: Mean accuracy (and SO) for I 0 and no-so trials
Congruent Incongruent Neutral No Totalprime
Go 0.88 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.93(0.10) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)All
No-go 0.75 0.94 0.89 0.92 0.87(0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Go 0.85 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.92
Aware (0.13) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
No-go 0.74 0.95 0.90 0.92 0.86(0.16) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Go 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94Not (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Aware No-go 0.76 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.87(0.16) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Similarly, accuracy was lowest on congruent trials for both go and no-go
targets (see table 5.2.2). A three way mixed ANOVA with prime congruency
(four levels) and target type (two levels) as repeated measures factors, and
awareness as an independent measures factor revealed a significant main
effect of prime congruency (F(3,42)=36.2, p<O.001) a main effect of target
(F(1,14)=8.84, p<O.05) as well as a target by prime congruency interaction
(F(3,42)=12.56, p<O.001). Once again there was no main effect of
awareness and no interaction between awareness and any other factors.
Inspection of table 5.2.2 also reveals that the main effect of target was due to
significantly greater accuracy for go trials than no-go trials. Subsequent one
way ANOVAs were conducted to explore the interaction between target type
and prime congruency. A significant main effect of congruency was present
for both go trials (F(3,42)=12.56, p<O.001) and no-go trials (F(3,42)=12.56,
p<O.001). Inspection of table 5.2.2 reveals that although this effect was
present for both go and no-go trials, a greater cost of prime congruency was
observed for no-go than go trials. Subsequent t-tests revealed that
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congruent go trial accuracy significantly differed from all other conditions (at
p<0.005 uncorrected) with other comparisons for go trials not reaching
significance. Pair-wise comparisons of no-go accuracy were all significant
(at p<0.005 uncorrected) with the exception of the comparison between no
prime and incongruent trials, which failed to reach the corrected p value
(p=0.015). Finally, there was no significant correlation between participants'
performance on the forced-choice tasks and the amount of priming in the
go/no-go task either for reaction times in the go trials or for error rates in the
go or the no-go trials, suggesting that the influence of the masked primes in
the go/no-go task was independent of their visibility.
EEG Results
ERPs were formed for each condition relative to the onset of the target
stimulus for each of the sixteen participants. ERPs were formed from an
average of between 160 and 200 trials per condition with a minimum of 60
trials per condition and approximately equal numbers of left (average 94
trials) and right (average 95 trials) hand response trials.
Lateralised Readiness Potential
Figure 5.2 shows grand average LRP for the four go conditions with stimulus
onset at time zero (prime onset at -116ms, signified by dashed vertical line).
Initial analysis focused on LRP onset for congruent, incongruent and neutral
go conditions as well as the no prime go condition. ANOVA showed a
significant main effect of prime congruency on LRP onset (F(1.5,23.3)=8.79,
p<0.01), with subsequent t-tests showing that LRP onset was significantly
earlier for incongruent trials in comparison to congruent (t(15)=6.74,
p<0.001), and neutral trials (t(15)=4.75, p<0.001). In addition, congruent go
trials showed significantly later LRP onset compared with neutral (t(15)=2.89,
p<0.05) and no prime trials (t(15)=4.03, p<0.005). Neutral go LRP onset did
not significantly differ from incongruent go LRP onset or go LRP onset.
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1
- No Prime Go
- Congruent Go
- Incongruent Go
- Neutral Go
-3
Figure 5.2: LRP for go target trials in experiment 1 relative to stimulus onset. Prime onset at -
116ms signified by dashed line.
Amplitude analysis was conducted on the six conditions in which a prime
was presented. These six conditions are presented in figure 5.3. ANOVA
was conducted with prime type (go, no-go, neutral) and target type (go, no-
go) as repeated measures factors. Awareness was included as a between
participants factor to check whether any prime-related modulations were
related to visibility of the primes. This analysis revealed a significant main
effect of prime in the 50 to 150ms time window (F(1.7,24)=5.9, p<0.05), with
a significant linear contrast (F(1,14)=8.4, p<0.01) revealing that no-go prime
trials showed the least negative amplitude and go prime trials showed the
most negative amplitude, with neutral trials in between. There was no
significant main effect of target or target x prime interaction in this time
window. Additionally, there were no significant effects involving awareness.
These early prime-related separations suggest that the unconscious primes
were directly initiating the motor response. From 150 to 220ms there was a
significant main effect of prime (F(1.5,20)=6.8, p<0.01), with a significant
linear contrast (F(1,14)=9.3, p<0.01) revealing that no-go prime trials were
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now more negative in comparison to neutral and go prime trials. This
reversal reflects the prime-mask effect induced by the mask. There was no
significant main effect of target or target x prime interaction in this time
window and no significant effects of awareness. It is important to note that
the congruent no-go condition shows a partial onset of the LRP in this period,
this once again suggests direct unconscious LRP activation, in this case in
response to the prime-mask effect. In a 220ms to 500ms time window there
was a significant main effect of target (F(1,14)=29.8, p<O.001), signifying an
increased LRP for go target trials
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Figure 5.3: LRP waveforms for experiment 1.
Frontal No-go N2 and P3 Analysis
Initial analysis focused on the specific a-priori hypotheses outlined in the
introduction, namely that the no-go N2 will vary in amplitude or onset
dependent on the nature of the unconscious prime. This specific hypothesis
was explored by calculating difference waveforms for each of the three no-go
conditions in comparison to the neutral go condition. In addition, the
difference between the no-go and go trials where no prime was presented
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was included as a further baseline of the normal no-go N2 P3 complex.
Analysis of these difference waveforms was conducted at electrode Fz in line
with previous research showing a frontocentral maximum for the no-go N2
and P3. This analysis was initially performed with all participants regardless
of their performance on the forced-choice tasks. Initial analysis focused on
the onset of the no-go N2 for the four no-go conditions only. N2 onset was
explored by determining the greatest negative peak in each difference
waveform and calculating the onset of that peak using the segmented
regression technique described in chapter 4.
Figure 5.4 shows the difference waveforms for the four no-go conditions. N2
onset for each participant was calculated using the segmented regression
technique (see chapter 4). Three participants were excluded from this
analysis because the N2 was not well defined enough to allow onset
calculation in one or more condition. The nature of the prime modulated N2
onset for no-go trials (F(2.13,25.6)=29, p<.001). Mean onset for the
incongruent (no-go prime-mask effect) no-go condition (M = 137.1ms, SO =
25.1ms) was earlier than the congruent (go prime-mask effect) condition
(M=248ms, SO=29.1ms; t(12)=10.7, p<O.001;) as well as the neutral
condition (M=216ms, SO=38ms; t(12)=7.3, p<O.001) and the no prime
condition (M=213ms, SO=31.7ms; t(12)=7.6, p<O.001). The modulation of
N2 onset was consistent with the time between the onset of the mask and
the onset of the target (see Figure 1), such that the early N2 in the
incongruent no-go condition occurred around 100ms earlier than in the
congruent and neutral no-go conditions. There was no main effect of
awareness on N2 onset.
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Figure 5.4: Difference ERP waveforms for the four no-go conditions at electrode Fz, with
respect to target onset.
Two separate two-way ANOVAs were conducted at electrode Fz for the four
no-go difference waveforms to explore the amplitude of the no-go N2 and
P3. The N2 time window (250ms to 350ms) was chosen to encompass the
period around the peak latency of the typical no-go N2. Similarly the P3 time
window (450ms to 550ms) was meant to capture any differences in average
amplitude of the no-go P3. Each ANOVA (one for each time window)
included prime congruency as a repeated measures factor (congruent,
incongruent, neutral and no-prime) and awareness as an independent factor.
In the N2 time window there was a siqnificant main effect of prime
congruency (F(1.8,25.5)=1 3.01, p<0.001), but no main effect of awareness
(F(1,14)=0.34, p=0.57) and no prime type x awareness interaction
(F(1.8,25.5)=0.6, p=0.31). Follow up t-tests confirmed that congruent no-go
trials (m=-5.9; std=4.2) showed significantly more negative amplitude than
both neutral (m=-4.1; std=2.8; t(15)=-2.7, p<0.05) and incongruent no-go
trials (m=0.25; std=2.4; t(15)=-5.9, p<0.001). Similarly, neutral no-go trials
showed significantly more negative amplitude than incongruent no-go trials
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(t(15)=-6.4, p<0.001). Neutral no-go amplitude did not significantly differ
from no-prime no-go trials (m=2.7; std=3.3; t(15)=0.25, p=0.8).
In the P3 time window there was once again a significant main effect of
prime congruency (F(1.2,17.2)=16.4, p<0.001) but no significant main effect
of awareness (F(1,14)=0.3, p=0.57) and no interaction between awareness
and prime type (F(1.2,17.2)=1.54, p=0.24). Follow up t-tests confirmed that
no-go P3 average amplitude was significantly greater for congruent no-go
trials (m=4.5; std=5.8) in comparison to both neutral (m=2.09; std=3.7;
t(15)=3.4, p<0.005) and incongruent no-go trials (m=-O.4; std=3.3; t(15)=-4.2,
p<0.001). Similarly, neutral no-go trials showed significantly greater average
amplitude than incongruent no-go trials (t(15)=3.9, p<0.001). Neutral no-go
P3 amplitude was not significantly different to no-prime no-go P3 amplitude
(m=2.7; std=3.3; t(15)=-1.2, p=0.25).
Further analysis was conducted to explore the possibility that the magnitude
of the N2 and P3 effects was affected by participants' scores on the forced-
choice tasks. Correlations were calculated between the three no-go
difference amplitudes in each time window and performance on the two
forced-choice tasks measured by both percentages correct and d'. In
addition, absolute values of d prime and the absolute difference from 50%
performance were also calculated and correlated with the ERP amplitudes.
Differences between each of the three no-go difference waveforms were also
calculated as a measure of the amount of priming between conditions.
Finally, correlations between no-go N2 onset, and forced-choice
performance were explored. None of these correlations were found to be
significant, suggesting that the modulation of the ERPs in the participants
was not due to residual awareness of the primes. Finally, running two one-
way ANOVAs using only the eight participants classed as unaware confirmed
that the amplitude and onset modulation of the N2 and the amplitude of the
no-go P3 were still present for this group.
Finally, to explore whether early frontal ERP activity was modulated by the
nature of the primes two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted
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with prime type (go, no-go, neutral) and target type (go, no-go) as repeated
measures factors and awareness as an independent factor. Since the
analysis described above found that incongruent no-go N2 showed an earlier
onset than the other two conditions, it is important to consider if this early N2
might also be evident for the congruent go condition. Such a finding would
imply that the unconscious primes were directly activating the frontal control
processes indexed by the no-go N2. Figure 5.5 shows the raw ERPs at
electrode Fz for these six conditions. Visual inspection of the ERPs shows
the N2 for congruent and neutral no-go trials peaking around 320ms after
stimulus onset. The incongruent no-go N2 is also evident, peaking at around
200ms. Importantly, an identical N2 appears to be present in this time
window for congruent go trials (no-go prime mask-effect). ANOVA confirmed
that there was a significant main effect of prime (F(1.1,15.6)=17, p<0.001)
from 150 to 200ms after stimulus onset, with go prime trials showing
significantly increased negative amplitude in comparison to neutral
(F(1,14)=18.8, p<0.001) and no-go prime trials(F(1, 14)=35, p<0.001). There
were no significant effects involving awareness or target type in this time
window and no target x prime interaction. This finding suggests that the
early N2 in response to the prime-mask effect was directly initiated by the
unconscious prime, since it is present even when the final target stimulus
codes for a go response.
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Figure 5.5: Grand average ERPwaveforms for six primedconditions at electrode Fz.
N2 and P3 topography was explored by computing scalp maps of the
difference waveforms for those conditions which showed a notable N2 or P3.
Figure 5.6 shows the scalp maps for the no-go N2 for the neutral prime, no
prime and congruent prime conditions. In all three conditions the no-go N2
appears to initially show a frontal maximum, beginning around 260 to 270
ms. This initial frontal maximum then becomes rather more centrally and
parietally distributed, which in the neutral and no prime trials ends up as a
separate parietal component. The bottom right panel shows the early no-go
N2 for incongruent no-go trials. This condition showed a similar frontal
component, but not the parietal contribution observed in the other conditions.
These apparently separate frontal and parietal contributions to the difference
waveforms in this time window will be discussed in more detail in the
following sections.
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Figure 5.6: Scalp distribution of no-go N2 for no prime (top left), congruent (top right), neutral
(bottom left) and incongruent no-go trials (bottom right) . Each scalp map represents the
average amplitude for the specified 10ms time window.
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Figure 5.7: Scalp distribution of no-go P3 for congruent (left panel), no prime (central panel)
and neutral (right panel) no-go trials .
Figure 5.7 shows the scalp distribution of the no-go P3 which appears to
have a fronto central distribution in all three conditions, but is more focused
on Fz FCz and Cz in the congruent no-go condition. A bilateral
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parietal/occipital negativity is also present in this time window and will be
examined in the later more comprehensive analysis of go/no-go differences.
Early visual ERP effects
To explore whether the observed modulation of the no-go N2 and P3 were
mediated by differences in early visual ERP components EEG activity was
explored at electrode Oz. Figure 5.8 shows the grand average ERPs at
electrode Oz. ANOVA focused on the P1 (-25 to 15ms) found no significant
main effect of prime or target and no significant interaction. Similarly, a time
window focused on the N1 (25 to 75ms) showed no main effects and no
interaction. In a third time window (75ms to 175ms) there was a significant
main effect of prime type (F(2,29.5)=21.5, p<0.001), with go primes showing
significantly more positive amplitude than neutral (F(1,15)=35.2, p<0.001) or
no-go primes (F(1,15)=23.2, p<0.001). Neutral and no-go prime trials did not
differ.
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Figure 5.8: Grand average ERPs for six conditions where a prime was presented at electrode
Oz.
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Visual ERP effects were explored further by computing grand average ERPs
dependent on the direction of the prime and target arrows regardless of the
experimental condition. Since each participant completed one session
where a left arrow signified a go response and another session with the
reverse opposite mapping, the grand average presented above (figure 5.8) is
collapsed across these two response mappings. Therefore, to explore ERPs
for the different visual primes and targets separate grand averages were
formed for sessions requiring different response mappings. Analysis at Oz
for these two different response mapping revealed essentially the same
effects as those observed for all subjects - namely a significant increase in
amplitude from 75ms to 175ms after target onset for go trials.
Further analysis explored possible lateralised ERP effects dependent on the
type of stimulus presented. 01-02 and P07-P08 difference waveforms
were calculated for each different physical prime/target combination,
regardless of the response. Figure 5.9 shows these grand average ERP
difference waveforms. Visual inspection reveals that the early visual ERP
components were slightly right lateralised, with the P1 showing decreased
amplitude over electrode 01 in comparison to 02. The N1 component also
appears slightly right lateralised showing slightly lower amplitude at electrode
P07 in comparison to P08. More importantly there appears to be some
consistent effects of prime type and target on these difference waveforms,
examined in more detail below. ANOVA were conducted in various time
windows with prime type (left, right, neutral) and target type (left and right) as
repeated measures factors. In addition, response mapping was included as
a repeated measures factor to explore whether the differences any
differences were related to the meaning of the response rather than simply
their physical differences. For example a left arrow might only produce a
right hemisphere response when it is designated as the go stimulus. This
would reflect an N2pc response to the arrow, which should exhibit a posterior
contralateral negativity following a target stimulus but not a non-target
distracter (see chapter 2).
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Figure 5.9: Lateralised occipital/parietal effects dependent on the physical stimuli presented in
experiment 1.
For the P07-P08 difference, ANOVA in the P1 time window (-25 to 15ms)
revealed a significant main effect of prime (F(1.7,25.3)=5.5, p<O.05), but no
main effect of target type (F(1,15)=2, p=O.1 8) and no significant effects
involving response mapping. A significant linear contrast (F(1,15)=7.3,
p<O.05) was evident such that left pointing primes showed greater positivity
over the right hemisphere than right pointing arrow primes, with neutral
primes in between. Similarly, in the N1 time window (25 to 75ms) there was
a significant main effect of prime type (F(1,1 5)=3.8, p<O.05) but not target
type (F(1,15)=O.6, p=0.44), and no effects of response mapping . A
significant linear contrast (F(1,15)=6.4, p<O.05) was evident for prime type
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with left prime trials showing reduced negativity over the right hemisphere
and right prime trials showing the greatest increased N1 amplitude over
electrode P07. Similar results were obtained for the 01-02 comparison,
with the P1 (F(1.4,20.2)=S.4, p<0.01) and N1 (F(1.7,25.7)=3.7, p<0.05)
showing significant modulation dependent on prime type. From around
150ms after stimulus presentation the difference ERPs begin to separate
based on the target, with increased activity contralateral to the direction of
the arrows. ANOVA confirmed significant main effects of target for 200 to
300ms post-stimulus for both the 01-02 difference (F(1,15)=11.5, p<0.01)
and the P07-POS difference waveform (F(1,15)=17.6, p<0.001). As in the
early time windows, there were no significant effects involving response
mapping. These results suggest that the particular physical characteristics of
the prime and target stimuli were coded extremely early in the visual system,
despite the primes being completely unconscious. These early visual
asymmetries were independent of the functional significance of the stimulus
and simply reflected the physical characteristics of the stimuli.
Go/no-go Differences
This section provides a more comprehensive analysis of go/no-go
differences throughout the epoch and across the scalp. Figure 5.10 shows
the raw ERP waveforms for the six conditions where a prime was presented.
Visual inspection of the ERPs reveals a clear frontocentral negativity peaking
around 350ms after stimulus onset for the congruent no-go condition and for
the neutral no-go condition, which likely reflects a no-go N2. An earlier
negativity is also evident maximal over frontal and central electrodes peaking
around 200ms after stimulus onset in the congruent go condition and the
incongruent no-go condition. Interestingly in both these conditions the prime-
mask effect codes for a no-go response, and thus this earlier negativity could
reflect an early no-go N2 elicited by the unconscious prime-mask effect.
There is also frontal positivity in this same time window for the two conditions
that contain a go prime-mask effect (incongruent go and congruent no-go),
which appear to be more positive than the conditions with a neutral prime.
Also evident in the ERP waveforms is a P300 component which is maximal
over central/parietal electrodes and is bilaterally distributed. This component
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seems larger for the three go conditions and its onset appears to be
modulated by prime congruency such that its onset is earliest for incongruent
go trials and latest for congruent go trials.
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Figure 5.10: Grand average ERPs for six conditions where a prime was presented. Scalp map
shows the arrayof electrodes presented in the figure. Prime onsetsignified by dotted line.
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Statistical analysis of the go/no-go differences was explored further using a
six way ANOVA with prime type (go,no-go,neutral), target type (go,no-go),
time (85-135, 135-235, 235-385 and 385-585ms), hemisphere (Ieft,right),
anterior-posterior (Fp, F, FC, C, P, and 0) as within-subjects factors and
awareness as a between subjects factor. There was no main effect of
awareness nor any significant interaction with awareness and any other
variable or combinations of variables. Similarly, there was no main effect of
hemisphere and the only interaction to reach significance was a hemisphere
x anterior-posterior x time x prime interaction (F (7.7,108)=2.72, p<0.01).
Further exploration revealed that this interaction was caused by larger left
sided amplitude for neutral prime conditions in the early time window, which
then reversed over frontal electrodes in the second time window before
largely disappearing in the final two time windows. Importantly, the four-way
interaction prime x target x anterior-posterior x time was highly significant,
suggesting that further exploration of the effects of the prime and target
stimuli and their interaction with anterior-posterior electrode locations in the
four time windows was required.
Four follow up three-way ANOVAs were conducted exploring prime type (go,
no-go, neutral), target type (go, no-go) and anterior-posterior electrode
location (Fpz, Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, and Oz) in each of the four time windows.
Since awareness and hemisphere appeared to play no role in the
relationship between prime and target type, all subjects were analysed in a
single group regardless of their awareness of the prime, with analysis
conducted on six electrodes along the midline. The time windows were
selected to capture the effects of the prime, prime-mask effect and target
respectively. The first time window was centred on 201-251ms after prime
onset which was equivalent to 85ms to 135ms after target onset. This period
was chosen to capture any initial negativity beginning 200ms after prime
onset (an N2 to the prime). Since the prime effect would be immediately
followed by a prime-mask effect, the second time window (135 to 235ms
after target onset) was chosen to reflect the period around any N2 related to
the prime-mask effect. Similarly, the third time window (235ms to 385ms
post target onset) was chosen to reflect the period around the peak latency
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of the N2 related to the target. Finally, the fourth time (385ms to 585ms)
window was chosen to capture any no-go P3 activity which is normally seen
following the no-go N2.
In the early time window (201ms to 251ms post prime; 85ms to 135ms post
target), there was no significant main effect of target (F(1,15)=1.07, p=0.75)
and no target x prime interaction (F(1.6,23.4)=0.11, p=0.7). There was a
main effect of prime (F(1.9,28.7)=22.12, p<O.001), as well as a prime x
anterior-posterior (F(3.7,55.5)=7.6, p<O.001) and a marginally significant
target x anterior-posterior interaction (F(2.1,32)=3.3, p<0.05), but no three
way interaction (F (1,15)= 0.11, p=0.7).
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Figure 5.11: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in early timewindow dependent on prime
type (left panel) and target type (rightpanel). Amplitude in microvolts on y axis and electrodes
onx axis.
Figure 5.11 shows a summary of the data for this time window. The left
panel shows that the main effect of prime appears to be present across all
electrode sites, but maximal at electrodes Fz and Fez, with this decreased
difference at posterior sites likely driving the prime x anterior-posterior
interaction. Follow up comparisons revealed that there was no significant
difference between no-go and neutral prime trials (all ps>O.1) at any
electrode sites. There were significant differences between go primes and
both neutral and no-go primes at all six electrode locations (all p values less
than 0.001 uncorrected, with go versus no-go at electrode Pz the only p
value not reaching p<O.001), with the effect maximal at Fz. The right panel
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shows that the go and no-go targets appear to have a similar amplitude at all
electrode sites, with only a slight difference evident at electrode Fpz. T-tests
confirmed that there was no significant difference between go and no-go
targets at any of the six electrode sites (all t values less than 1.3, p>O.2).
Thus, the significant effects in the early time window are driven by a
widespread increase in ERP amplitude in response to go primes in
comparison to neutral and no-go primes peaking at electrode Fz.
In the second time window (135 to 235ms after target onset), the initial
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of prime (F(1.2,18.3)=26.37,
p<O.001) and significant prime x anterior-posterior (F(1.9,28.7)=22.12,
p<O.001) and target x posterior anterior (F(2,30.1)=4.35, p<O.05)
interactions. There was no main effect of target (F(1,15)=3.4, p=O.08), no
interaction between prime and target (F(1.35,20.2)=3.78, p=O.055) and no
three way interaction between prime, target and anterior-posterior
(F(3.5,51.7)=1.9, p=O.13).
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Figure 5.12: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in second time window dependent on
prime type(leftpanel) and target type(rightpanel).
Figure 5.12 shows the data from the second time window. The left panel
shows that trials with a no-go prime appear to be more positive than the
neutral trials, with neutral trials in turn more positive than go prime trials.
This effect appears to be evident across frontal electrodes and much less so
at parietal and occipital sites. T-tests confirmed significant differences (at
p<O.003 uncorrected, with only two comparisons failing to reach p<O.001)
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between all prime conditions at Fpz, Fz and FCz. At Cz the difference
between no-go prime trials and the other two conditions reached significance
(at p <0.001 uncorrected), while the difference between go and neutral trials
was not significant (t(15)=-1.9, p=0.08). At electrode Pz and Oz only the
comparisons between go and no-go primes remained significant (at
p<0.001). The difference between the prime conditions peaked at electrode
Fz and FCz.
The right panel of figure 5.12 shows that go target trials appear to be slightly
more positive than no-go target trials, especially at central and parietal
electrodes. T-tests confirmed that there were marginally significant
differences at electrodes Cz, Pz and Oz (p<0.025, uncorrected), but not at
anterior electrodes. Summarising the results from the second time window, it
appears that once again the major contribution to the differences was a
frontal difference dependent on prime. This effect was reversed from the
effect in the first time window such that go primes trials appeared more
negative than neutral and no-go prime trials. This effect likely reflects
modulation of the frontal no-go negativity associated with the prime-mask
effect. A greater negativity was evident for go prime (no-go prime-mask
effect) trials, which likely reflects the early N2 component observed for these
trials in the earlier onset analysis. A significant difference was also observed
between no-go and neutral prime trials in this time window, with no-go prime
trials showing a greater positivity. Finally, a modest effect of target type also
appeared in this second time window, which was only present at posterior
electrode sites.
In the third time window (235ms to 385ms post target onset) there was a
main effect of target (F(1.2,18.3)=26.37, p<0.001), a significant main effect of
prime (F(1.2,18.3)=26.37, p<0.001) as well as a target x prime interaction
(F(1.2,18.3)=26.37, p<0.001). In addition there was a significant interaction
between prime and anterior-posterior (F(1.2, 18.3)=26.37, p<0.001), with the
target x prime x anterior-posterior interaction also showing statistical
significance (F(1.2,18.3)=26.37, p<0.001). Figure 5.13 shows the average
amplitude for the three prime conditions separately. The figure shows that
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while there is no difference between go and no-go target trials following a go
prime, there appear to be widespread differences following a neutral and no-
go prime. This was confirmed by paired t-tests which showed significant
differences (at p<O.001) between go and no-go trials at all electrode
locations following no-go primes and neutral primes (with the exception of
Fpz which was at p<O.002 for the comparison between neutral and no-go
primes). In contrast the only significant difference following go primes was at
electrode Fpz (t(15)=3.73, p<O.002).
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Figure 5.13: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in third timewindow dependent ontarget
typefor go primes (left panel), no-go primes (middle panel) and neutral primes (rightpanel).
In addition to this differential effect of target type for the three prime type
conditions (the target x prime interaction), the relationship between prime
and target also appeared to be dependent on the anterior-posterior electrode
location (the prime x target x anterior-posterior interaction). Figure 5.14
shows the effect of prime type for go and no-go target trials separately on the
six midline electrodes. It is evident from this graph that while a frontal
modulation is present for no-go target trials (right panel) a parietal/occipital
modulation is driving the differences on go target trials (left panel). This
relationship was confirmed with paired sampled t-tests which showed that for
go trials the only significant differences (at p<O.001 uncorrected) between
prime types were at electrode Pz and Oz, with all three conditions differing
from one another at these sites. For no-go trials all three conditions
significantly differed (at p<O.001) from one another at electrodes Fz, FCz and
Cz only with the differences peaking at FCz. Go and no-go prime trials
differed at electrodes Oz and Pz and Fpz (at p<O.002).
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Figure 5.14: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in third timewindow dependent on prime
typefor go targets (left panel) and no-go targets (rightpanel).
Summarising the data from the third time window (235ms to 385ms post
target onset), there appeared to be two main effects driving the differences in
this period. The amplitude at frontal electrodes appeared to vary dependent
on prime type for no-go target trials only, while a parietal difference was
evident only for go target trials. Re-examining the ERPs presented in figure
5.10 it seems clear that the differences at frontal electrodes reflect
modulation of the frontal no-go N2 which peaks in this time window. As
described in the previous section, this component was found to be greatest
for no-go trials preceded by a no-go prime (congruent no-go), and smallest
for no-go trials following a go prime. The parietal modulation for go trials
appears to reflect modulation of a parietal P300 component which is greater
for go compared to no-go trials, with its onset apparently modulated by prime
type. The finding that amplitudes significantly differed on the upward slope
of this component indeed confirms that this component varied as a function
of prime type for go trials.
In the final time window (385 to 585ms) there was no main effect of target
(F(1,15)=3.75, p=O.07) and no main effect of prime (F(1.7,26.6)=3.4,
p=O.054). There was however a significant target x prime interaction and a
significant target x prime x anterior-posterior interaction (F(3.7,54.8)=17,
p<O.001). Figure 5.15 shows the average amplitude for the fourth time
window dependent on prime type, for go and no-go target trials. While for go
target trials go primes show more positive amplitude in comparison to no-go
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primes this effect is reversed for no-go target trials such that no-go primes
appear more positive. In addition, while these differences for go target trials
appear greatest at posterior sites, the no-go target trials differ at more
anterior electrode locations. T-tests confirmed that for go target trials, no-go
primes were significantly more negative than neutral and go-primes at
electrode Oz (P<O.001) and marginally significant at Pz (p<O.006), with no
other comparisons approaching significance. For no-go target trials no-go
prime trials were significantly (at p<O.001) more positive than neutral and go
prime trials at electrodes FCz, Cz and Pz.
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Figure 5.15: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in fourth time window dependent on
prime typefor gotargets (left panel) and no-go targets (right panel).
The parietal effects in this final time window likely once again reflect the
modulation of the parietal P300 for go trials, with this period encompassing
the falling edge of this component and thus showing the reverse direction to
the effect in the previous time window. The more anterior difference on no-
go trials most likely reflects modulation of the frontocentral no-go P3 that, as
explored above, was modulated by prime type on no-go trials.
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Figure 5.16: Grand average ERPsat electrodeFezand Pz.
Figure 5.16 shows the grand average ERPs for electrodes Fe z and Pz with
the four time windows separated by the dashed lines. These two waveforms
provide a summary of all the major finding in the comprehensive analysis of
the entire epoch described above. The effects in the first time window were
confined to frontal electrodes where trials with a go prime (congruent go and
incongruent no-go) showed an increased positivity. In the second time
window these effects reversed such that no-go primes now showed more
positive amplitude, with go primes showing increased negative amplitude.
Importantly, in both these time windows the waveforms at frontal electrodes
were uniquely determined by the unconscious prime. This second time
window also began to include differences at parietal electrodes associated
with increased P300 for go trials in comparison to no-go trials.
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The third time window centred on the no-go N2 at frontal electrodes and the
rising bank of the P300 at parietal electrodes. At frontal electrodes the no-go
N2 was found to be significantly more negative for congruent no-go trials
than neutral no-go trials, while the N2 for the incongruent no-go condition
appeared to be altogether absent in this time window. At parietal electrodes
the modulation of the P300 component for go target trials was highlighted by
significantly increased amplitude for incongruent go trials. This dissociation
between no-go effects at frontal electrodes and go effects at Pz is important
with respect to the N2 topography shown in the previous section. In the
topographic maps presented in this analysis (Figure 5.6), two contributions to
the go/no-go differences were identified. Thus while the parietal contribution
to the difference topographies reflects P300 differences between go and no-
go trials, the frontal effect reflects the no-go N2. Finally, the fourth time
window was focused on the period around the no-go P3 on frontal
electrodes, and the falling bank of the P300 at parietal electrodes. The
frontal no-go P3 was found to be largest on congruent no-go trials, while
amplitudes at Pz once again separated based on the modulation of the
P300.
LRP and go/no-go differences
To explore the possibility that the effects observed at central electrodes were
projections of movement related activity at lateral electrodes, grand average
ERPs were computed separately for left and right hand responses. Since
Praamstra and Seiss (2005) showed that a pseudo N2 was produced in a
choice reaction time version of this experiment that caused by averaging
together right and left responses, it is important to consider the contribution
of these lateralised motor effects in the current experiment. Figures 5.17
shows grand average ERPs for left and right hand trials separately at
electrodes C3, C4 and Cz for congruent and incongruent no-go conditions.
Examination of this figure reveals that there are lateralised differences
present at these electrodes. Most notably, from around 200ms after stimulus
onset the grey and black lines showing more negative amplitudes over FC3
and the converse at FC4. These lateralised motor effects reflect the partial
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onset of an LRP for congruent no-go conditions from around 180ms after
stimulus onset highlighted in the earlier LRP analysis (see figure 5.2).
Despite, this slight lateralisation of activity at central electrodes the main
effect of the N2 is apparent at both left and right electrodes for both left and
right hand responses and therefore cannot be produced by averaging
together left and right responses as was the case in Praamstra and Seiss
(2005). In addition, an earlier lateralised effect is also evident overlapping
with the prime-related effects, but once again, since the difference between
the prime conditions is different at both electrode locations and for both
conditions, this effect is not caused by the motor related asymmetries.
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Figure 5.17: Grand average ERPs for congruent no-go and incongru ent no-go tri als separated
by response hand.
Finally figure 5.18 shows the relationship between the no-go .N2 at electrode
Fz alongside the LRP for all conditions (with neutral go omitted from the N2
waveforms as they represent difference waveforms from this condition). The
dotted line represents the average onset of the N2 for the trials with a no-go
prime-mask effect (left line), and the trials with a no-go target (right line).
Following these lines down to the LRP reveals a strong relationship between
the onset of the negative component and the motor related activity.
Specifically the onset of the early no-go N2 for those trials with a no-go
prime-mask effect appears to coincide very closely with the time at which the
early LRP activation begins to return to baseline. Similarly, for congruent no-
go trials, the N2 appears to onset around the same time that the LRP in this
condition returns begins to return to baseline.
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Discussion
This investigation aimed to determine whether endogenous motor inhibition
can be initiated unconsciously. While Eimer and Schlaghecken (1 998) have
shown that exogenous inhibition may be elicited in response to unconscious
primes, this has been shown not to be modulated by frontal control
mechanisms (Praamstra & Seiss, 2005) . Leuthold and Kopp (Leuthold &
Kopp, 1998) did show N2 modulation elicited by subliminal primes, but this
component exhibited a parietal rather than a frontal topography. This
experiment, shows for the first time that the frontal No-Go N2 can be
modulated by an unconscious prime. This is in contrast to Eimer and
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Schlaghecken's (2003) proposal that this mechanism can only be engaged
by a conscious stimulus.
The current experiment varied Eimer and Schlaghecken's (1998) masked
priming paradigm to explore unconscious priming of go/no-go differences.
Participants were required to press a button as quickly as possible following
a go stimulus, and to withhold their response following a no-go stimulus. In
order to build up a readiness to respond participants were required to
respond to go targets within 500ms of their onset. Reaction times on go
trials were significantly affected by the presence of unconscious masked
primes, such that participants responded more quickly when a go target was
preceded by a no-go prime (incongruent go trial). Similarly, error rates on
both go (misses) and no-go (false alarms) were greatest for congruent trials.
These behavioural effects follow the negative compatibility effects (NCE)
described by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998).
These findings were evident despite the fact that participants were below the
objective threshold for awareness. Performance in the prime identification
and prime detection tasks did not significantly differ from chance. However,
performance on the long duration primes also did not differ from chance
despite clearly being above the subjective threshold for awareness. Further
analysis of these trials showed that participants either performed significantly
above or below chance. Since in the current experiment, the presentation of
the mask reverses the effect of the prime participants effectively perceive
both left and right pointing arrows in these trials. In fact, a number of
participants reported that they did see the arrows quickly reversing in this
task. Clearly, this finding is rather problematic for the use of the prime
identification task as a measure of awareness of the primes, since
participants may be able to reliably identify the direction but may be confused
by the fact that they see one direction followed by the other. This problem is
overcome in the current experiment by also asking participants to perform a
prime detection task. Since in this task participants are required to detect the
presence or the absence of any prime, their performance should not be
affected by any reversal effects caused by the mask. Therefore, since
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performance on this task was not significantly different from chance, it is
unlikely that participants were aware of the briefly presented primes. This
assumption is also reinforced by the finding that priming was not correlated
with prime detection performance, suggesting awareness of the primes was
independent of priming effects. However, it is important to note that the
finding of significantly below chance performance on the long duration
primes for the identification task has implications for other experiments using
these stimuli. Firstly, since most of those experiments (including Eimer &
Schlaghecken, 1998) use a similar prime identification task, it is possible that
performance was at chance despite some awareness of the masked primes
being present. Furthermore, a central claim of the exogenous inhibition
account of the NCE proposed by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) is that
negative compatibility only occurs below the threshold of awareness. The
finding that negative compatibility occurred for long duration primes (which
were clearly visible) in the prime identification task in the current experiment,
suggests rather that it is the combination of the prime and the mask that
reverses the NCE and that this reversal is independent of awareness.
The LRP also showed a similar pattern to that observed by Eimer and
Schlaghecken (1998). ANOVA confirmed that an initial separation was
evident such that incongruent go trials showed least LRP activation and
congruent go trials showed greatest LRP activation, reflecting a motor
response to the prime. These effects quickly reversed, reflecting the prime-
mask effect and leading to an earlier onset of LRP for incongruent go trials,
and a later onset for congruent go trials. Further analysis confirmed that
these early prime-related effects were also present for no-go trials,
confirming that the LRP was directly initiated by the unconscious primes.
This finding supports previous reports of direct unconscious priming of a
motor response (Dehaene et al. 1998; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Eimer &
Schlaghecken, 1998).
Initial analysis of go/no-go differences focused on the specific hypotheses
outlined in the introduction, namely that the subliminal primes will modulate
the no-go N2 and P3 on no-go target trials. This was explored both in terms
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of the onset of the N2 component, as well as the ERP amplitude in the no-go
N2 and no-go P3 time window. This analysis supported the hypothesis that
the unconscious primes were able to modulate frontal inhibition/control
mechanisms. N2 onset was significantly earlier for incongruent no-go trials
in comparison to all other conditions. Importantly, in this condition the no-go
prime-mask effect coded for a no-go response, so this shift in N2 latency
likely reflects a no-go N2 to the prime-mask interaction. This is supported by
the fact that the latency shift is very similar to the difference in time between
the prime onset and the mask onset (100ms). Importantly, the topographic
distribution showed that the no-go N2 and P3 components showed a
frontocentral maximum, although this was later replaced by a parietal
maximum.
As with the LRP, this early N2 was observed in response to the prime and
was independent of the target stimulus, suggesting that the primes were able
to directly initiate this component. This conclusion was supported by the
more comprehensive analysis of go/no-go differences, which also revealed
early effects over frontocentral electrodes uniquely dependent on the
subliminal primes. Initial activity appeared to separate based on the prime
information, with neutral and no-go primes showing an increased negativity
in comparison to go primes. This effect then reversed with go prime trials
(no-go prime-mask effect trials) showing increased negativity and no-go
prime (go prime-mask effect trials) showing increased positivity in
comparison to neutral primes. Importantly, this modulation was maximally
observed over frontocentral electrodes, suggesting that it reflected
modulation of the no-go N2. This early N2 occurred even on congruent go
trials despite the fact that ultimately a response was required to the target
stimulus. This N2 (in response to the no-go prime-maskeffect) suggests that
the response was successfully inhibited at this point, and later reactivated by
the target stimulus. This interpretation is supported by examining the LRP
and N2 for these trials, where the LRP appears to onset around the time that
the N2 component begins to return to baseline. The fact that the ERP
waveforms were determined entirely by the prime type in this time window
suggests that the primes were able to directly initiate frontal inhibition/control
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mechanisms. However, it is important to note that the functional significance
of the no-go N2 is still under debate. For example it seems likely that at least
part of this component reflects activity related to conflict monitoring and not
an active process of inhibiting the response (see chapter 2). While the
interaction between the N2 and the LRP points to an active role of this
modulation it is possible that this component simply reflects detection of a
conflict and not its resolution.
In addition to an increased negativity observed for the no-go prime-mask
effect in this time window, an opposite deflection is present for the go prime-
mask effect. A possible explanation for this is that since the neutral prime
contains one feature that is relevant to a go response and another that is
relevant to the no-go response it itself produces a moderate amount of
conflict. This would suggest that as the degree of conflict induced by the
mask increases, the modulation of this frontal component increases.
Similarly, the neutral prime may partially co-activate go and no-go responses
and would therefore be associated with a greater degree of inhibition than go
primes (or prime-mask effects) and less than no-go prime/prime-mask
effects.
In the N2 time window there was a significant modulation of no-go N2
amplitude at frontal electrodes with congruent no-go trials showing greater
N2 amplitude. Importantly, a functionally distinct modulation was evident at
parietal electrodes, where go target trials varied in amplitude. A significant
prime by target by anterior-posterior interaction showed that the frontal
modulation was exclusive to no-go target trials, while the go target trials
differed only at posterior sites. Furthermore, both the frontal no-go N2 and
parietal component were more positive for go target trials than no-go target
trials. Therefore, since the N2 difference waveforms were computed in
reference to the neutral go trials, the parietal part of the no-go N2
topographic maps in this experiment likely reflects a P300 effect and not a
parietal N2. This assumption is supported by evidence that a parietal P300
effect is often observed in go/no-go tasks which partially temporally overlaps
with the no-go N2 (Nieuwenhuis et aI., 2003).
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In the final time window, the major effect to appear was the modulation of the
frontal no-go P3, also referred to as the no-go P3 anteriorization due to the
shift in topography from a parietal to a frontal P3 for no-go trials. This
component was found to vary as a function of the subliminal primes such that
it showed greatest amplitude for congruent no-go trials and smallest
amplitude for incongruent trials. Once again, this is consistent with the
notion that the prime was able to initiate unconscious frontal control/inhibition
processes, since this component was reduced when these processes had
presumably already occurred.
Analysis of visual ERPs revealed no significant early modulation of visual P1
and N1 components. While a later separation was evident at electrode Oz
this appears later than the earliest prime-related effects at frontal electrodes.
This once again suggests that the unconscious primes were able to directly
initiate the activity at frontal electrodes, and not through perceptual priming of
the target stimulus. However, lateralised occipital and parietal effects were
evident in response to the physical characteristics of the prime and the mask.
Jongen, Smulders and Van der Hinden (2007) recently showed similar visual
asymmetries using the same arrow stimuli as those utilised in the current
experiment. As in the current task they found that these visual asymmetries
were independent of the functional significance of the arrow, and simply
reflected the coding of the visual features of the arrows. Despite the arrows
being presented at a central location, the more salient feature of the arrow
(the point) are appear asymmetrically in the direction in which the arrow
points. In the current experiment this would reflect (unconscious) visual
detection of lateralised visual features relevant for task processing. Since
these visual asymmetries were independent of the functional significance of
the arrows, as indexed by the absence of any interactions with response
mapping, they do not reflect an N2pc compnent, which should show greater
response to go than no-go stimuli.
The finding of early visual effects related to the physical characteristics of the
prime does not compromise the conclusion that the frontal effects are
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initiated by the prime, as they occur well in advance of the time at which this
lateralised activity becomes dependent on the target stimulus. In addition, it
seems necessary that some form of visual detection of the stimulus features
must be required for a response to begin to be processed, even if this is
unconscious. The possible mechanisms of the modulation observed in this
experiment, and masked priming effects in general will be discussed in more
detail in chapter 10.
The major limitation of this experiment is that it utilised a paradigm that
produces a negative compatibility effect, thus complicating the results
somewhat. In particular, the greatest prime-related effects appeared in
response to the prime-mask effect. While it is likely that this effect is
produced in this experiment by a physical interaction between the prime and
the mask, its exact mechanism remains the subject of debate. If some
inhibition based mechanism is involved in producing the NCE this might be
responsible for the N2 modulation in response to the prime-mask effect.
However, this seems unlikely in light of the fact that Praamstra and Seiss
(2005) failed to find N2 modulation in a similar task. Nonetheless, it is
important to show that a similar modulation of no-go N2 and P3 components
is evident when a prime-mask combination is used that produces a positive
compatibility effect.
Conclusions
This experiment aimed to show that frontal inhibition/control related ERP
components could be modulated by an unconscious prime. In support of this
hypothesis the frontal no-go N2 and P3 were found to vary as a function of
the unconscious information. The finding that early ERP effects were
uniquely determined by the nature of the prime suggests that as with motor
responses, motor inhibition can be directly initiated by an unconscious
stimulus. However, the choice of prime and mask in the current experiment
and the reversal of the priming effects that they produced (the NCE) make
these conclusions difficult to generalise to unconscious priming producing
more conventional priming effects.
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Chapter 6
Experiment 2 - Unconscious modulation of no-go N2
and P3 amplitude in a metacontrast masking
paradigm.
Introduction
This experiment aimed to replicate the effects of experiment 1 in a paradigm
that produced positive compatibility between the mask and the prime. The
major complication in interpretation in experiment 1 was the reversal of the
initial prime effects generating the NeE. In order to explore if the modulation
of the no-go N2 and P3 components were reliable and not simply an artefact
of this rather unusual effect of inverse priming, it was important to replicate
the effect using a paradigm that produced a positive compatibility effect. A
metacontrast masking paradigm was employed similar to that used by
Neumann and Klotz (1994). They presented participants with an array of two
different shapes - one square and one diamond. Participants were required
to press a left button for one array (for example left diamond right square)
and press a right button for the opposite array. The subliminal primes
consisted of smaller versions of these shapes that fit exactly in to the internal
contours of the target/mask. Neumann and Klotz (1994) found that the
subliminal primes were successful in priming motor responses, such that
reaction times were significantly reduced following a congruent prime. These
stimuli were selected for use in the current experiment because they are
known to produce a positive priming effect in the absence of awareness.
Hypotheses
Reaction times and error rates should follow a positive compatibility effect in
this experiment, with fastest reaction times for congruent go trials and
slowest reaction times for incongruent go trials. Similarly, accuracy should
be greatest for congruent trials and lowest for incongruent trials. If the
subliminal primes are able to influence frontal inhibition/control processes in
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this task they should also produce positive modulation of the No-go N2 and
P3. N2 and P3 amplitude should be greatest for incongruent no-go trials and
smallest for congruent no-go trials. In addition, early frontal differences
dependent on prime type should be evident if the unconscious primes can
directly initiate inhibition of the response.
Method
Participants
Twenty first-year undergraduate psychology students (three male and 17
female) participated in exchange for course credits. All participants were
right handed and had normal or corrected to normal vision. The mean age of
participants was 20 years and two months, with a range of 18 to 29 years.
Experimental Procedure
All participants completed a single experimental session lasting
approximately two hours. The participants completed 14 blocks of the go/no-
go task followed by four blocks of the prime identification task. The go/no-go
task required participants to respond as quickly as possible to one stimulus
configuration, and refrain from responding to the other. Each go/no-go block
contained 96 trials presented in a random order. The 14 experimental blocks
were preceded by two practice blocks of 48 trials. On each trial two shapes
appeared on the screen. One of the shapes was a square and one of the
shapes was a diamond (see figure 6.1). The two shapes appeared randomly
above or below fixation. This was in accordance with the procedure
employed by Neumann and Klotz (1994). The participants responded
identically regardless of whether the stimuli appeared above or below the
centre of the screen. The centre of the stimulus was 4.5cm above or below
the centre of the screen, with both stimuli either above or below fixation on
each trial. The square shape measured 4.7cm across, with the diamond
shape being the same shape but rotated by 90 degrees. The centre of each
stimulus appeared 3.6cm to the left or right of fixation.
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Participants were allocated to either a left go condition, which required a go
response when the diamond was on the left, or a right go condition, where a
right diamond signalled a go trial. Figure 6.1 shows the stimuli for a
congruent, incongruent and neutral trial. Participants in the left go condition
were told to respond only when the diamond was presented on the left side
of the screen and to refrain from responding when the diamond was
presented on the right. For these participants the stimuli in figure 6.1 would
represent congruent go, incongruent go and neutral go, respectively.
Conversely, participants in the right go condition were told to respond only
when the diamond was presented on the right side of the screen and to
refrain from responding when the diamond was presented on the left, thus
the stimuli in figure 6.1 would represent congruent no-go, incongruent no-go
and neutral no-go, respectively.
The response hand was varied from one block the next, with the initial hand
counterbalanced across participants. The participants were informed that
that they had a time limit of 500 milliseconds (ms) to respond to the go
stimuli and that they should react as quickly as possible without sacrificing
accuracy. Participants were given visual feedback immediately after the
500ms response window for correct responses and non-responses as well
as false alarms and incorrect non-responses. Unbeknownst to the
participants masked primes were presented prior to the target stimulus. The
prime consisted of a pair of shapes presented at the same location as the
target shapes. The primes fit exactly into the internal contours of the target
and measured 3cm by 3cm. The configuration of these shapes was
congruent with, incongruent with, or neutral to the target stimulus. On
congruent trials the prime contained a square and a diamond in the same
configuration as the target. Incongruent primes had an opposite
configuration to the target, and neutral primes contained two squares. There
were an equal number of congruent, incongruent and neutral trials in each
block.
The primes were masked by the target stimulus. The primes fit exactly into
the internal contours of both target shapes for optimized metacontrast
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masking. Each trial began with a central fixation for 700 ms then the primes
were presented for 16ms followed by a blank screen for 49ms and then the
mask/target for 100ms. Participants had 500ms to respond, after which
visual feedback was presented for 500ms. Finally, a blink pause was
presented where "blink pause" appeared in the centre of the screen for
1200ms and participants were informed to use this time to blink if they
needed. Participants were also informed not to blink during the trial, and to
keep their eyes fixated on the centre of the screen.
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Figure 6.1: Stimuli for experiment 2.A congruent (A), incongruent (8) and neutral (C) trial.
Following the go/no-go task participants were asked the following questions:
(1) Did you notice that there were stimuli presented prior to the diamonds
and squares? (2) Could you tell what they were? (3) Did you notice anything
flicker on the screen? Responses to these questions were noted by the
experimenter. The participants were then fully informed of the nature of the
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primes and were shown the sequence in slow motion. Participants were
then asked (question 4) if they recognised having seen these primes during
the go/no-go task. Participants then completed one practice block of 32 trials
followed by four experimental blocks of the prime identification task. The
exact same sequence was presented as that used in the go/no-go task, but
now participants were asked to identify the location of the diamond in the
prime pair. No neutral trials were presented in this task. Participants were
asked to respond with the right button if the diamond was on the right and
the left button if the diamond was on the left. Half the trials contained a left
diamond prime and half contained a right diamond prime. Furthermore, half
the trials were congruent and half were incongruent and participants were
informed that using the target stimulus to make their judgement would not aid
their performance. There was no time limit to respond. Participants received
feedback after each trial. Following the prime identification task, participants
were asked to estimate on what percentage of trials they were able to see
the location of the diamond prime (question 5).
Behavioural Results
Awareness of Primes
None of the participants reported having seen any stimuli appear prior to the
diamond and square targets. Table 6.1 shows participants responses to the
questions regarding their subjective awareness of the masked primes.
Table 6.1. Summary of subjective awareness measures for experiment 2
Notice? What? Flash? Recognise? See?
NO
YES
20 20 13 12
o 0 7 8
14%
Performance on the forced-choice ranged from 46% to 57% and averaged
51.6%. This represented a significant difference from chance (t (19) = 2.34,
P = 0.03), d' scores were not significantly different from zero (mean = 0.06, t
=2, P = 0.06). Performance on the forced-choice task was not correlated
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with participants self report of the number of trials where they thought the
prime was visible (r=-O.097;p=O.7). The slightly above chance findings on
the prime identification task suggests that some participants may have had
residual awareness of the masked primes. To explore this possibility in more
detail, later analysis attempted to correlate prime identification performance
with the magnitude of priming effects under the assumption that residual
awareness of the primes will affect both measure and will therefore show a
significant correlation.
Priming
Table 6.2 shows a summary of the behavioural pnrnmq effects for
experiment 2. Repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect
of prime-stimulus congruency on reaction times (F(2,38)=36.7, p<O.001) for
go trials. A significant main effect of accuracy was observed for no-go trials
(F(2,38)=18.2, p<O.001) but not for go trials(F(2,38)=O.97, p=O.39).
Subsequent t-tests showed a significant difference in reaction time between
congruent and incongruent go trials (t(19)=4.2, p<O.001) and between
congruent and neutral go trials (t(19)=4.4, p<O.001). No significant
difference was observed between incongruent go and neutral go trials
(t(19)=1.8, p=O.08). With regard to error rates on no-go trials, a significant
difference was observed between congruent no-go and incongruent no-go
(t(19)=4.2, p<O.001) and between incongruent no-go and neutral no-go
(t(19)=4.4, p<O.001) for error rates such that more errors were observed for
incongruent trials (t(19)=1.8, p=O.08).
Table 6.2.1: Mean Reaction times and accuracy (and Standard Oevia
Congruent Incongruent Neutral
RT 330 (22) 349 (19) 348 (18)
Accuracy 0.91 (0.05) 0.91 (0.06) 0.91 (0.05)
Table 6.2.2: Mean accuracy (and SO) for no-go trials
Congruent Incongruent Neutral
Accuracy 0.94 0.86 0.95(0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
tions) for gotrials
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There was no significant correlation between behavioural priming and prime
identification using raw scores for percent correct and d'. In addition,
absolute values of d prime and the absolute difference from 50%
performance were also calculated and correlated with priming on the go/no-
go task. There was a significant correlation between priming, measured as
the difference in reaction time between congruent and incongruent go trials,
and the absolute difference from 50% (r=0.63, p<0.01) on the prime
identification task. Similarly, priming was also correlated with the absolute
value of d' (r=0.47, p<0.05). There was no correlation between priming of
error rates on go and no-go trials, and prime identification performance.
These findings suggest that while there appeared to be an association
between prime visibility and the magnitude of behavioural priming, this
relationship was only observed when prime identification was measured as
the absolute difference from chance. This issue will be explored in more
detail in the discussion section of this chapter.
EEG Results
Two participants were excluded from the EEG analysis. One participant was
excluded due to a hardware failure during recording and another was
excluded due to incorrect coding of stimulus triggers. ERPs for the
remaining 18 participants were formed from an average of between 77 and
85 trials per condition per response hand, with a minimum of 35 trials per
condition per response hand.
Lateralised Readiness Potential
Figure 6.2 shows grand average LRP for the six conditions. Onset analysis
was conducted only on go target trials. ANOVA showed a significant main
effect of prime congruency on LRP onset (F(1.9,31.5)=9.8, p<0.01), with
subsequent t-tests showing that LRP onset was significantly earlier for
congruent trials in comparison to incongruent (t(17)=3.59, p<0.005), and
neutral trials (t(17)=3.46, p<0.005). Incongruent no-go LRP onset did not
differ from neutral go LRP onset.
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Figure 6.2: LRP for the three go conditions with respect to target onset. Prime onset at -100ms
signified by dashed line.
Amplitude analysis was conducted on all six conditions with prime type (go,
no-go, neutral) and target type (go, no-go) as repeated measures factors. In
the 50 to 100ms time window there were no significant main effects, but
there was a significant prime x target interaction (F(2,33.2)=5.8, p<0.01).
Follow up t-tests revealed that this interaction was largely caused by a
decreased negativity for incongruent go trials, which were significantly
different to all other conditions except for incongruent no-go (at p<0.05). No
other pairs significantly differed from one another. In a later time window
(1 50 to 200ms) there was a significant main effect of prime (F(2,33.2)=3.9,
p<0.05) but no effect of target and no prime x target interaction. Subsequent
contrasts revealed that go-prime trials were significantly more negative than
neutral prime trials (F(1,17)=6.8, p<0.05) but were not signif icantly different
to go prime trials (F(1,17)=3.3, p=0.085). There was no difference between
neutral and no-go prime trials (p=0.32). These findings suggest that the
early part of the rising bank of the LRP was modulated dependent on the
prime, with increased motor readiness for go primes. In a 200 to 450ms time
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window there was a significant main effect of target type (F(1,17)=67,
p=O.001) reflecting the increased LRP for go target trials.
Frontal no-go N2 and P3 analysis
Initial analysis focused on the hypothesised frontocentral modulation of the
no-go N2 and P3. Figure 6.3 shows the no-go differences waveforms for
each of the three no-go conditions compared to the neutral go condition.
Two separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted at electrode Fz for the
three no-go difference waveforms to explore the amplitude of the no-go N2
and P3. The N2 time window (200ms to 300ms) was chosen to encompass
the period around the peak latency of the no-go N2. Similarly the P3 time
window (375ms to 475ms) was meant to capture any differences in average
amplitude of the no-go P3. Each ANOVA (one for each time window)
included prime type as a repeated measures factor (congruent, incongruent
and neutral).
In the N2 time window there was a significant main effect of prime
congruency (F(1.4,23.5)=19.9, p<O.001). Follow up t-tests confirmed that
incongruent no-go trials (m=-5.3; std=2.8) showed significantly more
negative amplitude than neutral no-go trials (m=-2.9; std=3; t(15)=5,
p<O.001) and congruent no-go trials (m=-2.7; std=2.8; t(15)=4.5, p<O.001).
Neutral no-go N2 amplitude did not significantly differ from congruent no-go
N2 (t(15)=0.43, p=O.68).
In the P3 time window there was once again a significant main effect of
prime congruency (F(1.8,30A)=3.91, p<O.05). Follow up t-tests confirmed
that no-go P3 average amplitude was significantly greater for incongruent no-
go trials (m=4.2; std=5.6) in comparison to neutral no-go trials (m=2.96;
std=5A; t(17)=2.55, p<O.05), and showed a non-significant trend in
comparison to congruent no-go trials (m=3.1; std=5.2; t(15)=2.02, p=O.059).
Neutral no-go P3 amplitude was not significantly different to congruent no-go
P3 amplitude (m=2.7; std=3.3; t(17)=-1.2, p=O.25).
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Figure 6.3: Difference ERP waveforms for thethreeno-goconditions at electrode Fz.
No-go N2 peak latency (F(1.9,31.9)=5.7, p<O.01) and amplitude
(F(1.3,22.5)=31.7, p<O.001) were found to vary as a function of prime
congruency. Subsequent t-tests confirmed that the N2 peak latency was
significantly later for incongruent trials (m=287; std=27.4) in comparison to
both neutral (m=261; std=36.1; t(17)=2.8, p<O.05) and congruent trials
(m=256; std=37.8; t(17)=3.3, p<O.01). There was no significant modulation
of P3 peak latency, but there was a significant effect of P3 peak amplitude
(F(1.7,29.6)=4.6, p<O.05), with incongruent trials showing significantly
greater P3 peak amplitude (m=7.2; std=6.2) in comparison to neutral trials
(m=5.5; std=5.8; t(17)=2.8, p<O.05).
Further analysis was conducted to explore the possibility that the magnitude
of the N2 and P3 effects were affected by participants' scores on the forced-
choice tasks. Correlations were calculated between the three no-go
difference amplitudes in each time window and performance on the two
forced-choice tasks measured by both percentages correct and d' as well as
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the absolute differences from chance. There were no significant correlations
between N2 or P3 and performance on the prime identification task.
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Figure 6.4: Scalp distribution of no-go N2 for congruent (top left), incongruent (top right) and
neutral (bottom left) no-go trials. Each scalp map represents the average amplitude for the
specified 1Oms time window
N2 and P3 topography was explored by computing scalp maps of the
difference waveforms for those conditions which showed a notable N2 or P3.
Figure 6.4 shows the scalp maps for the no-go N2 for the congruent prime,
incongruent and neutral prime conditions. In all three conditions the no-go
N2 appears to initially show a frontal maximum, beginning around 200 ms.
This initial frontal maximum then becomes rather more centrally and
parietally distributed. Figure 6.5 shows the scalp distribution of the no-go P3
which appears to have a frontocentral distribution in all three conditions.
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Figure 6.5: Scalp distribution of no-go P3 for congruent (left panel), incongruent (central panel)
and neutral (right panel)no-go trials.
Finally, to explore the possibility that early prime-related effects may be
present at electrode Fz, two-way ANOVA was conducted with prime type
(go, no-go, neutral) and target type (go, no-go). Figure 6.6 shows the grand
average ERPs at electrode Fz for all six conditions. Visual inspection
reveals a clear no-go N2 peaking at around 350ms for no-go target trials,
followed by a no-go P3 peaking at around 520ms (both explored above). In
addition, a prime-related difference appears to be present overlapping a
negative peak at around 150ms_ ANOVA from 120 to 180ms revealed a
significant main effect of prime type (F(1.8,31.4)=9.2, p<0.001), but no main
effect of target and no target x prime interaction. Contrasts revealed that
neutral prime trials were significantly more negative than go prime trials
(F(1,17)=14.9, p<0.001) and no-go prime trials (F(1,17)=7.6, p<0.05). In
addition, no-go prime trials showed a non-significant trend towards being
more negative than go prime trials (F(1,1 7)=3.6, p=0.075). These early
prime-related differences suggest that the unconscious primes were able to
directly initiate frontal modulation of go/no-go ERP differences. However, the
comparison between go and no-go primes failed to reach statistical
significance, with neutral prime trials instead exhibiting statistical differences
from both other conditions.
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Figure 6.6: Grand average ERPs for the six conditions at electrode Fz
Early visual ERP effects
Figure 6.7 shows the grand average ERPs at electrode Oz for all six
conditions. Repeated measures ANOVA with prime type (go, no-go and
neutral) and target type (go, no-go) revealed a significant main effect of
target for P1 (15 to 65ms) amplitude (F(1,17)=5.26, p<0.05). Follow up
comparisons revealed that go target trials showed significantly greater P1
amplitude than no-go target trials (t(1 7)=2.29, p<0.05). In the N1 time
window (90 to 125ms), ANOVA revealed a significant prime x target
interaction for N1 amplitude (F(1.7,29.5)=4.47, p<0.05). Figure 6.7 shows
that N1 amplitude appears to be greatest on congruent go trials and
congruent no-go trials. In fact this difference is evident in the waveforms
from as early as 60ms after stimulus onset. This may reflect an earlier onset
of this component for congruent trials. Linear comparisons revealed
significantly greater N1 amplitude for congruent trials (m=-3.3; std=4) in
comparison to both neutral (m=-2.6; std=4.2; t(1 7)=4.5, p<0.001) and
incongruent trials (m=-2.7; std=4.2; t(17)=-1.2, p<0.05). In addition,
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incongruent go trials appear to have a greater amplitude than incongruent
no-go trials and both neutral prime conditions, however paired t-tests
revealed that these differences were not significant.
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Figure 6.7: ERPwaveforms at electrode Oz.
Further analysis was conducted to explore possible lateralised visual effects
related to the physical target. Since targets are presented to both the left
and right hemisphere it is likely that visual ERPs would be lateralised
dependent on the particular stimulus array. Figure 6.8 shows grand average
ERPs computed dependent on the physical stimulus properties regardless of
the response requirements. The conditions are labelled with respect to the
side on which a diamond was presented. For example left left indicates that
a diamond prime was presented on the left and a diamond target was also
presented in the left. Neutral primes consisted of two squares, so the neutral
left condition would be one where two squares are presented followed by
diamond target on the left. A clear separation between left prime trials,
neutral prime trials and right prime trials is evident from around 20ms after
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stimulus onset such that trials with a right prime appear more positive than
trials with a left prime, with neutral primes in between. This time window
corresponds roughly to the peak of the P1 component observed at electrode
Oz (figure 6.7 above). An increased positivity in the difference waveforms
below (figure 6.8) would thus reflect greater amplitude over left
occipito/parietal regions in comparison to right sided electrodes. In the P1
time there appears to be general increased amplitude over right sided
electrodes, but this is more pronounced when the prime stimulus (a
diamond) appeared on the left side of the visual presentation. Similarly this
effect is least pronounced following a left sided prime stimulus.
ANOVA was conducted to explore these effects in more detail. Each
analysis included prime type (left, right, neutral) and target type (left,right) as
repeated measures factors and response mapping as an independent factor.
Response mapping was included as a factor to explore whether these
lateralised effects were dependent on the meaning of the stimulus rather
than its physical characteristics. Since the ERPs were formed by combining
subjects with different response mappings to create ERPs dependent on the
physical aspects of the prime, each ERP contains both left go and right go
response mappings. Therefore, if lateralised responses were dependent on
the nature of the stimulus then this should result in a significant interaction
involving response mapping. ANOVA for average amplitude in the 20ms to
40ms time window showed that a near significant effect of prime
(F(1.6,25.3)=3.1, p=O.075) and no effects involving target or response
mapping. A significant linear contrast was present for prime type
(F(1,16)=7.2, p<O.05), with right prime trials showing greatest positive
amplitude and left prime trials showing least positive amplitude, confirming
lateralised prime-related visual effects in this time window.
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Figure 6.8: Lateralised occipital/parietal effects dependenton the physical stimuli presented in
experiment 2.
In a later time window (60ms to 100ms) ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of prime (F(1.5,23.8)=8.5, p<O.05) as well as a significant main effect
of target (F(1,16)=18.6, p<O.001) and a target x prime interaction
(F(1.9,30.5)=6.5, p<O.01). There was no significant effect of response
mapping. Visual inspection of the difference ERPs reveals that the
waveforms separate based on prime type for left and right sided diamond
primes, with right sided primes showing greater amplitude than left diamond
primes. However, rather than remaining in the middle of the two different
types of target stimuli, the neutral primes appear to separate based on target
type with neutral left target trials showing greater positive amplitude than
neutral right target trials. This means that while left-left left-right and neutral-
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right group together, right-left right-right and neutral-left group together.
Subsequent t-tests confirmed that all pair-wise comparisons between these
groupings were significant (at p<0.01) while those within the groupings were
not significant. One common difference between these groupings is that the
former all have a square prime on the right, the latter all have a square prime
on the left. However, this does not explain why the neutral primes separate
as they do since they both contain two squares. From 100ms onwards the
waveforms separated dependent on the target stimulus (F(1,16)=7.9,
p<0.001), with no effects of response mapping. All the effects described
above for the 01-02 difference were identical for the P07-P08 difference.
Go/no-go Differences
This section provides a more comprehensive analysis of all the go/no-go
differences observed in the current experiment. Figure 6.9 shows the raw
ERP waveforms for the six conditions. The no-go N2 is clearly evident as a
negative deflection beginning around 200 ms after stimulus presentation. In
addition, a parietal separation is evident between go and no-go trials but
does not appear to be modulated on no-go trials. Amplitude analysis of
go/no-go differences was conducted using a five-way repeated measures
ANOVA with prime type (go,no-go,neutral), target type (go,no-go),
hemisphere (Ieft,right), anterior-posterior (Fp, F, FC, C, P, and 0) and time
(120-180, 180-350, 350-550) as within-subjects factors. The early time
window (120-180ms after target onset; 186-246ms after prime onset) was
selected to explore any early differences in the ERPs associated with the
unconscious primes. The second and third time windows were centred on
the no-go N2 and no-go P3 respectively. The initial five-way ANOVA
showed no main effects of hemisphere and no significant interactions
involving hemisphere and target or prime type. Therefore, further analysis
was conducted on the six midline electrodes only (Fpz, Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, and
Oz). Since there was a significant four way interaction between the other
four factors (F(4.9,84)=9.7, p<0.001), further analysis explored the three way
interactions between prime type, target type and anterior-posterior separately
for each time window.
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Figure6.9: Raw ERPwaveforms for experiment 2
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In this first time window (120-180ms), there was a significant main effect of
prime type (F(1.9,32.4)=132.2, p<O.001), but no significant effect of target
type, and no significant interactions. Figure 6.10 shows the average
amplitude for go prime, no-go prime and neutral prime trials collapsed across
target type. The main effect of prime appears to be caused by a widespread
effect of greater negative amplitude for neutral prime trials in comparison to
go prime trials, which in turn are more negative than no-go prime trials.
Follow up ANOVAs confirmed that a significant main effect of prime was
present at all six electrode locations, with follow up contrasts revealing
significant (at p<O.01) differences between neutral prime trials and go prime
trials at electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz, and maximal at FCz. In addition, no-go
prime trials appeared to be somewhat more negative in this time window in
comparison to go trials. This effect was maximal over electrode Fz although,
as highlighted in the earlier analysis focused on Fz, it failed to reach
statistical significance (F(1,17)=3.61, p=O.075).
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Figure 6.10: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the first time window dependent on
prime typecollapsed across go and no-go target trials.
Amplitude analysis in the second time window (180ms to 350ms) revealed a
significant main effect of target type(F(1, 17)=28.5, p<O.001) and a significant
main effect prime type(F(1.7,28.7)=4.2, p<O.05) as well as a prime x target
interaction (F(1.7,29.2)=11.1, p<O.001). Furthermore, there was a marginally
significant prime x target x anterior-posterior interaction (F(2.4,40.2)=2.98,
p=O.054). Figure 6.11 shows the average amplitude in the second time
window dependent on prime type for go trials and no-go trials separately.
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For go trials the only significant difference occurred at electrode Pz, where
go prime trials showed significantly greater positive amplitude than neutral
prime trials. In contrast, for no-go trials, go prime trials showed significantly
increased negativity in comparison to no-go prime trials at electrode Fpz Fz
FCz and Cz and in comparison to neutral prime trials at Fz and FCz. These
differences were greatest at FCz and likely reflect modulation of the no-go
N2 for no-go trials.
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Figure 6.11: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the second timewindow dependent on
prime typefor gotargets (leftpanel) and no-go targets (rightpanel).
In the final time window (350 to 550ms) there was no main effect of target
and no main effect of prime. However, there was a significant target x
anterior-posterior interaction (F(2.2,37.6)=5.6, p<0.05) as well as a
significant prime x target interaction (F(1.7,28.9)=5.6, p<0.05) and a
significant prime x target x anterior-posterior interaction (F(3.5,59.1)=7.6,
p<0.001). Figure 6.12 shows the average amplitude at each electrode
dependent on prime type for go target trials (left panel) and no-go target trials
(right panel). Inspection of these two graphs together reveals that the
interaction between target type and anterior-posterior electrode location
appears to be driven by differences between go and no-go target trials at
posterior electrodes, visible as greater amplitude for target go trials (left
panel) in comparison to no-go target trials (right panel). Follow up
comparisons confirmed that go target trials shows significantly greater
positive amplitude than no-go target trials at electrodes Pz and Oz. This
difference likely reflects modulation of the parietal P300 component. The left
panel of figure 6.12 shows the average amplitude at each electrode for go
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target trials dependent on prime type. T-tests revealed that there were no
significant differences at any electrode sites for go target trials. The right
panel of figure 6.12 shows that average amplitude for no-go target trials in
the final time window. It is evident that go prime trials show a significantly
greater positive amplitude in comparison to neutral and no-go prime trials
over central and anterior electrode sites. This effect only reached statistical
significance (at p<0.001) at electrode Cz and likely reflects modulation of the
no-go P3.
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Figure 6.12: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the final time window dependent on
prime typefor gotargets (leftpanel) and no-go targets (rightpanel).
LRP and go/no-go differences
To explore the possibility that the effects observed at central electrodes were
projections of movement related activity at lateral electrodes, grand average
ERPs were computed separately for left and right hand responses. Figure
6.13 shows grand average ERPs for left and right hand trials separately at
electrodes FC3, FC4 and FCz for congruent and incongruent no-go
conditions. It is evident that the effects described above are not simply
projections of lateralised movement activity. The two squares showing the
ERPs between 100 and 200ms reveal that the early prime effects are not
caused by lateralised effects which are then averaged together, since the no-
go prime conditions is more negative at both lateral electrode sites.
Similarly, the increased no-go N2 for incongruent trials is evident both for
both left and right hand responses over both left and right hemisphere. The
amplitude at FCz appears to be greater than that observed over the lateral
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sites suggesting a central topography to the effects, again ruling out the
possibility of contamination from lateralised movement activity.
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Figure 6.13: Grand average ERPs for congruent no-go and incongruent no-go trials separated
by response hand.
Discussion
This investigation aimed to replicate the effects observed in the experiment
1: that subliminal primes were able modulate the no-go N2 and P3
components and further that they were able to directly initiate these
processes. Participants were presented with a diamond and a square on
each trial and were asked to make a go response for one combination of the
targets and a no-go response to the opposite stimulus array. Unconscious
primes presented in advance of these stimuli were shown to influence
reaction times to go targets, with slower reaction times for incongruent
primes and faster reaction times for congruent primes. However, there was
no significant difference in reaction times between incongruent go trials and
neutral go trials, suggesting that the neutral prime acted in a similar way to a
no-go prime. Similarly, for error rates there were significant differences
between incongruent no-go trials and both neutral and congruent no-go
trials, but the latter two conditions did not differ from one another. This
shows that once again the neutral primes appeared to behave much like no-
go primes.
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Similarly, analysis of the frontal no-go N2 and P3 revealed that both these
components showed significantly greater amplitude for incongruent no-go
trials in comparison to neutral no-go trials, but that neutral and no-go prime
trials did not differ. A possible explanation for this is that although
participants were instructed to attend to both stimuli (a diamond on one side
codes for go and the other side for no-go), the task is easily accomplished by
simply attending to the side where a go stimulus will be present. For
example those participants who were instructed to go in response to a left
diamond and not go following a right diamond could simply attend to the left
and go if a diamond was presented, but not go if a square was presented.
This would mean that on the side where attention is allocated the neutral
prime and no-go prime would be identical (a square) since neutral primes are
always two squares and incongruent primes are a square and a diamond
with the diamond on the opposite side. This is highlighted by examining
figure 6.1 and looking at the sequence of stimuli presented left of fixation.
Comparing only the left of the stimulus array of an incongruent trial (B) and a
neutral trial (C) reveals that the stimulus sequence presented on this side of
the screen were essentially identical.
The more in-depth analysis of ERP go/no-go differences replicated many of
the effects observed in the first experiment. Crucially, for the hypothesis that
the primes could directly initiate frontal control mechanisms, there was once
again a significant main effect of prime in the early time window. This
appeared to be largely driven by greater negative amplitude for neutral prime
trials in comparison to go prime trials. No-go prime trials also appeared
somewhat negative in relation to go prime trials, showing a maximum at
electrode FCz, although this contrast only reached a significance level of
p=O.075. Even disregarding this trend, the finding that neutral prime trials
showed increased negativity in this time window is consistent with the
explanation above that these trials effectively acted as no-go trials.
However, this effect must also be treated with some caution since due to the
complications observed with the neutral trials in the current experiment.
These early prime-related effects at frontal electrodes appear to support the
hypothesis that the subliminal prime was able to directly initiate frontal
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control mechanisms in this task. While some of these early effects were
significant it is noteworthy that these effects are much smaller than those
observed in the first experiment.
The effects in the second and third time window were very similar to those
observed in experiment 1. Firstly, a similar dissociation was observed
between prime-related modulations on go and no-go trials. For no-go trials
the effect of prime was maximal over frontocentral electrodes, while for go
trials this effect was limited to electrode Pz only. However, similar to the
initial analysis at frontal electrodes these differences were only evident
between go and no-go primes as well as go and neutral primes, with activity
for no-go and neutral primes grouping together. Similarly in the third and
final time window neutral/no-go and go prime trials showed significant
modulation at anterior electrodes related to the no-go P3.
LRP analysis revealed a significant effect of LRP onset for go trials. Two
early amplitude modulations were also evident. The early effect, just 50ms
after stimulus onset was caused by a decreased LRP activation for
incongruent go trials. However, since the same decreased was not evident
for congruent no-go trials, this effect was classified by a prime x target
interaction. A more reliable effect was also evident in the 150 to 250ms time
window, where the LRP separated dependent on the nature of the prime. As
with the other prime-related effects in this experiment, go primes were
different from neutral and no-go primes, with neutral and no-go primes
showing no difference. This finding once again supports the assumption that
neutral primes acted as no-go primes in the current experiment, and provides
further support for the assumption that a motor response can be directly
prepared by a subliminal prime.
Examination of visual ERPs revealed a significant effect of prime congruency
at electrode Oz from around 60ms after stimulus onset with greater negative
amplitude for the rising bank of the N1 component for congruent trials. This
suggests that the difference between congruent and incongruent trials was
detected in the visual system extremely early. Further analysis of lateralised
146
ERPs at occipital and parietal electrodes also revealed an early separation
dependent on prime type, with increased visual P1 and N1 components
contralateral to a diamond prime. These findings suggest that the locations
of the different prime stimuli were able to initiate lateralised visual effects
related to either perception of the target or increased attention towards one
location or the other. The congruency effects at Oz suggest that perhaps
these early lateralised responses to the prime modulated attention such that
a greater visual response was then evident for congruent trials, since the
prime had successfully directed attention toward that location. Consistent
with this interpretation there is evidence to suggest that increased attention
toward a spatial location of a subsequent stimulus increases the amplitude of
the visual response (Martinez et aI., 2001) from around lOms after stimulus
onset. However, since these lateralised effects were purely dependent on
the physical characteristics of the primes and did not vary dependent on the
functional significance of the primes, this suggests that these effects reflect
visual detection of the different targets. The fact that these effects occurred
despite the two different prime stimuli being simply a 90 degree rotation of
one another suggests that this visual discrimination must have involved
some selection of target relevant dimensions to discriminate which of the two
stimuli were presented.
The finding that congruency related visual ERP effects emerged so early is
slightly problematic for the interpretation that the early ERP effects at frontal
electrodes reflected direct effects of the unconscious primes, since it is
possible that this effect was produced by an earlier response to the target
due to the increased attention toward the target location. However, this
explanation seems unlikely given the early prime-related modulation at
electrode Fz. For example if the priming of the no-go response was simply
caused by earlier categorisation of the target due to increased attention or
faster visual categorisation one would expect an earlier N2 for congruent no-
go trials but no prime-related negativity for incongruent go trials. This would
manifest as a prime x target interaction in the early time window at Fz.
However, in this time window the ERPs separated entirely dependent on the
prime with no target effects and no interaction, supporting the assumption
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that the modulation of the no-go response was caused by a direct partial
activation of the no-go response following a no-go prime. It is worth
reiterating once again, however, that this early prime-related effect at Fz was
only partially reliable, and therefore can not entirely rule out a simple
attentional explanation for the priming effects observed in the current
experiment.
Finally, performance on the Prime identification task was found to be
marginally above chance when measured as the difference from 50%
accuracy on the forced-choice task but not when measured using d'. In
addition there was no significant correlation between either of these
measures and priming in the go/no-go task, suggesting that the priming
effects were not driven by residual awareness. Interestingly there was a
significant correlation between the absolute difference from chance in the
prime identification task and the amount of priming. These absolute
measures reflected the difference from chance regardless of the direction of
this distance. For example, 53% accuracy and 47% accuracy were both 3%
away from chance performance. The correlation between these measures
suggests that there may have been at least some aspect of performance in
the two tasks that were related. It is important to note that participants
received feedback on an individual trial basis in the forced-choice task, so it
should be expected that if participants were able to detect some subtle
differences between the two primes then they would have been able to use
the feedback to perform above chance rather than below chance. However,
as outlined in chapter 3, there is some evidence to suggest that flexible
adaptive responses to unconscious stimuli may not be possible (Mayr, 2004).
In fact the process dissociation task works on the basis of this assumption,
that while we can flexible control our responses to conscious stimuli in order
to exclude them under certain instructions, we are not able to do the same
for unconscious stimuli (Jacoby, 1991). Under this assumption it would be
possible to conclude that the residual discrimination of the prime which
correlated with priming performance was driven by unconscious processes.
If participants were conscious of the stimulus, they could presumably have
utilised the feedback to perform consistently above chance. If however,
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unconscious discrimination of the prime in the identification task could not be
controlled, then it would be expected to differ from chance in a systematic
way, but not such that it was always above chance since participants would
be able to reliably respond one way or another, but would not be able to
adjust their response dependent on feedback. This is precisely what was
observed in the current experiment and therefore it seems likely that the
marginally above chance performance on the forced-choice task were not
driven by conscious awareness of the stimulus. While there are a number of
problems regarding this position (which will be discussed further in chapter
10), it is certainly noteworthy that this type of analysis could provide
interesting insight into the relative contribution of conscious and unconscious
processes in the prime identification task.
Conclusions
This experiment replicated a number of effects observed in the first
experiment. No-go N2 and P3 amplitude was found to vary as a function of
the unconscious prime. Importantly, in this experiment this modulation
reflected a positive compatibility effect such that congruent go trials showed
significantly reduced N2 and P3 amplitude in comparison to neutral trials. In
addition, a significant early frontal modulation was evident dependent on the
nature of the subliminal prime, suggesting it was able to directly initiate
frontal control processes. However, this modulation was markedly smaller
than in Experiment 1 with the specific contrasts of interest failing to reach
strict significance. A further problem with the current experiment was that
neutral primes appeared to group together with no go primes, possibly due to
increased attention toward the side where the go stimulus would appear. In
summary, the present experiment replicated the modulation of target-related
N2 and P3 components dependent on the nature of the unconscious prime
observed in Experiment 1, and provided further evidence of direct
unconscious engagement of frontal inhibition/control mechanisms.
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Chapter 7
Experiment 3 - Unconscious priming of a no-go
response in a choice reaction time task.
Introduction
Experiment 3 aimed to overcome the problem caused with the neutral primes
in experiment 2. This problem was attributed to the fact that participants
could easily complete the task by attending to one side of the visual display,
which in turn changed the utility of the neutral primes. In the current
experiment, in order to ensure that participants attended to both sides, the
stimulus-response parameters were slightly altered. Participants were
required to respond with their left hand to a left side diamond and their right
hand to a right side diamond. Two squares indicated a no-go trial. The
stimuli were otherwise identical to experiment 2, with the exception that
neutral primes were a combination of features from the two possible targets.
Since participants would have to determine on which side of the screen a
target stimulus was presented they must attend to both sides of the screen to
complete the task. Unlike in experiment 2 the task instructions cannot be
easily recoded to a rule that involves one side of the screen. While a
diamond on one side codes for a go response with the relevant hand, a
square to one side could either mean an opposite hand response or a no-go
trial.
This manipulation should also allow exploration of priming of go and no-go
responses alongside priming of specific hand responses. This will allow
direct exploration of the type of effects observed in the many paradigms
involving left and right hand response priming, alongside go/no-go priming.
Of particular interest, is Leuthold and Kopp's (1999) finding that a parietal N2
was observed for incongruent go trials. Eimer and Schlaghecken (2000)
have suggested that while this more parietal N2 is possible in response to
unconscious primes, modulation of a frontal N2 is not. The current
experiment will be able to explore these two components together.
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Hypotheses
As in experiment 1 and 2 the presence of subliminal primes which code for a
no-go response should directly modulate ERP amplitude at frontal electrode
sites. This modulation should be evident on the no-go N2 and P3 such that
congruent no-go trials will show reduced amplitude on these components in
comparison to neutral trials, which in turn will be reduce in comparison to
incongruent no-go trials. In addition, if the primes are able to directly initiate
the frontal no-go N2/P3 complex then some prime-related modulation should
be evident in advance of the target-related N2 and P3. Additionally the
current experiment will explore whether a parietal N2 is evident for trials
where a response with one hand is primed, but a response to the other hand
is ultimately required (incongruent go trials).
Method
Participants
Fourteen undergraduate psychology students (seven male and seven
female) participated in exchange for course credits. All participants were
right handed and had normal or corrected to normal vision. The mean age of
participants was 20 years and 10 months, with a range of 18 to 28 years.
Experimental Procedure
All participants completed a single experimental session lasting
approximately two hours. The participants completed 12 blocks of the go/no-
go task followed by four blocks of the prime identification task. Each go/no-
go block contained 128 trials presented in a random order. The 12
experimental blocks were preceded by one practice block of 48 trials. On
each trial two shapes appeared on the screen. On half the trials there were
two squares whilst on the other half a diamond was presented on the left or
the right. The two shapes appeared randomly above or below fixation.
Participants were required to respond with their right hand to a right sided
diamond and their left hand for a left sided diamond. If no diamond was
presented then participants were asked to refrain from responding (no-go
condition). The participants were informed that that they had a time limit of
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500ms to respond to the go stimuli and that they should react as quickly as
possible without sacrificing accuracy. Participants were given visual
feedback immediately after the 500ms response window for correct
responses, incorrect responses and non-response as well as false alarms
and incorrect non-responses.
Masked primes were presented prior to the target stimulus. The prime
consisted of a pair of shapes presented at the same location as the target
shapes. The configuration of these shapes was congruent, incongruent, or
neutral with respect to the target stimulus. On congruent go trials the prime
contained a square and a diamond in the same configuration as the target,
whilst incongruent primes had an opposite configuration to the target. No-go
primes consisted of two squares. Neutral primes consisted of a square on
one side and a neutral prime on the other side. The neutral prime was made
up of two features of the square prime and two features of the target prime.
The four different neutral primes are presented in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: The four neutral primes for experiment 3
There were an equal number of congruent, incongruent and neutral trials in
each block. Some examples of these different conditions are presented in
figure 7.2. The primes were masked by the target stimulus. The primes and
target were the identical size to those in experiment 2. The primes fit exactly
into the internal contours of both target shapes for optimized metacontrast
masking.
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Figure 7.2: A congruent Go (A), Incongruent Go (8), No-go Go (C) and neutral No-go trial for
experiment 3
Each trial began with a central fixation for 800 ms and then the primes were
presented for 16ms followed by a blank screen for 49ms and then the
mask/target for 100ms. Participants had 500ms to respond, after which
visual feedback was presented for 400ms. Finally, "blink pause" was
presented in the centre of the screen for 1000ms and participants were
informed to use this time to blink if they needed. Participants were also
informed not to blink during the trial, and to keep their eyes fixated on the
centre of the screen.
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Following the go/no-go task the participants were asked if they saw anything
appear before the target, and if so what they saw. In addition, they were
asked if they saw a flash on the screen in advance of the target.
Participants' were then shown the sequence in slow motion. After seeing the
slowed sequence participants were asked if they recognised having seen
any of the primes during the go/no-go task. The prime identification task
consisted of one practice block and four experimental blocks of 96 trials. Left
diamond, right diamond and two squares primes each made up a third of
trials. No neutral primes were presented during this task. Similarly a third of
all trials showed a diamond left target, a diamond right target and a two
squares target. The prime and target were congruent on a third of trials, and
participants were informed that responding according to the target would not
improve their accuracy. Participants were informed that they should press
the far left button if the diamond prime was on the left, the far right button if
the diamond prime was on the right, or the middle button if two squares were
presented. Participants had no time limit to respond, and received feedback
at the end of each trial.
Behavioural Results
Awareness of Primes
Table 1 shows the frequencies for the responses to questions 1 to 4.
Although three participants reported that they noticed something before the
target stimulus, none were able to report what had been presented. The
most reliable indicator of performance in the prime identification task was
whether participants recognised having seen the prime after being shown the
slow motion sequence. Three out of five participants who later performed
above chance reported recognising the primes, with only one of the nine
unaware subjects reporting recognition.
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ft th ffT bl 71a e . : summary 0 responses 0 e our uues Ions
Notice What Flash Recognise
No 11 14 7 10
Yes 3 0 7 4
Overall performance on the prime identification task was significantly above
chance (t (13) = 2.25, p < 0.05). When five participants with accuracy of over
37%, were excluded, performance for the remaining nine participants did not
significantly differ from chance (t (8) = 0.52, P = 0.62). Subsequent analysis
was conducted on all 14 participants with correlations between prime
identification performance and priming calculated at each step. In addition,
to ensure that any observed effects were truly unconscious, all major
analyses were repeated with only the nine participants who performed at
chance level.
Priming
A summary of the reaction times and error rates for go and no-go trials is
shown in table 7.2. Repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main
effect of prime congruency on reaction time (F(1.6,20.2)=43.7, p<0.001) and
error rates (F(1.8,23.2)=14.1, p<0.001) for the four go conditions.
Subsequent t-tests showed that RT were significantly reduced for congruent
trials in comparison to incongruent (t(13)=6.9, p<0.001) neutral (t(13)=8.2,
p<0.001) and no-go (t(13)=9.5, p<0.001) go trials. There was also a
significant difference between RT on incongruent and neutral go trials
(t(13)=3.8, p<0.01). Accuracy was significantly higher for congruent go trials
in comparison to incongruent (t(13)=4.4, p<0.001) and neutral (t(13)=3.5,
p<0.005) go trials. For no-go trials there was a significant main effect of
prime congruency on error rates (F(1.2,16.1)=6.3, p<0.05), with follow up
comparisons showing that congruent no-go trials had significantly fewer
errors than neutral no-go trials (t(13)=3.6, p<0.005) and incongruent no-go
trials (t(13)=2.6, p<0.05).
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Table 7.2.1: Mean Reaction times and accuracy (and Standard Deviations) for gotrial
Congruent Incongruent Neutral No-Go
RT 348 (30) 375 (29) 366 (29) 370 (30)
Acc 0.93 (0.04) 0.86 (0.9) 0.89 (0.07) 0.93 (0.04)
s
There was no significant correlation between behavioural priming and prime
identification using raw scores for percent correct or the absolute difference
from chance. In addition running the above analysis with only those nine
participants who performed at chance level produced the same results with
the exception that the error rates for no-go trials now marginally failed to
reach significance. These findings confirm that the priming effects were
unrelated to the difference from chance in the prime identification task, and
that the priming effects were present in the complete absence of awareness.
Further examination of neutral trials revealed that the side of the presentation
of the neutral trial greatly influenced participants' responses. On each
neutral trial one of the neutral primes was presented on one side, with a
square prime always presented on the other side. Table 7.3 shows the
reaction times to go target trials dependent on the congruency between the
location of the target and the location of the neutral prime. When the side of
the target was congruent with the side of the neutral prime reaction times
were significantly faster than when the neutral prime was on the opposite
side to the target. Repeated measure ANOVA with neutral prime location as
one factor (left/right) and go target location (left/right) revealed a significant
main effect of target (F(1,13)=57.5, p<O.001) as well as a significant
interaction between the two factors (F(1,13)=5.1, p<O.05). Follow up t-tests
confirmed that neutral left go left trials were significantly faster than neutral
right go left trials (t(13)=9.4, p<O.001). Similarly neutral right go right trials
were significantly faster than neutral left go right trials (t(13)=5.8, p<O.001).
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dT bl 73 R tl tl fa e .. eac Ion irnes or neutral trials depen entonsideof neutral prime
Standard
Mean
Deviation
Neutral Left- Go Left 358.1 34.6
Neutral Left- Go Right 379.9 27.1
Neutral Right- Go Right 343.9 34.5
Neutral Right- Go Left 376.3 32.8
EEG Results
ERP analysis was conducted on all 14 participants. Grand average ERPs
were formed for each condition with trial numbers averaging between 130
and 142 trials for each condition. Additionally these grand averages were
formed of approximately equal numbers of left (average of 67 trials) and right
(average of 69 trials) hand responses and contained at least 35 trials per
hand.
LRP Analysis
Figure 7.3 shows the grand average LRP for the four go conditions in
experiment 3. LRP onset varied as a function of prime congruency
(F(2.3,29.8)=4.7, p<O.05). Subsequent t-tests showed that LRP onset was
significantly earlier for congruent go trials in comparison to incongruent
(t(13)=3.6, p<O.005) neutral (t(13)=2.8, p<O.05) and no-go go trials
(t(13)=3.2, p<0.01). Neutral go, incongruent go, and no-go go LRP were not
significantly different from one another. ANOVA revealed no significant
amplitude differences between 50 and 100ms and 100 to 150ms after
stimulus onset. From 150 to 200ms there was a significant main effect of
prime congruency (F(2.9,37.1)=7.7, p<0.001), reflecting the difference in
LRP onset, with congruent go trials showing significantly increased amplitude
in comparison to the other three conditions. As is clearly evident from figure
7.3, there is also a significant effect of LRP amplitude from 200 to 300ms
(F(2.2,29.1 )=11.8, p<O.001), with neutral trials showing significantly reduced
amplitude in comparison to the other three conditions.
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Figure 7.3: LRP for go trials in experiment 3.
- Incongruent Go
- Congruent Go
- No-Go Go
- Neutral Go
Frontal No-go N2 and P3 Analysis
Initial analysis focused on the hypothesised frontocentral modulation of the
no-go N2 and P3. Figure 7.4 shows the no-go difference waveforms for
each of the three no-go conditions compared to the neutral go condition. It is
worth noting that due to the problems described above with the neutral
conditions, the more comprehensive analysis described in the next chapter
excluded neutral trials. However, the no-go N2 and P3 are still presented
here as difference waveforms from neutral go trials to allow easy comparison
between experiments. Since all the waveforms are taken as differences from
the same neutral go condition the statistical analysis of the difference
between congruent and incongruent no-go trials will be identical whether
conducted on raw waveforms or difference waveforms.
A clear no-go N2 and P3 are evident for the incongruent no-go condition and
the neutral no-go condition, but is absent for the congruent no-go condition.
Two separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted at electrode Fz for the
three no-go difference waveforms to explore the amplitude of the no-go N2
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and P3. The N2 time window (200ms to 300ms) was chosen to encompass
the period around the peak latency of the no-go N2. Similarly the P3 time
window (375ms to 475ms) was meant to capture any differences in average
amplitude of the no-go P3. Each ANOVA (one for each time window)
included prime congruency as a repeated measures factor (congruent,
incongruent and neutral).
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Figure 7.4: Difference ERP waveforms for the four no-go conditions at electrode Fz with
respect to target onset. Prime onset at -66ms signified by dotted line.
In the N2 time window there was a significant main effect of prime
congruency (F(1.4,18.1)=10.8, p<0.05). Follow up t-tests confirmed that
incongruent no-go trials (m=-2.8; std=1.8) showed significantly more
negative amplitude than congruent no-go trials (m=-0.8; std=3.1; t(13)=3.8,
p<0.005). In addition neutral no-go trials showed greater N2 amplitude (m=-
2.3; std=2.1) in comparison to incongruent no-go trials (t(1 3)=3, p<0.05).
Neutral no-go N2 amplitude did not significantly differ from congruent no-go
N2 amplitude (t(15)=1.7, p=0.12).
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In the P3 time window there was once again a significant main effect of
prime congruency (F(1.3,17.1)=22.8, p<0.001). Follow up t-tests confirmed
that incongruent no-go trials (m=1.1; std=5.2) showed significantly more
positive amplitude than congruent no-go trials (m=-2.3; std=5.9; t(13)=5.2,
p<0.001). In addition neutral no-go trials showed greater P3 amplitude
(m=0.5; std=5.1) in comparison to incongruent no-go trials (t(13)=4.7,
p<0.001). Neutral no-go P3 amplitude did not significantly differ from
congruent no-go N2 amplitude (t(13)=2, p=0.07). Figure 7.5 shows the
topographic distribution of the no-go N2 and P3 components. The N2 initially
appears at anterior electrodes before moving to more posterior sites.
Similarly, the no-go P3 is maximal at frontocentral electrodes.
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Figure 7.5: N2 and P3 topographyfor incongruent no-gocondition.
Further analysis was conducted to explore the possibility that the magnitude
of the N2 and P3 effects was affected by participants' scores on the forced-
choice tasks. N2 and P3 priming effects were calculated by subtracting
congruent no-go amplitude from incongruent no-go amplitude in the two time
windows. There were no significant correlations between either of these
measures and performance on the prime identification task, with the greatest
correlation reaching r=0.2, with an associated p value of 0.4. Furthermore,
the above N2 and P3 analysis was repeated using only those nine
participants who performed at chance level in the prime identification task
resulting in the identical significant effects to those described above. These
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results confirm that the modulation of the no-go N2 and P3 were independent
of prime identification performance, and that this modulation occurred even
in those subjects who failed to identify the primes in the control task.
To further explore the differences of interest, EEG analysis was initially
conducted on the same conditions as those utilised in the previous
experiments, with the exception that neutral trials were excluded from
analysis. Since the current experiment employed a somewhat different
procedure the breakdown of different trial types is also different. For
example an incongruent go trial in the current experiment signifies a trial
where the prime coded for a go response with one hand while the target
coded for a go response with the alternative hand. Since in the previous
experiments the response hand was fixed in each block, they did not include
such a condition. Therefore initial analysis did not include this condition
allowing a factorial analysis of prime type and target type to be conducted as
in the previous experiments. Prime type was explored on two levels (go and
no-go) and target type was also on two levels (go and no-go). These four
conditions in this experiment were labelled congruent go, no-go go,
congruent no-go and incongruent no-go. Neutral trials were excluded from
further analysis due to analysis above suggesting that they represent a
number of subgroups of differentially primed conditions, averaging to give
what appeared to be a neutral condition. Later analysis will return to explore
the difference between congruent and incongruent go trials.
To explore possible early modulation of frontal no-go N2 related activity,
ANOVA was conducted at electrode Fz with prime type (go, no-go) and
target type (go, no-go) as repeated measure factors. Figure 7.6 shows the
raw ERP amplitude at Fz for the four conditions. Visual inspection reveals
the presence of a small no-go N2/P3 complex for incongruent no-go trials. In
addition an early negativity is also evident for the congruent no-go trials,
peaking at around 150ms after stimulus onset (216ms after prime onset),
possibly reflecting an early N2 to the prime. ANOVA in a 120 to 180ms time
window showed a significant main effect of prime (F(1,13)=5.99, p<0.05) and
a significant main effect of target (F(1,13)=10.1, p<0.01) but no prime x
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target interaction. Subsequent t-tests revealed that congruent no-go trials
were significantly more negative that all the other conditions (P<0.01), while
there were no other pair-wise differences. This finding suggests that while
the prime appeared to successfully elicit an early N2 for congruent no-go
trials, this early modulation did not occur in response to the no-go prime for
incongruent go trials. Therefore rather than reflecting the direct activation of
frontal control/inhibition mechanisms, this early negativity likely reflects an
early onsetting target-related negativity on congruent no-go trials.
Fz
-400
;25
- Congruent Go
- No-goGo
- Congruent No-go
- Incongruent No-go
Figure 7.6: ERPwaveforms at electrode Fz.
Early visual ERP effects
Figure 7.7 shows the grand average ERPs at electrode Oz for all four
conditions. Repeated measure ANOVA with prime type (go, no-go) and
target type (go, no-go) revealed no significant effects in the P1 time window
(1 5 to 65ms). In the N1 time window (90 to 125ms), ANOVA revealed a
significant prime x target interaction for N1 amplitude (F(1,13)=9.29, p<0.01).
Follow up t-tests confirmed that congruent go trials showed significantly
greater N1 amplitude (m=-4.1 ; std=3.2) in comparison to Incongruent no-go
162
trials (m=-3.1; std=3.2; t(1 3)=4.3, p<0.001) and No-go Go trials (m=-3.5;
std=3.5 t(13)=2.3, p<0.05).
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Figure 7.7: ERP waveforms at electrode Oz.
Visual ERPs were explored further at lateral electrode sites. Unlike the
previous experiments all participants made the same responses to a
particular set of visual stimuli. A left diamond always coded for a left
response and a right diamond for a right response. Therefore lateralised
ERP effects were explored by calculating 01 -02 and P07-P08 difference
waveforms for each participant. Visual inspection of figure 7.8 reveals that
an early separation is evident based on the side of the go stimulus with left
go stimuli associated with increased left hemisphere amplitude and right go
stimuli associated with greater right hemisphere amplitude. These
differences were confirmed by a significant effect of prime type (left versus
right) between 40 and 100ms for both difference waveforms (F(1,13)=19.7,
p<0.001 for 01 -02). Since these differences roughly coincide with the visual
N1 at electrode Oz they likely reflect an increased negativity contralateral to
the target stimulus.
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Figure 7.8: 01-02 and P07-P08difference waveforms for experiment 3.
In the 100 to 210ms time window and 210 to 300ms time windows there
were significant main effects of target (p<0.001) as well as signif icant target x
prime interactions (p<0.001). Visual inspection of figure 7.8 reveals that the
lateralised ERP effects were generally much greater in this experiment in
comparison to experiments 1 and 2. Importantly , in the previous
experiments response hand was varied from one block to the next while the
response characteristics remained the same, such that while a left diamond
(or arrow) always coded for a go response, the required hand varied from
block to block. This manipulation ensured that lateralised visual components
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would average out and would not contaminate other ERP components. In
the current experiment the lateralised visual effects would also average out
in the combined ERPs observed for the go/no-go analysis, however due to
the way the LRP is calculated they may contaminate this component. To
explore this possibility in more detail LRP type waveforms were calculated at
electrodes 01 and 0 2 in the same way in which the LRP is calculated for the
four go conditions using electrodes C3 and C4. Thus the following
waveforms were computed for both for the four go conditions:
LRP =[Mean(O2-0 1) left diamond + Mean(0 1-02) right diamond]/2
:3
- Incongruent Go
- Congruent Go
- No-Go Go
- Neutral Go
Figure 7.9: Lateralisedvisual ERPcomponents for experiment 3.
Figure 7.9 shows the LRP type calculation for the four go conditions at
electrodes 01 and 0 2. It is clear from this figure that the LRP at C3 and C4
is likely contaminated by these lateralised visual effects. The large positive
deflections for No-Go Go and incongruent go (at around 1OOms) and its
immediate reversal can clearly be seen in the LRP waveforms (figure7.3).
Later components are also evident in figure 7.9 which are of larger amplitude
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than even the LRP itself and therefore likely contaminate even target-related
LRP effects which begin from around 200ms.
Go/No-go differences
Figure 7.10 shows the raw ERP waveforms for two go and two no-go
conditions. Visual inspection of the waveforms reveals that the no-go N2 is
less well defined than in experiments 1 and 2. This is likely due to the fact
that although 50% of trials were no-go trials, this made up the largest single
response set (compared to 25% go left and 25% go right). This means that
the default mode of participants was likely to be no-go and therefore it should
be easier to withhold the response. Despite this there is still a clear negative
deflection for no-go go trials in comparison to all other conditions, with typical
frontocentral topography. Similarly, although the no-go P3 is reduced it is
clearly still evident on electrodes Fz and Fez. In addition, a large difference
is evident between go and no-go target trials at posterior electrode sites,
which also appears to be modulated by prime type for go target trials.
Statistical analysis was conducted with a five-way ANOVA with target type
(go, no-go) prime type (go, no-go) hemisphere (left, right) anterior-posterior
(Fp, F, FC, C, P, 0) and time (120 to 180ms, 180 to 350ms and 350 to
550ms) as repeated measure factors. As in the previous experiment, the
early time window (120-180ms after target onset; 186-246ms after prime
onset) was selected to explore any early differences in the ERPs associated
with the unconscious primes. The second and third time windows were
centred on the no-go N2 and no-go P3 respectively. The initial five-way
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of hemisphere (F(1,13)=7.8,
p<0.05), with right hemisphere electrodes showing greater ERP average
amplitude. Furthermore, there was as a significant hemisphere x target
interaction (F(1,13)=6, p<0.05) and a significant hemisphere x target x time x
anterior-posterior interaction (F(3,38.4)=2.9, p<0.05). There was no
significant interaction involving prime and hemisphere, suggesting that while
the target type differences may have varied for the lateral electrodes prime
differences did not. Further analysis was conducted to explore the nature of
these lateralised effects. Three separate four way ANOVAs were conducted,
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one for each time window. Each ANOVA had prime type, target type,
anterior-posterior and hemisphere as repeated measures factors. In the first
time window there was no main effect of hemisphere and no interactions
involving hemisphere. In the second time window there was a significant
interaction between target and hemisphere (F(1,13)=6, p<O.05). Follow up
contrasts revealed that although significantly increased right hemisphere
amplitude was evident for both no-go (F(1,13)=11.5, p<O.01) and go target
trials, the difference was larger for go trials (11.9 versus 7.3). However,
since go target amplitude was greater than no-go target amplitude in this
time window, this difference likely reflects the additive effect of increased
right hemisphere ERP amplitudes.
In the final time window, there was a significant target x hemisphere x
anterior-posterior interaction (F(2.6,33.8)=3.3, p<O.05). Further analysis
revealed that there was a significant target x hemisphere interaction at
parietal electrodes only (F(1,13)=15.2, p<O.01). Once again this interaction
appeared to reflect an additive effect of increased right sided ERP amplitude
over right hemisphere in comparison to left hemisphere. In summary, the
hemisphere effects observed in this experiment reflect a general increase in
right hemisphere ERP amplitude. This effect was particularly prominent in
the second and third time window where it appears to be focused over
parietal electrodes where the largest ERP component (the P300) is evident,
and is more increased for go target trials than for no-go target trials. Visual
inspection of figure 7.10 reveals that despite the evident laterality of ERP
amplitudes, the largest ERPs are still observed over central electrodes.
Therefore further analysis of go/no-go differences was conducted on the six
midline electrodes (Fpz, Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, and Oz).
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Figure 7.10: Raw ERP waveforms for experiment 2
A Four-way repeated measure ANOVA at central electrodes revealed a
significant prime x target x anterior-posterior x time interaction
(F(2.8,36.6)=20.1, p<O.001). Further analysis explored the three way
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interactions between prime type, target type and anterior-posterior separately
for each time window. In the early time window there was a significant main
effect of prime (F(1,13)=5.2, p<0.05) and a significant main effect of target
(F(1,13)=4.7, p=0.05) but no significant interactions. Contrasts at each
electrode location revealed that the main effect of prime was maximal at
FCz, where no-go primes showed significantly more negative amplitude in
comparison to go primes (F(1,13)=5.3, p<0.05, uncorrected). The main
effect of target was maximal at Pz, with contrasts revealing a significant
effect of target (at p<0.01) at electrode Pz and Cz such that go target trials
were more positive than no-go target trials. Thus the effect of prime type at
frontal electrodes likely reflects modulation of frontal early no-go N2 related
activity while the more posterior target-related effects probably reflect the
onset of the parietal P300 effect.
In the second time window there was a significant main effect of target
(F(1,13)=22.4, p<0.001) as well as a target x prime (F(1,13)=10.6, p<0.01)
interaction and a significant target x prime x anterior-posterior
(F(2.3,30.1 )=6.3, p<0.01) interaction. The main effect of target reflects the
no-go N2 at anterior sites, and modulation of the P300 at posterior sites.
The left panel of figure 7.11 shows that, for go target trials go and no-go
primes separate at posterior electrodes only, where go primes have
increased amplitude in comparison to no-go primes. T-tests confirmed that
go and no-go primes were significantly different at Pz only (at p<0.001) and
marginally significant at Cz and Oz (p<0.01). For no-go target trials there is
an opposite modulation of ERP amplitude dependent on prime type, such
that go prime trials show more negative amplitude in comparison to no-go
prime trials. This modulation is greatest at Fz and FCz where it is significant
(at p<0.003) and is also marginally significant at Cz (p<0.02). As in
experiments 1 and 2 this second time window shows a functional
dissociation between modulation on go and no-go trials, with no-go trials
varying at frontal electrodes (no-go N2 modulation) and go trials varying at
parietal electrodes (P300 modulation).
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Figure 7.11: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in thesecond timewindow dependent on
prime typefor go targets (left panel) and no-go targets (rightpanel).
In the third time window there was a significant main effect of prime
(F(1,13)=23.9, p<O.001) and a main effect of target (F(1,13)=11.3, p<O.01).
In addition, there was a significant prime x target interaction (F(1,13)=54.4,
p<O.001) and a significant prime x target x anterior-posterior interaction
(F(2.8,37)=20.7, p<O.001). The main effect of target was caused more
positive amplitude for go target trials in comparison to no-go target trials.
Figure 7.12 shows the average ERP amplitude in the final time window
dependent on target type. For go target trials there was a significant
difference between go and no-go prime trials at electrodes Pz and Oz (at
p<O.001) and a moderately significant effect at Cz (at p<O.01). This anterior
modulation is in the opposite direction to that observed in the second time
window. This reversal appears to reflect the earlier onset of the P300
condition for congruent go trials, with the second time window coinciding with
the rising bank of this component and the third time window centered in the
falling bank. For no-go target trials, no-go prime trials showed greater
positive amplitude than go trials. This effect likely reflects the no-go P3.
Modulation of this component was observed over Fz, FCz, Cz and Pz
(significantly different at p<O.001).
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Figure 7.12: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the third time window dependent on
prime typefor gotargets (leftpanel) and no-go targets (rightpanel).
LRP and go/no-go differences
Since the go/no-go differences were explored by averaging together left and
right response trials those effects should be uncontaminated by the visual
and motor asymmetries that were evident in this experiment. To confirm that
the effects remained when the left and right responses were averaged
separately, ERPs were averaged separately for left and right conditions.
Figure 7.13 shows these grand average ERPs for electrodes FC3, FC4 and
FCz as well as P3, P4 and Pz for congruent go trials, no-go go trials and
congruent no-go trials. These conditions were selected to highlight the early
differences apparent at electrodes FCz for the congruent no-go condition.
The two boxes show the most important areas for the hypothesis that frontal
no-go effects were elicited by the prime, where the early N2 occurs on
congruent no-go trials. Over FC3 both FC4 congruent no-go conditions are
consistently more negative than all other conditions.
The earlier analysis of the early go/no-go differences highlighted that while
there was a negativity associated with congruent no-go trials; this was not
the case for no-go go trials. Further examination of the light blue and dark
blue lines in figure 7.13 reveals that there is no consistent early asymmetry
for no-go go trials. This is to be expected because the prime codes for a no-
go response and therefore no motor activation should occur. For congruent
go trials however, the congruent go left condition shows consistently greater
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negativity over right sided electrodes in the early time window. This effect
then persists throughout the epoch.
FC3 _ Congruent Go Left FCz
- Congruent Go Right
- NoGoGoLeft
- NoGoGoRight 25
- Congruent No-go
P3 pz
-10
I I I I I I I I I I I
-400 600
Figure 7.13: Effects of lateralisedcomponents on early go/no-go differences in experiment 3.
It is important to note that in this experiment, where forward compatibility
effects are observed the motor related effects occur in the opposite direction
to the go/no-go differences. For example any contamination at central sites
from the early contralateral negativity in response to congruent go left trials
would serve to decrease ERP amplitude for this condition, thus reducing the
go/no-go differences not artificially creating them. The same would also be
true for the non lateralised motor activity (the readiness potential), which is
also negative going and would therefore also reduce or remove very small
go/no-go differences. In the current experiment such motor related activity in
response to go primes could act to abolish a frontocentral negativity for no-
go go trials. The presence of an early negativity for congruent no-go trials
however, suggests that the no-go related negativity for that condition was
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large enough to overcome these competing factors, and therefore the same
should be expected if an N2 like effect had been present for no-go go trials.
In addition to the frontal prime-related modulations, figure 7.13 shows that
the target-related ERP effect at Pz, namely the early onset P300 for
congruent go trials, and the increased amplitude on go trials, were both
evident over the left and right hemisphere.
The overlap between response preparation negativities and frontal N2
related effects is again highlighted in figure 7.14. While the go target trials
show large motor related asymmetries, onsetting around 100ms after
stimulus onset, no-go target trials do not show similar asymmetries. Again,
since these motor asymmetries result in an increased negativity contralateral
to response the response hand, any spreading of these effects to central
electrodes would result in a reduction of the no-go N2. However, since the
no-go P3 is associated with increased negativity for no-go trials it is possible
that this difference is partly created by increased motor negativity (see
chapters 2 and 10 for further discussion on this issue).
FC3
15
-5
- Congruent go Left
- Congruent go Right
- Incongruent no-go Left
- Incongruent no-go Right
FC4
Figure 7.14: Effects of lateralised components on target-related go/no-go differences in
experiment 3.
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Congruent go versus incongruent go trials
Finally, to explore the possible presence of a parietal N2 for incongruent go
trials, ERP grand averages were formed for congruent go, incongruent go
and no-go go conditions. Figure 7.15 shows that while there is no frontal
modulation for go trials there is a parietal modulation, with incongruent go
trials showing significantly reduced amplitude from 250 to 370ms after target
onset (t(1 3)=3.86, p<0.002). ANOVA at P3 (F(1,1 3)=11.7, p<0.01) and P4
(F(1,13)=11.4, p<0.01) with prime congruency (congruent, incongruent) and
response hand (left, right) as repeated measures factors further revealed that
a main effect of prime congruency was evident at both lateral electrodes.
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- No-go Go
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Figure 7.15: Effects of lateralised components on target-related go/no-go differences in
experiment 2.
Discussion
This experiment aimed to overcome the problems with the neutral primes in
experiment 2 and also to explore go/no-go inhibition and selective inhibition
in the same task. In particular, it aimed to show that while frontal
inhibition/control mechanisms are involved in unconscious modulation of
go/no-go differences, they are not associated with the resolution of
unconscious conflict on incongruent go trials. While there is evidence to
suggest that conflict between response alternatives can modulate these
mechanisms (Van 't Ent, 2002), Leuthold and Kopp (1999) have shown that
the N2 exhibits a parietal rather than frontal topography when conflict
between two response alternatives is unconscious.
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Behavioural effects followed the predicted direction with fastest reaction
times for congruent go trials, and slowest for incongruent go and no-go go
trials. Importantly, neutral prime trials were significantly different to both
congruent and no-go prime trials. However, further analysis of the neutral go
trials revealed that the side of the neutral prime greatly influence reaction
times. More specifically, when the neutral prime was on the same side as a
subsequent go target, reaction times were significant faster than when the
prime was on the opposite side. A likely explanation is that since participants
were required to react on the side where a diamond was present, they will be
looking out for diagonal lines in the display. Although the neutral primes
contained two features of each of the primes, the requirement of the task to
respond to diagonals (diamonds) and not respond to straight lines would
likely give the diagonals more influence. Due to this problem with the neutral
primes, they were excluded from subsequent ERP analysis.
Frontal no-go N2 and P3 effects were consistent with previous experiments
which showed reduced N2 and P3 for primed no-go responses. This finding
once again suggests that frontal control mechanisms are modulated by
unconscious primes. Moreover, an early negativity was observed for
congruent no-go trials peaking around 150ms after stimulus onset. This
result suggests that in this condition the N2 onset earlier in time as a result of
the no-go prime. However, unlike in previous experiments this effect was
limited to the congruent no-go condition such that no early negativity was
observed following a no-go prime, when the subsequent target coded for a
go response. The more comprehensive analysis of go/no-go differences
highlighted the same early separation at frontal electrodes dependent on
prime type, with no-go prime trials showing significantly more negative
amplitude than go prime trials. However, it is important to note that in this
analysis a target-related effect was also evident in this early time window in
this experiment, which although having a more parietal maximum was also
evident at frontocentral electrodes. This overlapping target-related activity
suggests that the prime-related effects observed at frontal electrodes was
not purely related to the prime, but also influenced by the target. These
findings together suggest that the unconscious primes were not able to
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directly activate frontal inhibition/control mechanisms in the current
experiment.
Analysis of visual ERP effects revealed a significant prime x target
interaction at electrode Oz in the N1 time window. This is similar to the
effects observed in experiment 2 where congruent trials showed an
increased and perhaps earlier N1 component. In addition to this congruency
effect at Oz visual ERP effects were also seen to be lateralised dependent
on the nature of the physical features of the unconscious prime. As in
experiment 2, increased P1 and N1 responses were observed contralateral
to the side of the diamond stimulus, suggesting some kind of visual detection
of the stimulus features. Given the lack of any early prime-related
modulation at frontal electrodes, the presence of these visual effects
provides for the possibility that the modulation of target-related N2/P3 was
caused by perceptual priming of the target and therefore earlier and easier
categorisation of the target. For example, the presence of a diamond prime
might attract participants' attention to that location, which would then result in
faster classification of a diamond in the same location. This possible
alternative explanation was discounted in previous experiments due to the
presence of early frontal prime-related ERP modulation, which could not be
accounted for by faster or better classification of the target stimuli. The
absence of such an effect in the current experiment means it is impossible to
rule out this perceptual/attentional account of the observed N2/P3
modulations.
The presence of lateralised visual components in the current experiment also
led to complication with interpretation of LRP activity. Importantly, although
previous experiments also used somewhat lateralised visual stimuli, they
were counterbalanced across conditions to ensure that no such
contamination could occur. In the current experiment however, the change
in stimulus-response parameters meant that stimuli in different visual fields
consistently coded for one response or the other. This contamination of the
LRP in the current experiment makes interpretation of the lateralised motor
effects impossible. One method for avoiding this type of contamination of
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LRPs would be to present stimuli in central locations, or above and below the
midline (as in Leuthold and Kopp, 1999) as this would prevent the
appearance of lateralised visual effects. Although, these lateralised visual
effects were seen to contaminate LRP waveforms they did not affect the
analysis of go/no-go differences. Therefore they do not compromise the
finding that no-go N2 and P3 components were modulated by the
unconscious prime.
Inspection of ERPs generated for left and right hand responses separately
confirmed that the N2 and P3 effects were present over both hemisphere
and for both left and right hand response trials. This confirmed that the
complications with the lateralised visual and motor effects did not influence
the analysis of go/no-go differences. Furthermore, although motor related
asymmetries were clearly evident in the individual hand waveforms, they
were seen to be acting in the opposite direction to the N2 effects. Since
motor readiness potentials and lateralised readiness potentials (LRP) are
both negative going potentials, they will show increased negativity for go
trials in comparison to no-go trials. This is the opposite of the effects found
in the N2 time window where no-go trials are in fact more negative than go
trials. Praamstraa and Seiss (2005) found that a pseudo N2 was observed in
the negative compatibility effect for congruent no-go trials caused by
averaging together left and right hand responses. This led to the inclusion of
a similar check in the current experiments to determine whether the N2
effects were indeed genuine N2 effects and not projections of motor related
effects. Importantly, this effect only occurred in Praamstra and Seiss's
(2005) experiment because of the reversal of the initial motor priming effects.
As described above, any priming of a motor response in the current
experiment, and indeed in any experiment with positive compatibility, would
in fact work in the opposite direction to N2 effects and would therefore
reduce them, or even remove them and not, as reported by Pramstraa and
Seiss (2005), create spurious N2 effects.
The comprehensive analysis of go/no-go differences also revealed a number
of significantly lateralised effects, with right hemisphere electrodes showing
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generally increased amplitude in comparison to left hemisphere electrodes.
This effect is clearly visible on inspection of the ERP waveforms in figure 7.9.
However, despite a number of significant interactions occurring between
hemisphere and target type, these effects appeared to be additive such that
when go target trials showed increased amplitude in comparison to no-go
target trials this effect appeared to be magnified by the increased general
amplitude over right sided electrodes. This suggests that rather than the
components showing a significantly right sided distribution, there appeared to
be significantly increased right sided ERP amplitude. Reviewing the ERP
waveforms closely for experiments 1 and 2 reveals a similar pattern in each
of these experiments (although to a lesser degree); therefore the significantly
increased right hemisphere activity in the current experiment likely reflects a
generic process for the particular task. One possible explanation for this
observation is that since the task involves processing and identification of
objects, this might more actively engage right hemisphere processing.
Evidence in support of this interpretation comes from the finding that
increased right hemisphere magnetoencephalogram (MEG) activity appears
to be modulated by successful generation of object representations
(Schweinberger, Kaufmann, Moratti, Keil, & Burton, 2007). Similarly, Foxe,
McCourt and Javitt (2003) showed a right sided ERP bias for a line bisection
task, suggesting that control of visuospatial attention, in particular with
reference to objects, manifests in increased right hemisphere ERP
amplitude. This suggests that the increased right hemisphere activity
observed in the current experiment, and to a lesser degree in the previous
experiments, is associated with right hemisphere spatial attention and object
representation processes.
As in previous experiments, modulation of go trials in the N2 time window
was maximal at posterior and not anterior electrode locations. Interestingly a
similar parietal modulation was also observed in the current experiment
between congruent and incongruent go trials. Importantly, in the current
experiment incongruent go trials reflected trials where the prime coded for a
go response with one hand and the target code for a response with the other
hand (e.g. left go followed by right go). This condition is analogous to the
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incongruent go condition in Leuthold and Kopp (1999). They found a similar
parietal modulation which they interpreted as a parietal N2. However the
presence of this component alongside a genuine frontal N2 confirms that it
likely reflects an independent process. The most likely explanation for this
parietal modulation is that it reflects modulation of the parietal P300 or P3b
component. As described in the chapter 2 there is much debate as to the
exact functional significance and cortical generator of this ERP component,
which is measured in a wide variety of different tasks. However, it seems
likely that this component reflects the interface of perception and action,
where a decision is reached about how to respond to a stimulus is reached
(Verleger et aI., 2005). The modulation of this component for go trials in the
current experiment is consistent with such an interpretation, as the
incongruent or no-go prime increases both stimulus evaluation time and
reaction time to the target, both processes which are reflected in the
component. This issue is discussed more extensively in response to all the
current experiments in the general discussion (chapter 10).
Conclusions
This experiment replicated the unconscious modulation of go/no-go ERP
differences observed in experiments 1 and 2. More specifically, no-go N2
and P3 amplitude were found to vary as a function of the unconscious
masked prime. In addition to this target-related modulation, an early frontal
negativity was observed for congruent no-go trials. Unlike in previous
experiments however, this modulation was not entirely determined by the no-
go prime as this negativity was largely absent for no-go go trials. Therefore,
the results from the current experiment cannot rule out the possibility that the
N2 and P3 priming effects were caused by earlier or more successful
classification of no-go targets when followed by a no-go prime. Moreover,
the current experiment showed that unconscious conflict between two
response alternatives does not exhibit a frontal no-go N2, but rather is
reflected in modulation of a parietal P300 component. However, examination
of these effects alongside LRP modulation was not possible due to
contamination of this component from lateralised visual ERP effects. A
further complication with the neutral primes also meant that only differences
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between congruent and incongruent (and no-go) primes could be explored in
the current experiment. In summary, the current experiment replicated the
modulation of the target-related no-go N2 and P3 amplitude as a function of
the unconscious prime observed in the previous experiments. Importantly,
this modulation was maximal over frontal electrode sites, while an additional
effect was observed at posterior sites for incongruent go trials. This finding
suggests that while the frontal effects reflect modulation of frontal
inhibition/control mechanisms, the parietal effects are related to the P300
elicited on go trials.
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Chapter 8
Experiment 4 - Unconscious facilitation of no-go N2
and P3 ERP components.
Introduction
Experiment 4 aimed to further extend the conclusion of the first three
experiments that unconscious primes could facilitate the no-go response as
measured by the no-go N2 and P3. In experiments 1 to 3 this facilitation was
manifested in decreased N2 and P3 amplitude for congruent no-go trials in
comparison to incongruent no-go trials. However, only experiment 1 allowed
direct comparison of trials with a neutral prime with congruent and
incongruent trials. Given that this effect occurred in an experiment where
congruent primes impeded rather than facilitated responses it is worthy of
replication. The comparison between congruent and neutral no-go trials is
particularly important since any modulation of no-go N2 and P3 amplitude
between congruent and incongruent trials might reflect motor priming rather
than priming of a no-go response. For example, when a go prime is
presented this may initiate motor response preparation which then requires
inhibition. When a no-go prime is presented, since no unconscious motor
activation would be expected the no-go responses will be smaller in
comparison. Crucially however, without a neutral prime it is not clear
whether the no-go N2/P3 response is attenuated in this condition compared
to baseline.
The observation in the previous experiments that the subliminal primes were
able to, to differing degrees, directly initiate early frontal ERP effects
associated with inhibition/control mechanisms, strongly supports the
assumption that the no-go response is indeed facilitated by a no-go prime.
Nonetheless, this conclusion would be further supported by showing
facilitation of a no-go response in comparison to a neutral baseline. The
current experiment reverted back to the simple go/no-go procedure
employed in the first two experiments so as to not introduce the additional
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confounds observed in experiment 3. In the current experiment participants
were required to make a response to a single central arrow pointing either to
the left or to the right. Unbeknownst to the participants a prime arrow was
presented that was either congruent incongruent or neutral to the target.
Congruent arrows pointed in the same direction as the target while
incongruent arrows pointed in the opposite direction. Neutral primes
consisted of arrows pointing either upwards or downwards. The primes were
presented slightly above, below, left or right of fixation. Since the target was
in the centre of the screen; all primes would be equidistant from the target
thus ensuring that they would have equal allocation of attention.
Hypotheses
If no-go N2 facilitation occurs as a result of priming of the no-go response
then N2 and P3 amplitude should be reduced for congruent no-go conditions
in comparison to incongruent and neutral no-go conditions. Additionally, if
these processes are directly initiated by the unconscious primes then the
ERPs should show some early frontal modulation dependent on prime type.
Method
Participants
Twenty-one participants (11 male and 10 female) were recruited by means of
poster advertisement. All participants were right handed and had normal or
corrected to normal vision. The mean age of participants was 26 years and
omonths, with a range of 19 to 38 years. Participants were reimbursed £15
in compensation for their time.
Experimental Procedure
All participants completed a single experimental session lasting
approximately two hours. The participants completed 14 blocks of the go/no-
go task followed by three blocks of the prime identification task. Each go/no-
go block contained 72 trials presented in a random order. The 14
experimental blocks were preceded by two practice blocks of 36 trials.
Participants were required to respond if a central arrow was pointing in one
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direction and to refrain from responding to arrows in the opposite direction.
Half the participants were instructed to press a button in response to left
pointing arrow and half were instructed to respond to right pointing arrows.
The response hand was varied from one block to the next. The participants
were informed that they had a time limit of 450 ms to respond to the go
stimuli and that they should react as quickly as possible without sacrificing
accuracy. Participants were given visual feedback immediately after the
450ms response window for correct responses, incorrect responses and
non-response as well as false alarms and incorrect non-responses.
Participants were informed that a black square with a white diamond centre
would be presented prior to the target stimulus. They were informed that this
would help to guide their attention to the centre of the screen. Unbeknownst
to the participants a brief prime was also presented prior to the diamond
shape (see figure 8.1). The prime consisted of a faint arrow pointing either to
the left or the right, or up or down. The primes fit exactly into the contour of
the white diamond shape for maximum metacontrast masking. One third of
the primes were congruent with the respect to the target stimulus and one
third were incongruent. A third of trials were neutral to the target stimulus.
The neutral trials either pointed up or down, with half the participants being
presented with up neutral primes and half with down neutral primes. The
allocation of target stimuli and neutral primes was counterbalanced across
participants.
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Figure 8.1: Stimuli for experiment 4. A congruent (A), incongruent (B) and neutral (C) trial.
The stimuli used for experiment 4 are shown in figure 8.1. Left and right
pointing prime and target stimuli measure 0.8cm across and 1.6cm from top
to bottom, with the dimensions reversed for up and down pointing arrows.
Primes were presented with the outer edge 1.75cm from the centre of the
screen. The outer contours of the mask measured 4cm, with the internal
diamond measuring 3.5cm. The target arrow was presented in the centre of
the screen such that an approximately equal number of pixels were
presented marginally either side of fixation (78 pixels on the side of the
arrowhead and 82 pixels on the side of the flankers)
Each trial began with a large central fixation for 200 ms which acted as a
warning signal to participants that the next trial had begun. A smaller fixation
cross was then presented for 800ms followed by the prime (16ms), a blank
screen (16ms), the mask (84ms) and the target (100ms). Following the
450ms response window participants were given visual feedback which
remained on the screen for 500ms. Finally a blink pause was presented for
800ms followed by a blank screen for a randomly selected interval between
200ms and 800ms.
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Following the go/no-go task the participants were asked the same three
questions as in experiment 2 and 3 and were then shown the sequence in
slow motion. After seeing the slowed sequence participants were asked if
they recognised having seen any of the primes during the go/no-go task.
The prime identification task consisted of one practice block and three
experimental blocks of 96 trials. One half of trials contained a right pointing
prime arrow and the other half contained a left pointing prime arrow. No
neutral primes were presented in this task and no target stimulus was
presented. Participants were informed that they should press the far left
button for left arrow primes and the far right button for right pointing primes.
Participants had no time limit to respond, and received feedback at the end
of each trial. Finally participants were asked to report whether the felt they
were able to see the masked primes during the detection task.
Behavioural Results
Awareness of Primes
Table 8.1 shows the participants' responses to the four questions regarding
the visibility of the primes. None of the 21 subjects reported having seen
anything appear before the diamond shape. In fact four participants did not
even notice the diamond shapes despite being informed of its presence.
Whilst four subjects reported that they might have seen something flash, only
one subject recognised having seen the prime when shown the slow motion
sequence, and the same subject reported seeing the primes in the forced-
choice task.
t Q f 1t 5fT bl 81 Sa e .. ummarv 0 responses 0 ues Ions 0
Notice? What? Flash? Recognise? See?
NO 21 21 17 20 20
YES 0 0 4 1 1
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Overall performance on the forced-choice task was not significantly different
from the 50% chance level (t (20) = 1.385, P = 0.181). However, one subject
(the same subject who reported having seen the primes) achieved 75%
accuracy, while one other participant achieved close to 60%. These two
participants were classed as possibly having some residual awareness of the
prime. Initial analysis included these two participants, with all priming effects
then correlated with prime identification performance. In addition, the
reliability of the effects was assessed when these two participants were
excluded. The remaining participants achieved an average accuracy of
50.3% which did not differ from 50% (t (18) = 0.43: p=0.68). Participants d'
values did also not differ from chance (t (18) = 0.44, p=0.68).
Priming
The influence of the masked primes during the go/no-go task was assessed
in the nineteen participants who showed chance recognition of the primes in
the forced-choice task. Repeated measures ANOVA with prime congruency
as a repeated measures factor showed a highly significant effect on prime-
stimulus congruency for reaction times (F(1.9,37.8)=25.2, p<0.001) and
accuracy (F(1.9,37.3)=16.1, p<0.001) on go trials. Similarly a significant
main effect of prime-stimulus congruency was evident for accuracy on no-go
trials (F = 13.99, p<0.001).
Table 8.2.1: Mean Reaction times and accuracy (and Standard Dev
Congruent Incongruent Neutral
RT 342 (15) 354 (13) 347 (15)
Acc 0.91 (0.06) 0.87 (0.07) 0.88(0.07)
iations) for go trials
Subsequent t-tests confirmed that reaction times were significantly different
between congruent and incongruent go trials (t(20)=6.3, p<0.001), congruent
and neutral go trials (t(20)=3.1, p<0.01) and incongruent and neutral trials
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(t(20)=4.5, p<0.001). For error rates there was a significant difference
between congruent and incongruent go trials (t(20)=5.9, p<0.001) and
congruent and neutral go trials (t(20)=3.9, p<0.001). No-go error rates were
also significantly different for congruent and incongruent no-go trials (t(20)=-
5, p<0.001) as well as congruent and neutral no-go trials (t(20)=3.5, p<0.01)
There was no significant correlation between behavioural priming and prime
identification using raw scores for percent correct or the absolute difference
from chance. Furthermore, running the above analysis excluding those two
participants who showed possible residual awareness of the primes
produced the same results as outlined above. This confirms that the priming
effects were unrelated to the prime identification performance and that the
priming effects were present when objective measures of awareness did not
differ from zero.
EEG Results
One participant was excluded from EEG analysis due to a hardware failure
during recording, leaving a total of 20 participants. ERPs were formed from
an average of between 118 and 130 trials for each condition (with a minimum
of 60 trials), made up of equal numbers of left and right hand response trials
(approximately 62 per hand).
LRP Analysis
Figure 8.2 shows the LRP for the six conditions. Onset analysis was
conducted in the three go conditions using the 50% relative criterion method
and the jackknife procedure. There was no significant difference in LRP
onset between the three conditions (F(1.5,29.1)=0.5). Amplitude analysis
was conducted with prime type (go, no-go, neutral) and target type (go, no-
go) as repeated measures factors in 50ms time windows from target onset.
This revealed no significant main effects of prime and no prime x target
interactions. From 200 to 250 ms there was a near significant (F(1,19)=3.4,
p=0.081) main effect of target type, which then became highly significant
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(p<0.001) in each 50ms time window up until and including the 400 to 450ms
time window.
1
- Congruent Go - Congruent No-go
- Incongruent Go - Incongruent No-go
- Neutral Go - Neutral No-go
-3
Figure 8.2: LRP waveforms for the six conditions in experiment 4 with respect to target onset.
Prime onset at -116signified by dashedline.
Frontal No-go N2 and P3 Analysis
Figure 8.3 shows the difference waveforms for each of the three no-go
conditions compared to the neutral go condition. Two separate one-way
ANOVAs were conducted at electrode Fez for the three no-go difference
waveforms to explore the amplitude of the no-go N2 and P3. The N2 time
window (275ms to 325ms) was chosen to encompass the period around the
peak latency of the no-go N2. Similarly the P3 time window (400ms to
450ms) was meant to capture any differences in average amplitude of the
no-go P3. The ANOVA for each time window included prime congruency as
a repeated measures factor (congruent, incongruent and neutral).
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Figure 8.3: Difference ERPwaveforms for the three no-go conditions at electrode Fz.
In the N2 time window there was a significant main effect of prime
congruency (F(1.9,31.5)=5.4, p<0.05). Follow up t-tests confirmed that
incongruent no-go trials (m=-7.3; std=4.7) showed significantly more
negative amplitude than congruent no-go trials (m=-5.9; std=3.8; t(19)=3,
p<O.001). In addition, neutral no-go trials showed greater N2 amplitude (m=-
7.1; std=4.2) in comparison to congruent no-go trials (t(1 9)=2.4, p<O.05).
Neutral no-go N2 amplitude did not significantly differ from congruent no-go
N2 amplitude (t(15)=0.5, p=O.63). In the P3 time window there was no
significant effect of prime congruency on P3 amplitude (F(1 .7,32)=O. 8).
Further analysis was conducted to explore the possibility that the magnitude
of the N2 modulation was related to participants' scores on the forced-choice
task. N2 priming effects were calculated by subtracting congruent no-go
amplitude from incongruent no-go amplitude in the two time windows. There
were no significant correlations between either of these measures and
performance on the prime identification task. Furthermore, the above N2
analysis was repeated using only those 18 participants who performed at
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chance level in the prime identification task resulting in the identical
significant effects to those described above. These results confirm that the
modulation of the no-go N2 was independent of prime identification
performance, and that this modulation occurred even in those subjects who
failed to identify the primes in the control task.
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Figure 8.4: Scalp distribution of no-go N2 for congruent (top left), incongruent (top right) and
neutral (bottom left) no-go trial s. Each scalp map represents the average amplitude for the
specified 10ms time window
Figure 8.4 shows the topography of the no-go N2 for congruent, incongruent
and neutral no-go trials. The scalp maps show that the no-go N2 initially
appears over frontocentral electrodes before later spreading to parietal
electrodes showing a second maximum at Pz. Figure 8.5 shows the
topography of the no-go P3 which also shows a frontocentral maximum.
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Figure 8.5: Scalp distribution of no-go P3 for congruent (left panel), incongruent (central panel)
andneutral (right panel) no-gotrials.
To explore any early prime-related modulation of fronta l inhibition/control
processes, factorial analysis was conducted on all six conditions at electrode
- Congruent Go
- Incongruent Go
- Neutral Go
- Congruent No-go
- Incongruent No-go
- Neutral No-go
Fz
Fz. Figure 8.6 shows the grand average ERP at electrode Fz for the six
conditions. The no-go N2/P3 complex is clearly visible onsetting around
200ms after stimulus onset. Visual inspection of the ERP waveforms also
reveals that there appears to be no early prime-related effects at electrode
Fz. ANOVA from 120 to 180ms after stimulus onset, with prime type (go, no-
go, neutral) and target type (go, no-go) revealed no significant effects.
25
-10
Figure 8.6: ERP waveforms for the six conditions in experiment 4 at electrode Fz.
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Early visual ERP effects
Figure 8.7 shows the grand average ERPs at electrode Oz for all six
conditions. Visual inspection revealed that N1 and P1 components were less
well defined than in previous experiments with ERP activity showing a
sequence of two positive and two negative peaks, possibly reflecting visual
N1 and P1 components to the prime and target stimuli respectively. ANOVA
with prime type (go, no-go, neutral) and target type (go, no-go) as repeated
measures factors was conducted in four time windows centred on the
observed peaks (0-30ms, 30-60ms, 60-110ms, 110-160ms). There were no
significant effects in any of these time windows.
Oz
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-10
Figure 8.7: ERP waveforms at electrode Oz.
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Further analysis was conducted to explore possible lateralised effects related
to physical characteristics of the prime. Figure 8.8 shows grand average
ERPs constructed dependent on the visual stimulus, such that they were
formed from different conditions for participants with different response
mappings. Visual inspection reveals that the waveforms appear to separate
based on prime type at from about 20 to 50ms after target onset with left
primes showing greater left hemisphere sided amplitude in comparison to
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right primes. ANOVA was conducted in this time window with prime type
(left, right) target type (Ieft,right,neutral) as repeated measures factors and
response mapping (left go, right go) as an independent factor. Response
mapping was included to ensure that the any observed effects were truly
related to the physical characteristics of the prime and not the relevance of
the stimuli. A significant main effect of prime was observed for the 01-02
difference (F(1.9,26.9)=6.5, p<0.01) and the P07-P08 difference
(F(1.8,28.2)=8.3, p<0.01). A significant linear contrast (both ps<0.002) was
observed for both electrode pairings, with left go primes showing greatest
amplitude followed by neutral prime and then incongruent primes. There
was no significant prime x target interaction, and no significant interactions
with response mapping. From 100ms after stimulus onset the waveforms
separated based on the primes with an initial increase for left sided targets
from 100 to 150ms then being replaced by an increase in right sided targets
from 150 to 200ms (confirmed by repeated measures ANOVA in these time
windows showing only main effects of prime). These effects likely reflect
modulation of the later positive and negative peaks observed at electrode
Oz, possibly a target-related P1 and N1.
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Figure 8.8: Lateralisedvisual ERPdifferencewaveforms for experiment 4.
Go/No-go Differences
As in the previous experiments, amplitude analysis of go/no-go differences
was conducted using a five-way repeated measures ANOVA with prime type
(go,no-go,neutral), target type (go,no-go), hemisphere (Ieft,right), anterior-
posterior (Fp, F, FC, C, P, and 0) and time (1 20-180, 180-350, 350-550) as
within-subjects factors. The early time window was selected to explore any
early differences in the ERPs associated with the unconscious primes. The
second and third time windows were centred on the no-go N2 and no-go P3
respectively.
Initial analysis focusing on the six lateral electrode locations over the left and
right hemisphere revealed no significant main effect of hemisphere
(F(1,19)=3.5, p=0.08). However, there was a significant hemisphere x target
194
x time interaction (F(1.6,29.7)=6.2, p<0.05) as well as a near significant
hemisphere x prime x time interaction (F(2.9,54.9)=8.2, p=0.054). Further
analysis was conducted for each of the three time windows to try and classify
these interactions. This analysis revealed that there appeared to be an
interaction between prime and side in the first time window only, although
this failed to reach statistical significance (F(1.5,27.5)=6.2, p=0.08). Further,
since this effect appeared extremely inconsistent across the anterior-
posterior dimension it most likely reflected noise. Conversely, the interaction
between side and target appeared to develop more in the later time windows
with a non significant trend observed in the second time window
(F(1,19)=3.6, p=0.07) and a significant interaction in the final time window
(F(1,19)=6.7, p<0.05).
In addition to the significant interaction between target and side, this third
time window also exhibited a significant main effect of side and a significant
side x anterior-posterior interaction. The main effect of side was caused by
increased amplitude over the right hemisphere (m=8.1; std=0.8) in
comparison to the left hemisphere (m=7.5; std=0.7). The side x anterior
posterior interaction manifested in a greater right lateralisation of amplitude
over frontocentral electrodes (F4, FC4 and C4; mean difference = 1.1mv) in
comparison to anterior electrodes (P4 and 02; mean difference = 0.2mv).
Finally, the target x side interaction was caused by a more increased right
lateralisation for no-go target trials (mean difference = 0.8mv) in comparison
to go target trials (mean difference =0.3). It is important to note that these
laterality effects were extremely small in comparison to the target and prime-
related effects (explored in more detail below). Visual inspection of figure 8.9
reveals that overall ERP amplitude was greatest at midline electrodes further
suggesting that the components were largely centrally distributed. Further
analysis of the prime and target-related effects was therefore explore over
the six midline electrode sites (Fpz, Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz and Oz).
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Figure 8.9: Raw ERPwaveforms for experiment 4
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Four-way ANOVA using the six midline electrodes (Fpz, Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz and
Oz) as the anterior-posterior dimension revealed a significant target x time x
anterior-posterior interaction (F(3.4,63.9)=59.2, p<0.001) as well as a prime x
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time x anterior-posterior interaction (F(6.4,122.2)=3.3, p<O.005). These two
effects suggest that the prime and target influenced ERPs differentially at
different electrode locations and in the different time windows. However the
four-way prime x target x time x anterior-posterior failed to reach statistical
significance with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied (F(4.5,86.1)=2,
p=0.09).
To explore these effects in more detail, separate three-way ANOVA was
conducted for each of the three time windows. In the first time window
(120ms to 180ms) there were no significant main effects or interactions
involving either prime or target. In the second time window (180 to 350ms
after stimulus onset) there was a significant target x prime interaction
(F(4.5,86.1)=2, p=0.09) as well as a significant prime x anterior-posterior
(F(4.5,86.1 )=2, p=0.09) and target x anterior-posterior interaction.
(F(4.5,86.1)=2, p=O.09). There was no significant three way interaction.
Figure 8.10 shows these two interactions. The right panel shows that there
appears to be a difference between go and no go target trials at all electrode
sites. Contrasts revealed significant differences between go and no-go
target trials (at p<0.001) at all electrode locations except Fpz, with the
absence of a significant difference at Fpz likely driving the prime x anterior-
posterior interaction.
10
8
6
4
2
0+-+''I=F--'--....L...L,--....L...L,--....L...L,--....L...L-r'''''-'--1....L-i
-2
-4 ~... .._ - _ _.._ ..1
Fpz Fz FCz Cz pz Oz
IIII Go D No-go D Neutral I
10
8
6
4
2
o
-2
-4 -l _ ,
Fpz Fz FCz Cz pz Oz
111I Go D No-go I
Figure 8.10: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the middle timewindow dependent on
prime type (left panel) and target type (right panel). Amplitude in microvolts on y axis and
electrodes onx axis.
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The left panel of figure 8.10 shows the amplitude in the second time window
dependent on prime type. Visual inspection reveals that no-go primes are
more negative than the other two prime conditions at anterior electrodes,
with this effect reversed over posterior electrodes. Contrasts showed that
no-go prime amplitude was significantly reduced at electrode FCz in
comparison to go amplitude (F(1,19)=4.9, p<O.05). In contrast, no-go prime
amplitude was significantly more positive than neutral prime amplitude at
electrode Oz (F(1,19)=5.2, p<O.05). Examining the raw ERP waveforms in
figure 8.8 shows that this likely reflects modulation of the no-go N2 at frontal
electrodes and the P300 at parietal electrodes, with the overlapping
differences at Cz and Pz cancelling one another out. The reduced N2 at
frontal electrodes is characterised by a reduced no-go N2 (therefore more
positive amplitude) for no-go prime trials (evident in the congruent no-go
condition). At parietal electrodes the P300 is reduced in this time window for
incongruent go trials manifesting in reduced amplitude for no-go primes. It is
important to note however that the three way interaction between prime type,
target type and anterior-posterior electrode location was not significant in this
time window.
In the third time window there was a significant main effect of target
(F(1,19)=5.2, p<O.05) and a target x anterior-posterior interaction
(F(2.5,47)=60, p<O.001). Figure 8.11 shows the average amplitude for
midline electrodes dependent on prime type. At anterior electrodes no-go
target trials were significantly more positive than go target trials, with this
effect reversed over electrode Pz and Oz. Contrasts confirmed significant
differences (at p<O.001) between go and no-go target trials at all electrodes
except Fpz. At Fz, FCz and Cz the no-go trials showed significantly greater
amplitude while at Pz and Oz go trials showed significantly greater
amplitude. This frontal modulation likely reflects the frontal no-go P3 effect,
while the reversal over parietal sites reflects the increased P300 for go
compared to no-go trials.
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Figure 8.11: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the late time window dependent on
target type.
Discussion
Experiment 4 aimed to replicate the effects in the previous experiments while
overcoming the problems previously observed with the neutral primes.
Behavioural results showed that, although the magnitude of the priming
effect on reaction time was notably smaller than in previous experiments, it
reliably separated based on the nature of the prime. Importantly this
modulation occurred between neutral and no-go primes as well as neutral
and go primes with a similar effect being observed for error rates for both go
and no-go trials.
The behavioural effect in this experiment was notably smaller than that
observed in the other experiments. The probable explanation for this lies in
the nature of the primes that were employed. Since each prime was
presented at a different physical location, the prime identification task
effectively amounted to a prime detection task. In this task participants could
have correctly identified the type of prime simply by noticing its location (left
or right of fixation). The fact that participants still performed at chance level
on this task effectively meant that the primes were presented below the
objective threshold for prime detection, which is known to be lower than the
threshold for prime identification (Snodgrass et aI., 2004). Interestingly,
Snodgrass et aI., (2004) also report that priming is increased at the objective
detection threshold in comparison to the identification threshold. However,
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this suggested has been vigorously contested (Holender & Duscherer, 2004;
see chapter 3 for more detailed discussion). The finding that primes at the
objective detection threshold produced a relatively small priming effect does
not support Snodgrass et al.'s (2004) assumption. Rather the finding that an
effect still emerged despite the primes being highly invisible suggests that
the go/no-go priming effects are truly unconsciously driven.
In line with the relatively small behavioural priming effects observed in the
current experiment, ERP differences were also reduced in comparison to
previous experiments. LRP analysis revealed that there was no significant
difference in the onset of the LRP between the three go conditions.
Similarly, there were no significant amplitude effects related to the
unconscious primes. This perhaps suggests that the priming effect was too
small to influence motor preparation. However, it is also possible that the
rather small effect size observed in the reaction times and error rates likely
meant that the LRP became somewhat insensitive to this very small
difference. Given the low signal to noise ratio of the LRP, it is likely that
small effects will be less noticeable in this component than in others. There
were significant differences observed in the amplitude of the no-go N2
component dependent on the prime for no-go trials. Importantly this
modulation occurred such that congruent no-go trials showed significantly
reduced N2 in comparison to incongruent and neutral primes. This suggests
that rather than simply reflecting an increased N2 on congruent trials, the
modulation of this component is caused by a priming of the no-go response.
Additionally, neutral prime trials did not significantly differ from incongruent
prime trials. Similarly, the parietal P300 component showed decreased
amplitude for no-go prime trials, but no difference between go and neutral
prime trials. Since there were no significant differences in LRP onset this
suggests that the go prime was not successful in initiating a motor response,
and therefore the N2 component should not be increased in the incongruent
no-go condition in comparison to a neutral baseline. It is important to note
that an alternative explanation is also possible, namely that the neutral and
go prime both primed the go response to an equal degree, thus increasing
the amount of conflict/inhibition required in response to a subsequent no-go
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target. Given the lack of effect in the LRP and the fact that neutral primes
showed a significant behavioural difference from go primes, this seems
unlikely. However, since there were behavioural difference between these
two conditions it is perhaps somewhat surprising that no ERP effects were
evident.
Unlike in the first three experiments there were no significant differences in
no-go P3 amplitude between the three no-go conditions in the current
experiment. Given the uncertainty regarding the exact functional significance
of the two components of the N2/P3 complex a precise interpretation of this
is difficult. Some recent evidence suggests that the while the no-go N2 may
be more involved in passive monitoring of conflict, the P3 may be involved in
inhibition of the response (Dimoska et al., 2006). If this is the case, then the
modulation of the no-go N2 in the current experiment may reflect modulation
of the amount of conflict induced by the no-go primes. However, there are
reasons to believe that when go and no-go response are equally probable, at
least part of the N2 component is involved in inhibition (Lavric et al., 2004).
A more detailed discussion of the N2/P3 complex in relation to all the
experiments in this thesis will be provided in chapter 10.
In addition to the absence of no-go P3 modulation, the current experiment
also failed to show any significant early differences related to the nature of
the prime. In experiments 1 and 2, as in similar studies exploring the LRP in
motor priming (Dehaene et al., 1998; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998) this early
prime-related separation was taken as evidence that the unconscious primes
could directly initiate frontal inhibition/control mechanisms. Therefore, the
lack of such an effect in the current experiment makes it difficult to come to a
similar conclusion. Instead it might be the case that priming occurred due to
earlier categorisation of the target stimulus for congruent primes in
comparison to neutral primes. However, while it is easy to conceive that
such an effect may drive the observed difference in reaction times, it is not
immediately obvious how early categorisation of a no-go target would reduce
the amount of engagement required from frontal inhibition/control
mechanisms. However, it is also unclear how the target-related no-go N2
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effects may be reduced for congruent trials, without some early engagement
of this system.
Analysis of visual ERP effects revealed significant lateralised differences
dependent on the prime type, with increased positivity contralateral to the
location of the prime. This likely reflects an increased visual response to the
lateral prime stimuli. This effect was preserved independent of response
mapping, suggesting that it reflected the visual characteristics of the prime
rather than a selective process responsive to one type of target. For
example, the go arrow might be described as the target, since it requires a
response, while a no-go arrow could be described as a non target. Thus any
visual or attention effects, such as the N2pc (see Chapter 2) that selectively
produces an asymmetry to go primes (and not to no-go or neutral primes)
would be reflected in a between participants effect of response mapping.
Since no such effect was present these early visual differences likely reflect
a basic visual response to the location of the prime stimulus.
Conclusions
The major finding in the current experiment was that unconscious no-go
primes were able to facilitate a reduction in no-go N2 in comparison to a
neutral baseline. This suggests that rather than reflecting differences in the
amount of motor preparation between different prime conditions, the
modulation of this component reflects priming of a no-go response.
However, the current experiment failed to show significant early modulation
of this frontal activity, thus questioning the exact nature of this facilitatory
effect.
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Chapter 9
Experiment 5 - Unconscious modulation of the no-go
N2 and P3 is associated with the degree of
behavioural priming.
Introduction
This final experiment aimed to further extend the main findings of the
previous experiments while overcoming some of the problems encountered.
Experiment 1 found that unconscious masked primes were able to directly
initiate ERP components associated with frontal inhibition/control
mechanisms. However, this modulation was observed in an experiment that
produces a rather unusual negative compatibility effect, such that a
congruent prime impedes performance. Three further experiments replicated
the unconscious modulation of the no-go N2 and P3. However, while the
second and third experiments provided further evidence of priming of target-
related ERP components a number of problems with the neutral primes in
these experiments meant that they could not be fully analysed. While
experiment 4 successfully resolved the problems with the neutral primes it
produced only very weak priming effects. In addition, there was a complete
absence of early prime-related effects in this experiment.
In an attempt to produce a more consistent pnmmg effect the current
experiment reverted back to stimuli similar to those employed in experiment
1. However, in order to avoid the complication produced by the mask-
induced reversal of the prime effects, a different mask was employed.
Instead of using a mask that was constructed from a compound of the two
possible targets, a random checkerboard mask was used. Since this mask
did not share any physical features in common with the primes or targets, it
should produce a positive compatibility effect. Moreover, since the primes
were presented in the same location, this should ensure that performance on
the prime identification task truly required identification of the nature of the
primes, and not simply detection of the primes as in the previous experiment.
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Hypotheses
The subliminal primes in the current experiment should produce a positive
compatibility effect such that performance is facilitated by a congruent prime
and impeded by an incongruent prime. Furthermore, the LRP and the no-go
N2/P3 complex should be modulated as a function of the unconscious prime.
No-go N2 and P3 amplitude should be reduced for congruent trials in
comparison to neutral trials, since the unconscious prime should facilitate
processing thus requiring less engagement of frontal control/inhibition
mechanisms. Similarly, N2 and P3 amplitude should be increased in
response to an incongruent prime in comparison to a neutral prime, since
subliminal priming of a go response in a no-go target condition will require a
greater subsequent inhibition, to successfully withhold the response.
Additionally, the facilitation of the no-go N2/P3 complex and the LRP should
be associated with an early separation of these responses dependent on the
unconscious primes.
Method
Participants
Twenty one volunteers (four male and 17 female) were recruited by means of
poster advertisement. Participants received course credits in exchange for
participation in the experiment. All participants were right handed and had
normal or corrected to normal vision. The mean age of participants was 22
years and two months, with a range of 18 to 35 years.
Experimental Procedure
All participants completed 14 blocks of the go/no-go task followed by three
blocks of the prime identification task in a single experimental session lasting
approximately two hours. Each go/no-go block contained 72 trials presented
in a random order. The 14 experimental blocks were preceded by two
practice blocks of 48 trials. Target stimuli were identical to those in
experiment 1 and consisted of either two left pointing «<) or two right
pointing arrows (>»), Participants were required to respond to arrows
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pointing in one direction and to refrain from responding to arrows in the
opposite direction. Half the participants were instructed to press a button in
response to left pointing arrows and half were instructed to respond to right
pointing arrows. The response hand was varied from one block to the next.
The participants were informed that that they had a time limit of 450 ms to
respond to the go stimuli and that they should react as quickly as possible
without sacrificing accuracy. Participants were given visual feedback
immediately after the 450ms response window for correct responses,
incorrect responses and non-response as well as false alarms and incorrect
non-responses.
Participants were informed that random chequerboard type patterns would
be presented in advance of the stimulus. In addition, masked primes were
presented before and after two different checkerboard patterns. Participants
were not informed of the presence of the primes. These primes were
congruent, incongruent or neutral with respect to the target stimulus.
Congruent primes consisted of fainter versions of the same arrows as the
target stimuli. Neutral primes consisted of one two arrows pointing in
opposite directions «> and ><). There were an equal number of neutral,
congruent and incongruent primes in each block and across the course of
the experiment. A different neutral prime was used for each participant, with
the choice of prime and the response mapping counterbalanced across
participants.
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Figure 9.1: Stimuli for experiment 5. A congruent (A), incongruent (8), and neutral (C) trial.
Pre-masks and masks were 6.2cm across and 3.2 cm high. Double arrow
prime and target stimuli were 3.2cm across and 1.6cm high. All primes,
masks and stimuli were presented at the centre of the display on a grey
background. Each trial began with a large central fixation for 200ms which
acted as a warning signal to participants that the next trial had begun. A
smaller fixation cross was then presented for 600ms. Next, the pre-mask
was presented for 16ms followed by the prime for 16ms. After a blank
screen for 16ms, the mask (66ms) and then the target stimulus (100ms)
were displayed. Following the 450ms response window participants were
given visual feedback. Finally a blink pause was presented for BOOms
followed by a blank screen for a randomly selected interval between 150ms
and 600ms.
As in previous experiments, following the go/no-go task, participants were
asked whether they noticed anything other than the checkerboards before
the prime, and if so what they saw. Additionally, they were asked if they
thought something might have flashed up. They were then shown the exact
stimulus sequence in slow motion. After seeing the slowed sequence
participants were asked if they recognised having seen any of the primes
during the go/no-go task. The prime identification task consisted of one
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practice block of 32 trials and three experimental blocks of 96 trials. One half
of trials contained a right pointing arrow prime and the other half contained a
left pointing arrow prime. No neutral primes were presented in this task and
no target stimuli were presented. Participants were informed that they
should press the far left button for left arrow primes and the far right button
for right pointing primes. Participants had no time limit to respond, and
received feedback at the end of each trial. Finally participants were asked to
report whether the felt they were able to see the masked primes during the
detection task.
Behavioural Results
Awareness of Primes
Table 9.1 shows the participants' responses to the four questions regarding
the visibility of the primes. None of the 21 subjects reported having seen
anything appear before the diamond shape. Four subjects thought they
might have seen a flash, while five thought that they recognised the primes
after having seen the slow motion sequence. Only one participant reported
having seen the prime in the prime identification task.
t Q f 1t 5fT bl 91 5a e .. ummary 0 responses 0 ues Ions 0
Notice? What? Flash? Recognise? See?
NO 21 21 17 16 20
YES 0 0 4 5 1
Performance on the forced-choice task ranged from 42% to 56% and
averaged 49.5% which was not significantly different from chance (t(20)=0.7,
p=0.5). In addition, d' scores were not significantly different from zero
(mean=-0.02, t=-0.5, p=0.62). Mean accuracy for those four subjects
detecting a flash was 49%, and 50% for those who claimed to recognise the
prime. The one participant who reported to having been able to see the
.primes in the prime identification task achieved 43% accuracy. These
findings suggest that increased subjective awareness was not associated
with increased performance on the objective awareness measures.
207
Priming
Repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of prime-
stimulus congruency on reaction times (F(2,38)=14.9, p<O.001) for go trials.
A significant main effect of accuracy was also observed for go trials
(F(2,38)=4.3, p<O.05) and no-go trials (F(2,38)=10.3, p<O.001). Subsequent
t-tests showed a significant difference between all three prime congruency
conditions for go trials (at p<O.01). Similarly there were significant
differences on accuracy for all pair-wise comparisons (at p<O.05) with the
exception of the comparison between incongruent no-go and neutral no-go
trials.
Table 9.2.1: Mean Reaction times and accuracy (and Standard Dev
Congruent Incongruent Neutral
RT 360 (30) 388 (20) 373 (19)
Acc 0.93 (0.07) 0.91 (0.08) 0.92(0.07)
iations) for go trials
Table 9.2.2: Mean accuracy and Standard Deviations) for no-
Congruent Incongruent Neutral
Acc 0.97 0.91 0.96(0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
go trials
Correlations were calculated between priming and prime identification
performance to determine whether priming may have been caused by
residual awareness on some trials. Raw scores on the forced-choice task as
well as d' scores and absolute values of d' were correlated with nine different
measures of behavioural priming, reflecting all pair-wise differences for
reaction times on go trials and accuracy on go and no-go trials. The only
significant correlations were between the difference in reaction times
between incongruent and neutral go trials and both d' (r=-5.6, p<O.01) and
prime identification accuracy (r=-5.6, p<O.01). However, the amount of
priming was negatively correlated with each of these measures. These
findings confirm that the priming effects were not likely to have been caused
by residual awareness of the primes.
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EEG Results
Eighteen out of the twenty-one participants were included in the EEG
analysis. One participant was excluded due to an equipment failure during
the recording. Two further participants were excluded due to excessive blink
artefact. ERPs were formed from the remaining eighteen participants with an
average of between 115 and 130 trials per condition, with a minimum of 80
trials per condition. There were approximately equal numbers of trials with
right (mean = 63 trials) and left (mean = 64 trials) hand responses with a
minimum of 38 trials per response hand.
LRP analysis
Figure 9.2 shows the grand average LRP waveforms for the six conditions in
the current experiment. ANOVA on the jackknifed LRP onsets for go target
trials revealed no significant difference dependent on prime congruency
(p=0.2). Amplitude analysis was conducted with prime type (go, no-go,
neutral) and target type (go, no-go) as repeated measures factors. ANOVA
from -100 to Oms revealed a significant main effect of prime (F(1.7,29.5)=4.3,
p<0.05), with subsequent contrasts showing that go prime trials were
significantly more negative than no-go prime trials (F(1,17)=6.8, p<0.05).
Visual inspection of the LRP reveals a large positive deflection for the
congruent go condition beginning at around 180ms before target onset.
Since this effect occurs prior to prime onset and all conditions were
presented unpredictably in a random order and were identical up until prime
onset this deflection likely reflects noise. In fact the later part of the LRP for
this condition also appears to show increased positive amplitude in
comparison to the other two conditions, most notable at around 100ms after
stimulus onset. This suggests that perhaps these differences are caused by
the entire ERP being shifted slightly upwards. This could be caused by
increased negative amplitude in the baseline period.
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Figure 9.2: Grand average LRP for experiment 5 relative to target onset. Prime onset at -100
signified by dashes line.
Figure 9.3 shows the grand average LRP using the 150 to 100ms pre-
stimulus period as a baseline. As expected, this removed the early LRP
difference and introduces an extended pre-baseline difference. ANOVA with
the re-baselined LRPs confirmed the absence of significant prime-related
effects from -100 to Oms (F=0.23,p>0.9). Furthermore, this change in the
baseline period makes the early LRP fluctuations more similar between the
conditions but also highlights an increased positive deflection at around
150ms for the incongruent go condition and congruent no-go condition.
ANOVA from 150 to 230ms revealed a significant main effect of prime
congruency (F(1.6,27.7)=4.4, p<0.05) with a significant linear contrast for
prime type (F(1,17)=5.2, p<0.05) such that no-go primes showed the most
positive amplitude and go primes showed the most negative amplitude.
There was no significant effect of target and no target x prime interaction in
this time window. These findings are in line with the prediction that the
unconscious primes could directly initiate motor preparation as indexed by
the LRP. ANOVA from 250 to 450ms revealed a significant main effect of
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target (F(1,17)=68, p<O.001), reflecting the increased amplitude of the LRP
for go target trials.
1
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Figure 9.3: Grand average LRP for experiment 5with a -150to -100baseline period.
Frontal no-go N2 and P3 analysis
Figure 9.4 shows the no-go difference waveforms at electrode Fz. Two
separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted at electrode Fz for the three no-
go difference waveforms to explore the amplitude of the no-go N2 and P3.
The N2 time window (250ms to 350ms) was centred on the peak of the no-
go N2. Similarly the P3 time window (375ms to 475ms) was selected to
capture any differences in average amplitude of the no-go P3. Each ANOVA
included prime congruency as a repeated measures factor (congruent,
incongruent and neutral).
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Figure 9.4: Difference ERP waveforms for the three no-go conditions at electrode Fz, with
respect to target onset.
In the N2 time window there was a significant main effect of prime
congruency (F(1.4,23.1)=12.5, p<0.001). Follow up t-tests confirmed that
incongruent no-go trials (m=-5.3; std=4.8) showed significantly more
negative amplitude than congruent no-go trials (m=-1.1; std=3.5; t(17)=3.8,
p<0.005). Congruent no-go trials also showed significantly reduced N2
amplitude in comparison to neutral no-go trials (m=-4.2; std=3.7; t(17)=3.7,
p<0.005). Neutral no-go N2 amplitude did not significantly differ from
incongruent no-go N2 (t(17)=0.43, p=0.68).
In the P3 time window there was a significant main effect of prime
congruency (F(1.3,22.4)=5.7, p<0.05). Follow up t-tests confirmed that no-
go P3 average amplitude was significantly reduced for congruent no-go trials
(m=4; std=3) in comparison to both neutral no-go trials (m=5.9; std=4.2;
t(17)=2.3, p<0.05), and incongruent no-go trials (m=6.5; std=4.5; t(1 5)=2.02,
p=0.059). Neutral no-go P3 amplitude did not differ from incongruent no-go
P3 amplitude (t(17)=1.4, p=0.19).
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Correlations were calculated between prime identification performance and
the amount of N2 and P3 priming, defined by the three pair-wise differences
between the three conditions in each time window. The only significant
correlation was observed between d' performance and the difference
between congruent and neutral N2 amplitude (r=-0.51, p<0.05) with a non
significant trend also observed for raw scores on the forced-choice task (r=-
0.44, p=0.65). Once again the negative nature of these correlations
suggests that as prime identification performance increased, the amount of
priming of the N2 amplitude decreased, suggesting that priming was not
caused by residual awareness of the primes.
Interestingly, there was also a significant correlation between N2 and P3
priming and the behavioural priming. Table 9.3 shows the correlations
between behavioural and ERP priming effects. It is clear that there is a
widespread positive correlation particularly between no-go N2 priming and
behavioural priming. For P3 amplitude, it is also of note that the congruent
versus neutral comparison showed the most significant correlations with
behavioural priming, including being the only EEG marker to significantly
correlate with the congruent versus neutral accuracy comparison for no-go
trials.
d ERP .. ff tb havl I"T bl 93 elf b ta e .. orrea Ions eween e roura pnmmg an pnmmg e ec 5
Reaction Times Accuracy
Go Trials Go Trials No-go Trials
CI CN NI CI CN NI CI CN NI
CI 0.88*** 0.73*** 0.8*** 0.7*** 0.43 0.59* 0.83*** 0.41 0.79***
N2 CN 0.81*** 0.47* 0.88*** 0.59** 0.36 0.5* 0.58* 0.35 0.53*
NI 0.51* 0.71*** 0.26 0.49* 0.31 0.41 0.76*** 0.27 0.75***
CI 0.46 0.23 0.53* 0.3 0.37 0.15 0.11 0.38 0.01
P3 CN 0.52* 0.25 0.6** 0.46 0.48* 0.26 0.18 0.55* 0.04
NI 0.001 0.02 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.2 0.1 0.23 0.05
***p<O.001; **p<O.01; *p<O.05; CI=Congruent V5. Incongruent; CN=Congruent V5. Neutral;
NI=Neutral V5. Incongruent
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Figure 9.5: Scalp distribution of no-go N2 for congruent (top left), incongruent (top right) and
neutral (bottom left) no-go trials.
Figure 9.5 shows the topographic distribution of the no-go N2 for the three
no-go conditions. The distribution of the N2 shows a similar topography to
previous experiments, with an early frontal negativity followed by a second
parietal negativity. The no-go P3 also shows a frontocentral maximum
(figure 9.6)
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Figure 9.6: Scalp distribution of no-go P3 for congruent (top left) , incongruent (top right) and
neutral (bottom left) no-go trials.
To explore the possibility that the unconscious primes were able to directly
elicit an early frontal no-go N2, grand average ERPs for all six conditions
were explored at electrode Fz. Figure 9.7 shows the ERP waveforms for
each condition at Fz. The target-related no-go N2 and P3 are clearly visible
beginning around 250 after stimulus onset. Although no clear early
separations are evident visual inspection reveals that from around 160 to
210ms after stimulus onset incongruent no-go and congruent go trials are the
most positive, while incongruent go trials are the most negative. ANOVA in
this time window with prime type (go, no-go, neutra l) and target type (go, no-
go) as repeated measures factors revealed a non-signifi cant trend towards a
main effect of prime (F(1.5,25.4)=2.8, p=0.09), with the subsequent contrast
between go and no-go prime trials just reaching significance (F(1,17)=4.4,
p=0.05). These results suggests that, although small, there were some early
effects at electrode Fz that where entirely dependent on the nature of the
unconscious prime.
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Figure 9.7: ERP waveforms at electrode Fz.
Early visual ERP effects
Figure 9.8 shows the grand average ERPs at electrode Oz for all six
conditions. Repeated measure ANOVA with prime type (go, no-go and
neutral) and target type (go, no-go) revealed no main effect of target, no
main effect of prime and no two-way interaction for P1 (0 to 20ms) amplitude.
Similarly in the N1 time window (50 to 80ms), there was no significant
effects. In addition, the comparison between congruent trials (no-go prime
no-go target and go prime go target) and incongruent trials (no-go prime go
target and go prime no-go target) was not significant (F(1,17=2.6, p=0.13).
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Figure 9.8: ERPwaveforms at electrode Oz.
Figure 9.9 shows the difference waveforms at lateral occipital and occipito-
parietal electrodes dependent of the physical stimuli. Visual inspection
reveals that there appears to be no modulation of lateralised visual ERPs in
response to the primes. ANOVA was conducted with prime type (left, right,
neutral) and target type as repeated measures factors and response
mapping an independent factor. ANOVA in the P1 time window revealed no
significant effects. In the N1 time window there was a significant main effect
of prime (F(2,31.9)=5.2, p<0.05). Subsequent contrasts revealed that ERP
difference amplitudes were significantly reduced for neutral prime trials in
comparison to left and right prime trials (p<0.05). There was no significant
difference between left and right prime trials (F=0.8). There was no
significant interaction between prime and prime type and response mapping.
Additionally, there were no significant early prime-related effects for the PO?-
P08 difference. From around 180ms the lateralised ERP effects for both
electrode pairs appeared to reflect target-related differences with increased
activity contralateral to the direction of the target stimulus. This was
confirmed by a main effect of target at occipital (F(1,16=21.5, p<O.001) and
occipito-parietal electrodes (F(1,16=18.1 , p<O.001).
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Figure 9.9: ERPdifference waveforms for electrodes01/02 and P07/POS.
Go/no-go Differences
Figure 9.10 shows the scalp distribution of the ERP waveforms for
experiment 5. Similar to the previous four experiments a frontal no-go N2
and P3 is clearly evident, maximally distributed over frontocentral electrodes.
In addition, a parietal P300 modulation is also evident. Amplitude analysis of
go/no-go differences was conducted using a five-way repeated measures
ANOVA with prime type (go,no-go,neutral), target type (go,no-go),
hemisphere (Ieft,right), anterior-posterior (Fp, F, FC, C, P, and 0) and time
(1 20-180, 180-350, 350-550) as within-subjects factors. The early time
window (1 20-1 80ms after target onset; 220-280ms after prime onset) was
selected to explore any early differences in the ERPs associated with the
unconscious primes. The second and third time windows were centred on
the no-go N2 and no-go P3 respectively.
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Figure 9.10: Grand average ERP waveforms for experiment 5.
The initial five-way ANOVA showed no main effects of hemisphere and no
significant interactions involving hemisphere and target or prime type.
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Therefore, further analysis was conducted on the six midline electrodes only
(Fpz, Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, and Oz). Both the ANOVA at lateral electrode sites
(F(4,76)=9, p<O.001), and over the central electrode sites (F(3.3,62.6)=10.3,
p<O.001) showed a significant four-way interaction between prime type,
target type, time and anterior-posterior electrode location. This suggests that
a different relationship between prime, target and anterior-posterior was
evident for each time window. Therefore, further analysis explored the three
way interactions between these variables separately for each time window.
In the first time window there were no significant effects involving either
prime type or target type. In the second time window there was a significant
main effect of target (F(1,19)=17, p<O.001) as well as significant prime x
target (F(1.3,25.3)=9.2, p<O.01) and prime x anterior-posterior
(F(3.4,64.7)=5.4, p<O.01) interactions. In addition, there was a significant
prime x target x anterior-posterior x time interaction (F(3.2,60.3)=7.7,
p<O.001). Figure 9.11 shows the average ERP amplitude in the middle time
window for go and no-go trials separately. For go trials (left panel) the prime-
related effects appear largest at posterior electrodes, while for no-go trials
(right panel) they appear larger at anterior sites. Paired t-tests confirmed
that for go target trials the only significant amplitude differences occurred at
electrode Pz, between go and no-go prime conditions (at p<O.001). The
same comparison was also marginally significant at Oz (p<O.005) with the
neutral versus go prime conditions also approaching significance (P<O.005)
at these two electrodes.
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Figure 9.11: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the middle timewindow dependent on
prime typefor go targettrials (left panel) and no-go target trials (right panel)
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For no-go target trials there was a significant difference (at p<O.001) between
neutral prime trials and no-go prime trials at electrode FCz and Cz. This
comparison also approached significance (p<O.005) at Fz and Fpz, with the
comparison between congruent and incongruent trials also marginally
significant (p<O.005) at Fz, FCz and Cz. These results confirm that the
modulation of no-go target trials was maximal over frontocentral electrodes,
and thus likely reflects modulation of a frontal no-go N2. Similarly the
parietal modulation of go target trials likely represents modulation of P300 for
these trials.
In the third time window there was a significant main effect of target
(F(1,19)=13.4, p<O.01) as well as significant interactions between all pairs of
factors and a 3-way interaction between prime type, target type and anterior-
posterior electrode location (F(3.4,64.7)=5.4, p<O.01). Figure 9.12 shows the
average amplitude dependent on target type along the midline electrodes for
the late time window. At frontal electrodes no-go trials show greater
amplitude in comparison to go trials, with the direction of this effect reversed
over electrodes Pz and Oz. Contrasts revealed that there were significant (at
p<O.001) differences between go and no-go target trials at each of the six
electrode locations. This modulation reflects the anteriorisation of the P300
on no-go trials to cause the frontocentral no-go P3.
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Figure 9.12: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the late time window dependent on
target type
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Figure 9.13 shows that average amplitude in the late time window dependent
on prime type for go and no-go trials respectively. For go target trials (left
panel) there appears to be a small but fairly widespread effect of greater
negative amplitude for go prime trials with a greater positivity for no-go prime
trials also emerging at posterior electrodes. T-tests showed that the only
significant differences (at p<O.001) were observed between neutral prime
trials and go prime trials at electrodes Fz and FCz. For no-go target trials
(right panel) go prime trials appeared to show greater positive amplitude with
no-go prime trials showing the most negative amplitude. However, there
were no significant pair-wise effects for no-go trials in this time window.
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Figure 9.13: Average amplitude for midline electrodes in the late time window dependent on
prime typefor go target trials (left panel) and no-go target trials (right panel)
Priming and ERP go/no-go differences
Further analysis was conducted to explore the relationship between the
amount of behavioural priming and the ERP effects. The current experiment
observed a number of significant correlations between the behavioural
priming and no-go N2 and P3 priming, which were not evident in the previous
experiments. One possible reason for this is that there was a particularly
large variation in the amount of priming observed in the current experiment.
Table 9.3 shows the response congruency effect (RCE; congruent minus
incongruent reaction times) for the 18 participants in the current experiment.
It is evident that while there are some participants that show a large RCE,
there are also many participants who showed very little priming. Participants
were subsequently divided into large and small priming groups by taking a
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median split. These groups had mean RCE of 55.19ms and 4.4ms
respectively. Importantly, these two groups did not differ in terms of their
performance on the prime identification task (t(16)=1.4, p=O.19), suggesting
that the differences in the magnitude of the priming effects were not caused
by greater awareness of the primes in the primed group.
Figure 9.14 shows grand average ERPs for the primed and un-primed
groups separately. Visual inspection reveals that, in line with the behavioural
effects, the amount of ERP priming appears to be different between the two
groups. While the ERP priming effects in the lower panel (behaviourally un-
primed participants) are restricted to a reduced N2 for congruent no-go trials,
there are much more widespread ERP effects for the participants that
showed large behavioural priming (top panel). Both the N2 and P3
amplitude appear to be modulated for this group, with an early modulation
dependent on prime type also evident.
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Figure 9.14: ERP grand average at electrode Fz for those participants showing behavioural
priming (top)and thoseparticipants not showing behavioural priming (bottom).
Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted in the same three time windows
as those above with priming added as a between groups factor. In an early
time window there was a significant prime x priming group interaction
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(F(1.9,31 )=3.63, p<O.05). Separate ANOVA was conducted in this time
window for primed and un-primed groups to explore this interaction in more
detail. For the un-primed group there was no significant main effect of prime
and no prime by anterior-posterior interaction. In the primed group there was
no significant main effect of prime but there was a near significant prime x
posterior interaction (F(2.8,22.5)=2.6, p=O.08). This finding suggests that the
significant prime x priming group interaction reflects a difference in the
amount of prime-related modulation in the ERPs, with a likely interaction with
electrode site. Further analysis was conducted only on primed trials to
explore this early prime-related modulation. Figure 9.15 shows the average
amplitude for the three prime types in the early time window for primed
participants. It is evident that the prime-related differences are largely driven
by less negative amplitude for go trials in comparison to no-go trials,
especially over frontal and central electrodes. In addition, no-go trials show
consistently more negative amplitude than neutral trials at anterior electrode
sites. Contrasts revealed significant differences (at p<O.05) between go and
no-go primes at electrodes Fpz, Fz, and FCz, peaking at electrode Fz.
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Figure 9.15: Average amplitude in the early time window dependent on prime type for primed
participants.
In the second time window there was a significant prime x target x anterior-
posterior x priming group interaction (F(3.8,60.1)=3.9, p<O.01). This
suggests that the priming of ERP components in this time window was
different between the two groups. Separate ANOVA for each group
confirmed that the only effect to approach significance for the un-primed
group was a main effect of target (F(1,8)=4.2, p=O.07), whereas for the
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primed group there was a significant main effect of target (F(1,8)=11.2,
p<0.01) as well as a prime x target interaction (F(1.2,9.2)=1 0, p<0.01) and a
target x prime x anterior-posterior interaction (F(2.9,22.9)=9.7, p<0.001).
Although the main effect of target failed to reach significance for the not-
primed condition it is important to note that the target x priming group
interaction was not significant. Therefore, the magnitude of the target-related
effects in the second time window were not different between these two
groups. However, the significant interaction 4-way interaction suggests that
priming of ERP components in this time window was different in the two
groups. The presence of target x prime and target x prime x anterior-
posterior interactions for the primed conditions suggests that the priming
effects were larger in this group. Figure 9.16 shows ERP amplitude
dependent on prime type for go and no-go target separately for the primed
participants and un-primed participants. Comparing the top panels with the
bottom panels reveals that priming of both go and no-go response is much
greater for primed trials. As for the analysis with all participants together, no-
go priming was maximal at frontal electrodes while go priming was maximal
at parietal electrodes. Paired t-tests for go targets confirmed significantly
increased amplitude at Oz and Pz for go prime trials in comparison to both
neutral and no-go prime trials for primed participants only (at p<0.005).
Similarly no-go target modulation only occurred for the primed group, where
no-go prime trials were more negative than go and neutral prime trials at
electrodes Fz, FCz and Cz (at p<0.01).
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Figure 9.16: Average amplitude in the middle time window dependent on prime type for go
target trials (leftpanels) and no-go target trials (rightpanels) and for primed participants (upper
panels) and un-primed participant (lower panels).
In the third time window there was a significant target x prime x priming
group interaction and a near significant target x prime x anterior-posterior x
priming group interaction. Once again these results suggest a difference in
the magnitude of ERP priming effects for the primed and un-primed groups.
Subsequent analysis confirmed that these effects were similar in nature to
those observed in the middle time window with significant prime x target
(F(1.8,14.5)=26, p<O.001) and prime x target x anterior-posterior
(F(2.9,23.5)=5.5, p<O.01) interactions for the primed group only. This
reflects increased priming of the frontal no-go P3 and parietal P300
components for primed participants only.
In summary, the between participants analysis separating those participants
with a large behavioural effect from those with a small or no behavioural
effect confirmed the relationship between behavioural priming and ERP
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priming observed in this and previous experiments. While this effect is not
unsurprising, it is important to show that the ERP priming effects are
genuinely caused by the experimental manipulation. The observed
correlation between N2/P3 priming reported in an early section already
pointed towards this relationship. However, the additional finding of
increased early frontal modulation dependent on prime type for the primed
participants provides further evidence that these frontal mechanisms are
directly initiated by the unconscious primes, and that they are related to the
degree to which the unconscious primes influence behaviour. Importantly
these effects were unrelated to visibility of the primes, as measured by
performance in the prime identification task.
Interestingly reaction times on neutral go trials were significantly faster
(t(16)=2.4, p>0.05) for the primed group (m=364, std=15) than the un-primed
groups (m=378; std=13.5), suggesting perhaps that the primed group were
generally more focused on the task. This improved reaction time did not
simply reflect a speed/accuracy trade of for these participants, since they
also showed marginally greater accuracy for these trials (0.96 versus 0.92;
t(16)=2;p=0.076). This explanation is supported by the observation that the
pre-stimulus negativity appears somewhat larger for primed participants than
un-primed participants (see figure 9.14), suggesting that anticipation of the
upcoming stimulus and the need to respond was greater for the primed
participants. However, ANOVA at electrode Fz from -300 to -250ms showed
that ERP amplitude for primed participants (m=2.9, std=2.6) was not
significantly more positive than ERP amplitude un-primed participants
(m=1.4, std=2.6; F(1,16)=2.8,p=0.11).
Discussion
The current experiment aimed to show unconscious modulation of frontal
inhibition-related ERP components in a paradigm that produces positive
compatibility effects. While the experiment replicated the modulation of the
no-go N2 and P3 components observed in the previous experiments, initial
analysis of all eighteen subjects together revealed only modest early frontal
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ERP separations. However, subsequent analysis showed that, not only was
such modulation present for a subset of participants, but that both this early
modulation and later target-related ERP modulation was associated with
participants' behavioural performance.
Behavioural analysis revealed that the stimuli utilised in the current
experiment were successful in producing a positive compatibility effect.
Reaction times were significantly reduced for congruent go trials, and
significantly increased for incongruent go trials in comparison to the neutral
baseline. Importantly, the magnitude of this effect was more comparable to
that observed in experiment 1, than in experiments 2 to 4, with an average
RCE of twenty-eight milliseconds. This suggests that reverting back to the
type of stimuli used in experiment 1 was successful in increasing the
behavioural priming effect. There are a number of possible reasons for this
increased behavioural priming effect. Firstly, only in experiments 1 and 5
were the primes identical to the targets. In all other experiments the primes
were somewhat modified versions of the targets and were often presented in
a different location to the target. Therefore, if participants set up a stimulus-
response mapping for particular stimuli, it is likely that the closer the prime is
to the original S-R mapping the more it will influence behaviour. Additionally,
in experiments 2 and 3 the stimulus response mapping was much more
complicated, and involved combining information about objects in different
spatial locations in order to produce an appropriate response. This
increased complexity might serve to reduce the influence of the unconscious
primes, since they will also have a less clear S-R mapping. This issue will be
discussed in more detail in chapter 10 with reference to the general
mechanisms of subliminal pnrrunq. Finally, as discussed in the previous
chapter, the primes in experiment 4 were likely below the threshold for prime
detection, likely reducing their efficacy in priming the no-go response.
Despite this increased behavioural priming effect in the current experiment, it
still failed to show ERP effects of a comparable magnitude to those observed
in experiment 1. LRP analysis did reveal an early modulation dependent on
prime type with no-go prime trials showing increased positivity and go prime
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trials showing increased negativity immediately prior to the rising bank of the
LRP. However, this effect was only significant when the LRP was baselined
to 150 to 100ms prior to stimulus onset. This was conducted due the
suspected presence of noise in the pre-stimulus LRP for the congruent go
condition. These pre-stimulus differences could not be the result of any
stimulus related effects since the trial order was random in each block for
each participant. As discussed in chapter 2, the LRP has a particularly low
signal to noise ratio. In the current experiment the LRP was formed from an
average of 60 responses per hand, with sometimes as little as 40 responses.
Although, ideally, LRPs would be constructed from a larger number of trials
this was not possible in the current experiment (or in experiments 2 to 4) if all
conditions were to be included in a single experimental session. Since the
LRPs in the current experiment appear to be rather noisy, the result of prime-
related effects must be treated with some caution.
Visual ERP effects were also significantly reduced in comparison to previous
experiments. Analysis at electrode Oz revealed no significant effects of
prime or target in the early visual ERPs. Similarly only relatively modest
lateralised visual ERPs were observed in response to the subliminal primes
in the current experiment. Furthermore, these effects were limited to
electrode the 01-02 comparison and were not present at for the P07-POS
difference. In addition there were no significant interactions evident with
response mapping. These findings suggest that the small lateralised
occipital ERP effect reflected a visual rather than attentional modulation
dependent on the functional significance of the target such as the N2pc (see
chapter 2). Since the precise stimulus response mappings were
counterbalanced across participants these lateralised ERPs were formed
dependent on the physical stimuli and therefore contained a mixture of
different possible responses. This meant, for example, that left prime left
target ERPs were calculate by combining congruent go trials for those
participants who were asked to respond to a left pointing arrow, and
congruent no-go trials for those participants who were asked to respond to a
right pointing arrow. Therefore any modulation of these lateralised ERP
effects related to the more functionally salient stimulus (the go stimulus)
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should result in an interaction with response mapping. Therefore it is likely
that these effects reflect either modulation of early visual ERP components
or attentional modulation that is independent of the functional significance of
the targets. Later target-related ERP asymmetries were also evident, with
increased amplitude contralateral to the target stimulus. Once again this
likely reflects low level visual/attention related effects of the target stimulus.
As in all previous experiments, the amplitude of the no-go N2 and P3 were
modulated as a function of the unconscious prime. In the current
experiment, this was evident both in the comparison between no-go primes
and neutral primes and the comparison between go primes and neutral
primes. This suggests that the modulation of the no-go N2 and P3 is not just
an effect of increased engagement of frontal inhibition/control mechanisms in
response to a primed motor response. More specifically, the finding that the
N2 and P3 are reduced in amplitude for congruent no-go trials in comparison
to neutral no-go trials suggests that the no-go response is facilitated by
unconscious no-go primes in comparison to a neutral baseline. While this
effect was limited to the no-go N2 in the previous experiment, it was evident
on both N2 and P3 components in the current experiment. Strikingly, the no-
go N2 appears to be almost completely abolished in the congruent no-go
condition in the current experiment. As in all previous experiments there was
again a difference in the modulation of go and no-go target trials, with no-go
trials showing a frontal modulation of the no-go N2 and P3 and go target
trials showing modulation of the parietal P300.
In addition to these prime-related effects in response to the target stimuli, a
small early separation was also evident that was entirely dependent on prime
type. However, this separation was not statistically reliable. An early prime-
related effect would signify the direct engagement of frontal inhibition/control
mechanisms by the unconscious primes. Inspired by the finding of a
significant correlation between behavioural priming and ERP priming in the
current experiment, further analysis was conducted to explore how the ERP
priming effects differed between those participants that showed a large
behavioural priming effect and those who showed little or no effect.
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Inspection of the RCEs for each participants revealed that while some
participants produced particularly large priming effects, in others the
subliminal primes had little or no effect. ERP waveforms were formed
separately for these two groups with ERP analysis repeated adding piming
group as a between participants factor. This analysis revealed significant
interactions between prime type and priming group in the first time window
and between prime type, target type and priming group in the second and
third time windows. These findings further confirmed that the ERP priming
effects were strongly associated with the behavioural priming effects. In
particular, the finding that the degree of frontal prime-related ERP modulation
in the early time window was significantly greater for the primed group
strongly suggests that the subliminal primes in this group were able to
directly influence frontal control mechanisms, leading to facilitation of
behavioural performance. This facilitation is further manifested in the
increased modulation of N2 and P3 amplitude for this group, showing that
the subliminal primes not only facilitated this early separation, but that this
was associated with an increased later priming effect.
Importantly, this modulation of ERP and behavioural priming appears to be
independent of awareness of the primes. If a number of participants had
some residual awareness of the primes, this would likely increase the
magnitude of the priming effect. However, there was no significant
difference between the primed and un-primed groups on the prime
identification task, suggesting that both groups were completely unaware of
the masked primes and that the variation in priming was not due to
differences in visibility of the primes between participants. An alternative
explanation for this differential priming effect is that increased priming was
associated with improved performance on the task. This is supported by the
finding that primed participants showed significantly faster reaction times
than un-primed participants, as well as marginally increased accuracy.
Similarly the observation that the pre-stimulus CNV type activity appears to
be slightly higher for the primed group (although not significant) suggests
that that they were in a heightened state of anticipation for imminent stimulus
presentation (cf. Luck, 2005). If these participants are more focused on
232
making a fast response and more attentively looking to identify the stimulus
as quickly and accurately as possible, it seems likely that they will be more
influenced by an arrow prime, even if this prime is presented below the
threshold of awareness.
Another important observation in this final analysis is that the no-go P3
appears to onset earlier for the congruent no-go condition. In the combined
ERPs presented earlier in the chapter this looked more like a straightforward
N2 amplitude modulation. While the spatial overlap of these components
make it impossible to distinguish which of these two explanations is the
correct one, it is important to note that the apparent abolition of the no-go N2
might be masked by a somewhat earlier P3. It is perhaps somewhat
surprising that the normal no-go N2 was completely abolished in the
congruent no-go condition, especially considering the absence of early
prime-related effects in the initial analysis - if no frontal control/inhibition
mechanisms are engaged then how is the response inhibited? If, as
suggested, the no-go P3 onsets somewhat earlier for the congruent no-go
condition, this would remove any remaining effect of a no-go N2 in this time
window. These findings highlight the difficulty in separating spatially
overlapping ERP components. A similar problem is evident in the earlier
frontocentral prime-related separation. As discussed in earlier chapters,
negativity for no-go primes in this time window is the opposite of what would
be predicted by motor priming alone, since the readiness potential is a
negative wave and thus an increased negativity should be present for go
trials. Therefore, the increased motor activation for go trials in this time
window will reduce the predicted separation, and in some cases may mask it
completely. These overlapping motor components likely explain why the
early N2 modulation appears somewhat less sensitive than the later N2/P3
modulation. However the presence of this effect in a number of experiments,
despite this complication, strongly supports the claim that frontal
inhibition/control mechanisms can be directly initiated by a subliminal prime.
Finally, the current experiment also provides some new insight into the
functional significance of the no-go N2 and P3. While previous studies have
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failed to show modulation of these components in a predicted manner when
the degree of engagement of frontal inhibition/control mechanisms are
manipulated (Smith et aI., 2007), the current series of experiments shows
that both the N2 and P3 are modulated when inhibition/conflict is increased
or decreased by subliminal primes. The association of this modulation with
behavioural priming in the current experiment strongly supports the claim
that the N2/P3 complex reflects engagement of frontal inhibition and control
mechanisms. The no-go behavioural priming effect, signified by the
difference between a congruent no-go and a neutral no-go trial, was
significantly associated with the same contrast in P3 amplitude modulation
and not N2 amplitude modulation. While this suggests that perhaps the P3 is
directly involved in no-go priming, the widespread correlations observed with
the no-go N2 suggest that this component is also important in priming of go
and no-go responses in the go/no-go task. In addition, as discussed above,
the spatial overlap between these components makes it difficult to
completely disentangle them.
Conclusions
The current experiment provides perhaps the strongest evidence that
unconscious masked primes were able to directly initiate frontal
inhibition/control mechanisms. Modulation of the target-related N2 and P3
was observed such that congruent no-go trials showed significantly reduced
N2/P3 responses in comparison to a neutral baseline, while incongruent no-
go N2/P3 amplitude was increased in comparison to neutral trials. This
finding confirms that modulation of the no-go N2 and P3 includes facilitation
of the no-go response and not just interference caused by an unconscious
go response. Furthermore, the current experiment showed that both this
later target-related modulation and early prime-related separation were
significantly associated with behavioural performance, confirming that
facilitation of the no-go N2 is associated with priming of the no-go response.
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Chapter 10
General Discussion
Outline
This chapter will present a general discussion of the research conducted in
this thesis. The first part of this chapter will include a brief review of the aims
and objectives of the current investigation. The second part will be
organised into sections dependent on the different results obtained for the
five experiments. This will include a brief reminder of relevant previous
research and a summary of the results obtained in each of the five
experiments and their relation to previous results. The final part of the
chapter will address the importance of the current findings in relation to the
literature outlined in the first three chapters as well as presenting a critical
review and presenting possible avenues for future research.
Background to current research
The first three chapters of this thesis outlined a number of experiments that
have shown a strong association between consciousness and frontal
inhibitory/control mechanisms. This association was evident from Libet's
early work exploring the role of consciousness in preparing a voluntary motor
act as well as in more recent experiments which measured brain activity in
response to conscious and unconscious conflicts (cf. Mayr, 2004). Libet et
al. (1983) found that while the brain appears to begin preparation for a
voluntary action some 300ms before conscious awareness of the decision to
move, consciousness may still have a role in either vetoing or allowing the
continuation of the action.
A similar conclusion is also evident in the parallel research area of subliminal
priming. Leuthold and Kopp (1998) showed that motor responses can be
initiated in response to a subliminal stimulus, a finding which has been
supported by a number of other research groups (Dehaene et aI., 1998;
Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). While motor preparation has been shown to
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be initiated by an unconscious stimulus, the conflict induced by two different
response alternatives was not sufficient to induce frontal cognitive control
mechanisms. Dehaene et al. (2003) showed that while anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) activity was increased in response to incongruent primes that
were consciously visible, unconscious primes did not produce the same ACC
activation. Similarly, Praamstra and Seiss (2005) showed that response
conflict produced by the negative compatibility effect (NCE) was not
mediated by frontal control mechanisms, as indexed by the absence of a
frontal N2 ERP component in response to such unconscious conflict. Mayr
(2004) reviews a number of other studies exploring ACC activation in
response to conscious and unconscious conflicts, and concludes that ACC-
related control processes are closely associated with conscious but not
unconscious conflict.
While it is clear that there is a strong association between consciousness
and activity in ACC, related to conflict monitoring and behavioural control, it
is not clear from previous research whether voluntary inhibition of a motor
response can occur in response to an unconscious stimulus. This is an
important consideration with regard to Libet's (1985) suggestion that the
function of consciousness is to allow or prevent motor behaviour from being
executed. If, like preparation of a motor response, inhibition of an imminent
response can be initiated unconsciously then this casts doubt over the role of
consciousness in guiding behaviour. Eimer and Schlaghecken (2003),
inspired by the findings that response conflict is strongly associated with
consciousness suggest that:
"endogenous inhibition is voluntary, optional, and is presumably mediated in
prefrontal cortex. Since endogenous inhibition depends on the conscious
detection of task-relevant signals, it is not available when stimuli are
presented subliminally". Eimer and Schlaghecken (2003; page 8).
Eimer and Schlaghecken (2003) have suggested that this type of inhibition
can only occur in response to a conscious stimulus, despite the absence of
direct evidence in support of this claim. The current research directly
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explored this claim and aimed to determine whether inhibition of an imminent
response can be initiated by a stimulus that is not available to
consciousness. In a series of experiments, participants were asked to
complete a go/no-go task, where they were required to make a response to a
go stimulus and withhold their response to a no-go stimulus. Unbeknownst
to the participants, unconscious masked primes were presented in advance
of the target stimulus. These primes were congruent, incongruent or neutral
with respect to the target stimulus. If the unconscious masked primes are
able to influence the go/no-go decision then a congruent go prime should
produce smaller reaction times, while a congruent no-go trial should produce
improved accuracy in comparison to neutral and incongruent go trials.
In addition to these behavioural priming effects, the research also
investigated the influence of unconscious primes on ERP markers of the no-
go response. As outlined in chapter 2, no-go trials in the go/no-go task have
been associated with an N2/P3 complex, such that no-go trials show an
increased negativity over frontocentral electrodes beginning around 200ms
after stimulus onset. Immediately following this negativity, no-go trials exhibit
an increased positivity over frontocentral electrodes, termed the no-go P3.
While the exact functional significance of each of these components is still
under intense debate, the N2 has been associated both with active inhibition
of a motor response as well as monitoring of response conflict (Falkenstein,
2006). Similarly, while the no-go P3 consistently appears following no-go
trials, it normally occurs too late to be actively involved in inhibition of the
response (Falkenstein et al., 1999), leading some people to suggest that it
reflects the outcome of the inhibitory process measured in the primary motor
cortex (Dimoska et al., 2006). Despite this uncertainty, there is a consensus
that these no-go ERP components together reflect frontal inhibition/control
mechanisms partly originating from the ACC, with another likely source in the
pre-frontal cortex (Falkenstein, 2006).
Previous reports exploring the modulation of these ERP components have
focused on their role of frontal control functions in mediating response
conflict, such as that induced in a choice reaction time task (Dehaene et al.,
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2003; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998). In this task, these ERP correlates of control
functions are selectively elicited on incongruent trials on which a response
conflict is present. Since these components are often absent when response
conflict is unconscious (Dehaene et aI., 2003; Mayr, 2004), it is often
assumed that these frontal control processes can not be engaged
unconsciously.
The current research used a somewhat different approach by employing a
task where these mechanisms are engaged in order to enable inhibition of an
imminent motor response. Presenting unconscious primes in advance of the
go/no-go target stimuli would allow exploration of the degree of engagement
of these mechanisms dependent on the nature of the unconscious
information. For example, on an incongruent no-go trial, a greater
engagement of frontal control mechanisms should be required to overcome
the primed motor response. In contrast, on congruent no-go trials, no-go N2
and P3 amplitude should be reduced, reflecting the fact that the unconscious
primes were able to facilitate inhibition of the response.
Recording ERP correlates of the no-go response allowed a more detailed
investigation of the mechanisms by which the unconscious primes might
exert their influence on behaviour, compared to using purely behavioural
measures. For example, if behavioural results show that the subliminal
primes influenced performance on the go/no-go task this could be due to a
number of different reasons. Firstly, since there is much evidence that motor
preparation can be initiated unconsciously, the go/no-go effects might be
mediated within the motor cortex, without the need to elicit frontal control
mechanisms. Alternatively, reaction times and error rates may be affected
via a simple perceptual priming effect such that participants are quicker to
classify the target stimulus when the preceding prime is congruent (this is
discussed in more detail below). Finally, the unconscious primes could exert
their influence by directly initiating the no-go response. The use of ERP
measures of go/no-go differences allowed disentangling of these different
possibilities. Leuthold and Kopp (1998) used ERPs in a similar way to show
that unconscious primes could directly program a motor response. They
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showed that the LRP produced an initial activation dependent on the
subliminal prime, suggesting that despite being unconscious the masked
primes were able directly specify a hand specific motor response. In the
current series of experiments ERP activity over frontocentral electrodes was
utilised in a similar manner to determine if unconscious primes were able to
directly initiate frontal inhibition/control mechanisms. If these processes are
directly elicited by the primes, then an early ERP separation should be
evident over frontocentral electrodes that is entirely dependent on the prime
information. More specifically, if the unconscious primes are able to directly
elicit the frontal no-go N2 then an early negativity should be observed
following a no-go prime and not following a neutral prime or a go prime.
Overview of experimental results
This section provides an overview of the results from the five experiments
reported in this thesis. Experiment 1 explored ERP responses to
unconscious primes in a go/no-go version of Eimer and Schlaghecken's
(1998) masked priming experiment. This particular paradigm was known to
produce a negative compatibility effect such that incongruent primes facilitate
responses and congruent primes impede responses. Much of the aim of the
subsequent experiments was to replicate the findings of this first experiment
in a situation that produced a positive compatibility effect. Although each
experiment showed some behavioural priming effects, there were a number
of complications with the neutral primes in some experiments, and a number
of effects observed in experiment 1 were not consistently replicated. The
following section provides a summary of the results. Rather than reviewing
the results one experiment at a time, this section will deal with each of the
main results observed in these experiments, on each occasion comparing
these effects across experiments and relating this to previous research.
Awareness ofprimes
In each experiment visibility of the masked primes was assessed using both
subjective and objective measures. Participants were asked a number of
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questions regarding the visibility of the primes. In addition, they completed a
prime identification task which required them to report on each trial, which of
two possible prime stimuli had been presented. In experiments 4 and 5
prime identification performance was not significantly different from chance.
In experiment 1, despite being subjectively unaware of the masked primes a
number of participants performed significantly above chance. Similarly, in
experiments 2 and 3 performance on the prime identification task was
significantly above zero. In each of these experiments, to ensure that any
effects of the masked primes were unconscious each of the major effects
was correlated with participants' performance in the prime identification task.
If some residual awareness of the primes was evident on the prime
identification task, then any priming effects could simply be due to this
residual awareness. In this case, performance of the visibility task should
correlate with the amount of priming in the go/no-go task, since the greater
degree to which the participant could see the prime the greater the priming
effect is likely to be. Finally, to ensure that the priming effects were still
present when prime identification was at chance level, analysis was repeated
excluding those participants showing slightly elevated performance on the
prime identification task. In each experiment where there was evidence of
possible residual awareness of the primes, each of these calculations
showed no association with the amount of priming observed in the go/no-go
task, confirming that the priming of responses was independent of
awareness of the primes.
Behavioural results
As predicted, experiment 1 produced a negative compatibility effect with
congruent go trials showing significantly increased reaction times in
comparison to neutral and incongruent trials. In addition, accuracy was
greatest for incongruent trials and smallest for congruent trials. The
response congruency effect (RCE) between congruent and incongruent go
trials in this experiment was large at -58ms. In each of the following
experiments a positive compatibility (PCE) effect was observed. In
experiment 2, however, there was no significant difference between
incongruent go and neutral go reaction times, or congruent no-go and neutral
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no-go error rates. These findings suggest that in this experiment the neutral
primes grouped together with the no-go primes. Since the task required
participants to respond to a diamond on one side of the screen, a possible
explanation suggested for this effect was that participants selectively
attended to the side of the screen where the diamond stimulus would appear.
Since neutral and incongruent primes only differed on the side opposite to
where the diamond was presented, this suggested attentional focus meant
that neutral and no-go primes were effectively identical. The RCE between
congruent go and incongruent go trials was smaller at 19ms.
Experiment 3 aimed to overcome the problems with the neutral primes that
was found in experiment 2, and also reverted to a task where the participants
were required to press either a left or right button in response to specific go
stimuli and withhold a response to no-go stimuli. This allowed exploration of
trials with response competition (incongruent go trials) alongside trials with a
no-go prime (no-go go condition). All pair-wise comparisons were
significantly different from one another for reaction times, suggesting that the
neutral primes were producing neutral priming effects, such that they did not
appear to facilitate or interfere with go or no-go responses. The RCE
between congruent go and incongruent go trials was 27ms and between
congruent go and no-go go trials was 22ms. However, further analysis
revealed that while some neutral trials appeared to prime a right hand
response, other neutral trials primed a left hand response. More specifically,
when a neutral prime appeared on the left it acted as a left-go prime, while a
neutral prime on the right acted as a right-go prime. This meant that neutral
primes effectively acted as go primes, most likely because they contained
diagonal features that were present in go stimuli. When averaging the
different types of neutral trials together, the overall reaction times were
significantly different from both congruent and incongruent trials, giving the
impression that they were genuinely neutral. Due to this confound with
neutral trials, they were excluded from further analysis.
Experiment 4 reverted back to a simple go/no-go task where participants
responded to a central arrow pointing either left or right. This experiment
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produced a positive pnmmq effect, with congruent go trials showing
significantly reduced reaction times in comparison to neutral go trials, while
incongruent trials showed slowest reaction times. All pair-wise comparisons
for both reaction times and accuracy were significant. However, the RCE for
this experiment was extremely small Gust 7 ms), suggesting that the primes
had only a small effect on go/no-go behaviour. A likely explanation for this
small priming effect is that the masked primes were presented either side of
a central location, and therefore in order to successfully identify the prime
participants simply had to detect its presence or absence on one side or the
other. Since the prime detection threshold is lower than the prime
identification threshold, the primes were significantly weaker in this
experiment. The finding that even at this strict objective threshold, go/no-go
priming was maintained suggests that the effect is truly unconscious.
Experiment 5 reverted back to similar stimuli to those utilised in experiment
1, using different masks to ensure a positive rather than negative
compatibility effect. This experiment produced the greatest response
congruency effect of all the experiments except experiment 1 with a
congruent versus incongruent reaction time difference of 28ms. In addition
to this large reaction time RCE, error rates followed a positive compatibility
effect for both go and no-go target trials.
In summary, all five experiments produced significant modulation of
behavioural responses as a function of the primes, suggesting that despite
being presented below the threshold of awareness they were able to
influence the go/no-go decision. It is interesting to note that there was a great
deal of variation in the RCE across the five experiments. The greatest RCE
was observed in experiments 1 and 5. One possible explanation for the
increased RCE in those experiments is that the primes and targets were
perceptually identical. If participants have built a stimulus-response
association for a specific target, and are looking out for that target in the
visual presentation, it is likely that the closer the prime to the target stimulus,
the more likely it is to activate the stimulus-response association. Moderate
RCEs were observed in experiments 3 and 4. In these experiments, the
primes were small versions of the targets, and therefore differed somewhat
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in their precise shape. The finding that a modest RCE was observed in
these experiments shows that the priming of no-go responses is not
restricted to identical primes. Finally, the small but significant RCE
observed in experiment 4 was attributed to the fact that in this experiment
primes were presented either side of fixation. This meant that the primes
needed to be particularly weak in order to be below the objective threshold
for prime identification, since identification could be achieved by simply
looking out for a flash either side of fixation, making the prime identification
task more like a prime detection task.
LRP
Experiment 1 showed a clear early separation of LRP waveforms dependent
on the unconscious primes, with a direct activation of LRP following a go
prime quickly replaced by LRP activation associated with a go prime-mask
effect, replicating the effects of Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998). This effect
of direct specification of a particular hand response was replicated in
experiments 2 and 5 which showed increased LRP activation in response to
a go prime. In experiment 3, the LRP became contaminated by confounding,
lateralised visual effects, consequently the effect of the unconscious primes
on this component could not be explored. In experiment 4, there were no
consistent effects of the unconscious primes on LRP activation.
Nevertheless, despite these problems with experiments 3 and 4, the clear
results from the other three experiments show that motor responses can be
initiated unconsciously.
No-go N2 and P3
All five experiments showed some modulation of the no-go N2/P3 complex in
response to the unconscious primes. In contrast to previous research
exploring the N2 in response conflict situations (Dehaene et aI., 2003; Mayr,
2004; Praamstra & Seiss, 2005), this shows that modulation of frontal
inhibition/control mechanisms in response to unconscious masked primes in
the go/no-go task is a highly replicable effect. It is important to note that in
experiment 1 the predicted modulations of no-go N2 and P3 components by
the prime were the opposite of those predicted in experiments 2 to 5. Since
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experiment 1 produced a negative compatibility effect, unconscious
facilitation of frontal inhibition/control mechanisms should result in a reduced
N2 and P3 for the incongruent no-go condition. In line with this prediction,
N2 and P3 amplitude was significantly increased for congruent no-go trials,
and decreased for incongruent no-go trials. Moreover, an early frontal
negativity was evident for incongruent no-go and congruent go trials. This
negativity appeared to reflect an early N2 in response to a no-go prime-mask
effect. Prior to this negativity related to the prime-mask effect, activity at
frontal electrodes was more positive for go primes in comparison to neutral
and no-go primes for both go and no-go target trials. Importantly, both these
early modulations were entirely dependent on the nature of the prime
stimulus, suggesting that they reflect N2-related activity directly elicited by
the unconscious primes. Moreover, the topography of these effects, with a
frontocentral maximum suggests that they reflect modulation of the no-go N2
component. This finding is analogous to Leuthold and Kopp's (1998) LRP
experiment which showed direct specification of a motor response by an
unconscious prime, suggesting that like a motor response, inhibition of an
imminent response can also be initiated unconsciously. However, given the
rather unusual nature of the direction of the priming effect using these
precise stimuli - namely an NCE rather than a PCE - the following
experiments aimed to replicate this effect in an experiment that produced
positive compatibility.
While experiments 2 to 5 replicated the modulation of later target-related N2
and P3 components, only experiments 2 and 5 showed any significant early
prime-related modulation. In each of experiments 2 to 5 target-related N2
amplitude was significantly reduced for congruent no-go trials in comparison
to incongruent no-go N2 amplitude. Experiments 4 and 5 also showed a
significant decrease in target-related N2 amplitude for congruent no-go trials
in comparison to neutral no-go trials. However, comparisons between
congruent and neutral trials were not possible in experiments 2 and 3 due to
potential confounds with the neutral primes in these experiments. In
experiment 5 there was also significant modulation of the no-go P3, with
congruent no-go trials revealing significantly reduced amplitude and
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incongruent no-go trials showing increased amplitude in comparison to
neutral no-go trials. This modulation of target-related N2 and P3
components is important as it shows a facilitatory effect for congruent trials
and not simply an interference effect for incongruent trials. Since it is well
known that unconscious primes can directly initiate a motor response it is
perhaps not surprising that N2 amplitude is increased following a go prime,
since the go response will become partially activated and will require greater
engagement of frontal control mechanisms to be successfully withheld.
However, it is also noteworthy that such modulation of N2 was not evident in
response conflict tasks where the source of the conflict remains
unconscious. In particular both Leuthold and Kopp (1998) and Praamstra
and Seiss (2005) found that although a subliminal prime was able to directly
specify a specific hand response, there was no genuine N2 effect following
an incongruent trial where presumably the response specified by the
unconscious prime would need to be inhibited before the alternative
response was specified. If the modulation of the N2/P3 in the current
experiment was simply the result of increased motor preparation for go
primes, then a similar N2 should have been elicited in these previous
experiments. In any case, the additional finding of a facilitatory effect of
congruent primes shows that like the go response, the no-go response can
also be unconsciously primed. More specifically, since neither the neutral
prime nor the no-go prime should produce an initial activation of a motor
response, the difference in N2 and P3 amplitude between these two
conditions indicates that the reduction in amplitude of these components is
caused by priming of the no-go response.
In experiments 2 and 5 the additional finding of early frontal negativities
related to no-go primes supports the assumption that the no-go N2 was
elicited in response to direct unconscious engagement of frontal control
mechanisms. In experiment 2, neutral prime trials showed significantly
reduced amplitude at frontocentral electrodes in comparison to go prime
trials. In addition, the comparison between no-go primes and go primes
showed a near significant trend, with no-go prime trials showing more
negative amplitude than go prime trials. A significant early modulation of
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frontocentral ERP activity dependent on prime type was also observed in
experiment 5, with no-go primes showing significantly more negative
amplitude in comparison to go primes. Furthermore, this effect was found to
be dependent on the degree to which participants' responses were affected
by the unconscious primes. Participants were split into one group with a
large priming effect and another group with little or no priming effect. A
significant interaction between prime type and priming group was then
observed, such that participants with a large priming effect also showed a
greater degree of frontocentral ERP modulation dependent on the nature of
the unconscious prime. Importantly, this effect was independent of
performance on the prime identification task, suggesting that the group
differences were not driven by differences in the visibility of the primes. The
finding that these frontal negativities were associated with behavioural
priming provides strong evidence that the successful recruitment of frontal
control mechanisms by the unconscious primes was present on these trials,
and to a greater degree in the primed participants.
The failure to find early prime-related differences in experiments 3 and 4
means that it is not possible to conclude that engagement of frontal control
mechanisms was directly elicited by the primes in these experiments.
Although target-related N2 and P3 components did vary as a function of the
unconscious prime, the finding of early visual effects, in particular in
experiment 3, suggests that perhaps the modulation of target-related N2 and
P3 components was the result of perceptual priming in experiments 3 and 4.
This possibility will be discussed in more detail later in a later section of this
chapter exploring the locus of the priming effects. Overall, the current set of
experiments show highly replicable effects of modulation of frontal no-go N2
and P3 ERP components in response to subliminal primes. This is in
contrast to previous reports that these components are not affected by
unconscious primes (Dehaene et aI., 2003; Mayr, 2004).
P300
In addition to the frontal no-go N2 and P3, no-go trials showed decreased
parietal P300 amplitude. This large positive deflection maximal over parietal
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electrodes is perhaps the most widely investigated ERP effect, possibly due
to its extremely large amplitude and its appearance in a number of different
tasks (Coles, 1989; Verleger, 1997; Verleger et aI., 2005). It is most
commonly studied in the oddball paradigm, where participants are required
to look out for infrequent targets (oddballs) in a sequence containing mainly
non-target distractors (see Potts, 2004; Verleger, 1997 for comprehensive
reviews). The parietal P300 is typically larger in response to the infrequent
targets. This has led a number of researchers to conclude that this
component reflects the updating of contextual information related to the
nature of the stimulus. Since the P300 reliably distinguishes targets from
non-targets it is widely thought that it peaks after the completion of stimulus
evaluation when the stimulus has been successfully identified. A number of
reports also suggest that while it is sensitive to manipulations of stimulus
discriminability, it is insensitive to situations involving response conflict
(Coles, 1989). However, more recently P300 has been strongly linked with
decision making processes, in particular the transition from stimulus-related
to motor-related processes (Verleger et aI., 2005). In contrast to the
traditional view of P300, this theory states that this component is affected
both by response and stimulus manipulations. Verleger et al. (2005) suggest
that the P300 indexes the point at which a decision is reached about an
upcoming stimulus, and is associated with the transition from stimulus
evaluation to response processing.
In the current research, increased P300 amplitude was observed in response
to go trials in each of the five experiments. Importantly, modulation of ERPs
dependent on prime type showed a functional dissociation between go and
no-go trials. For no-go trials prime-related modulation was maximal at
frontocentral electrodes while for go trials prime-related modulation was
maximal at parietal electrodes. This dissociation of frontal no-go related
priming and parietal go related priming is important to consider with respect
to Leuthold and Kopp's (1998) finding of a parietal N2 for incongruent go
trials, which they interpreted as reflecting response conflict between left and
right hand responses. Leuthold and Kopp (1998) asked participants to
respond with one hand when a stimulus above fixation was flanked by
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horizontal bars, and with the other hand when a stimulus below fixation was
flanked by horizontal bars. They found that subliminal primes were
successful in directly eliciting the motor response as measured by the LRP.
In addition, they found a parietal negativity for incongruent trials in
comparison to congruent trials peaking around 400ms after stimulus onset.
They interpreted this as a parietal N2, reflecting conflict between the primed
response and the target. This finding prompted Eimer and Schlaghecken
(2003) to suggest that while a frontal N2 is evident only in response to
conscious conflict, a parietal N2 might reflect a similar process in response to
unconscious conflict.
Inspection of the topographic distribution of the N2 component in the current
research revealed that although the no-go N2 showed an initial frontal
distribution, this was then replaced by a parietal negativity. However, the
functional dissociation between the no-go N2 and the parietal P300
modulation described above confirms that modulation of no-go trials was
present over anterior electrodes while modulation of go trials was present
over posterior electrodes. Furthermore, the temporal dissociation evident in
the scalp topographies - with an earlier onset for the frontal modulation in
comparison to the parietal modulation - provides further evidence that these
two aspects evident in the topographic maps were functionally distinct. More
precisely, while the frontal effects reflected modulation of the no-go N2, the
posterior effects reflected modulation of the P300. This functional distinction
between these two components may give some insight into the effects
observed by Leuthold and Kopp (1998). The latency and topography of their
posterior N2 is consistent with the observed modulation of P300 trials in the
current experiments, perhaps suggesting that the parietal modulation
observed in their experiment was a P300 modulation and not an N2
modulation. This suggestion is further supported by the presence of a similar
parietal negativity observed on incongruent go trials in the current
experiment 3. In this experiment, participants were required to respond with
one hand to one stimulus configuration and the opposite hand to another
stimulus configuration. They were required to make a no-go response to a
third stimulus set. Importantly, a similar dissociation was observed between
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the parietal and frontal prime-related modulations in this experiment such
that incongruent go trials - which were functionally identical to the same
condition in Leuthold and Kopp (1998) - showed a parietal negativity in
comparison to congruent go trials, while no-go go trials showed frontal
modulation.
LRP and go/no-go differences
Praamstra and Seiss (2005) showed that a pseudo N2 was evident on
congruent no-go trails caused by averaging together left and right hand
responses. Since the first experiment in this thesis utilised a similar
paradigm, namely one which produced a negative compatibility effect, it was
important to consider the influence of overlapping motor potentials in this
experiment. Generating ERP separately for left and right hand responses
revealed that the same pattern of activity was evident for each hand over
each hemisphere, confirming that the no-go N2 observed in response to
congruent trials in experiment 1 was not an artefact generated from
lateralised movement related activity. This issue was also explored in
experiments 2 and 3. In each of these experiments, behavioural and EEG
effects followed a positive compatibility effect. Thorough inspection of ERP
waveforms generated separately for each response hand revealed that early
frontal go/no-go effects were in the opposite direction to motor related
effects. More specifically, since both the RP and LRP are negative
potentials, the presence of a go prime should produce an increased
negativity if the early separation were dependent on motor activation.
However, in experiments 2 and 5 where early separations were evident, they
were in the opposite direction, with increased negativity for no-go trials in
comparison to go trials. Therefore, rather than being caused by increased
motor activation, the early separations in these experiments are evident
despite overlapping motor related activity which would work in the opposite
direction. It is important to note that increased motor activation produced by
the primes, could work to increase the amplitude of the no-go N2 on
incongruent go trials. However, the latency of these N2 effects, beginning
around 250ms after target onset, rules out the possibility that they were
generated by overlapping motor potentials, which were consistently evident
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only in the first 150ms after stimulus onset. These findings confirm that in
each experiment the go/no-go differences were not caused by overlapping
motor potentials and thus they more likely reflect true modulation of the no-
go N2.
Visual ERP effects
In each experiment visual ERP effects were explored both in relation to each
condition (such as congruent versus incongruent go conditions) at electrode
Oz and in relation to the physical stimuli (such as left versus right sided
diamonds) at electrodes P07/P08 and 01/02. Since in each experiment the
stimuli were either presented at lateral location, or were somewhat
asymmetrical (arrows), these lateralised visual effects were explored to
determine if the visual response was augmented over electrodes
contralateral to primes and targets. In each experiment (except experiment
3) the visual stimuli were counterbalanced either within or between
participants such that while one stimulus configuration coded for a go
response for some participants (or in one experimental session), the same
stimulus coded for a no-go response for other participants. Therefore,
lateralised ERP effects were explored in relation to the physical stimuli and
not their functional significance, since any lateralised effects related to the
physical characteristics of the stimuli would cancel out when the
counterbalancing was averaged together. Response mapping was also
included as a factor in the analysis to explore whether any visual
asymmetries were also dependent on the functional significance of the
target. Any such modulation would likely reflect an N2pc component which is
thought to reflect attention to and identification of target-related aspects of
the stimulus (Kiss et aI., 2007).
Each experiment showed some modulation of early visual ERP effects in
response to the unconscious primes. In experiment 1 there were no
significant effects on P1 and N1 amplitude, although a significant later effect
was observed at electrode Oz with go primes showing significantly increased
amplitude. In addition, significant lateralised visual ERP effects were
observed with increased P1 and N1 amplitude contralateral to the direction of
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the prime arrow. Similar effects were observed in experiment 2 and 3, with a
significant effect of prime congruency on N1 and significant lateralisation of
N1, with increased amplitude contralateral to the side of a diamond stimulus.
Experiment 4 showed no modulation of visual ERP effects, but did show
small increased lateralised ERP components contralateral to the side of the
prime. Similarly experiment 5 showed no effects at electrode Oz, but did
reveal some lateralised ERP components. In summary, experiments 1 to 3
showed both prime-related effects at Oz and lateralised visual ERP effects,
while experiment 4 showed only the lateralised effects.
Locus ofpriming effects
The presence of early visual ERP effects is important in trying to determine
the locus of the priming effects in the current experiments. This was
particularly important in those experiments where no early prime-related
frontal negativities were observed in response to the subliminal prime. The
presence of visual ERP effects in these experiments would point to the
possibility that the prime-related effects on the target N2 and P3 were
caused by visual or attentional priming. Since experiments 3 and 4 both
failed to show such early prime-related modulation, visual ERP analysis in
these conditions is particularly important.
As described above, experiment 3 showed significant lateralised visual
effects as well as a significant effect at electrode Oz such that congruent go
trials showed a significantly increased N1 component. In this experiment
participants were instructed to press a left button in response to a left
diamond and a right button in response to a right diamond. The presence of
early lateralised visual effects suggests that the visual system successfully
coded the location of the target stimulus (the diamond). The further finding
of an increased N1 at electrode Oz for congruent go trials suggests that the
unconscious primes were able to direct attention to the location of the target
stimulus. Previous research has found that visual P1 and N1 components
are subject to modulation by attention, such that they are increased when
attending to the relevant visual information (Clark & Hillyard, 1996).
Therefore, the finding that the visual N1 component was significantly
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increased for congruent go trials suggests that a go prime was able to direct
attention to its location, which meant that when the target was presented in
this same location, it showed an increased visual response. Such an
interpretation could mean that the modulation of target-related go/no-go
differences was caused by modulation of attention by the unconscious
primes.
However, it is not clear how such attentional modulation might cause the N2
and P3 effects observed in experiment 3. If attention is directed toward the
location of the upcoming stimulus by the prime then this would likely speed
up reaction times for congruent go trials and reduce reaction times to
incongruent go trials. This would provide an adequate explanation of priming
on go trials without the need to postulate direct unconscious initiation of
action. However, if attention was directed towards a go prime, then
responses to incongruent no-go primes should be quicker (as measured by
the N2) than responses to congruent no-go primes, since on incongruent
trials attention would be directed to the go prime, which would then be
replaced by a no-go target. In fact the exact opposite was observed, with
congruent no-go trials showing evidence of early engagement of frontal
inhibition/control mechanisms. Interestingly, the increased amplitude of the
visual N1 component at Oz was only present for the congruent go, with
congruent no-go, incongruent no-go and incongruent go all showing similar
amplitude. This suggests that any modulation of attention was limited to
congruent go trials. Therefore, the priming of the no-go N2 on no-go trials
was unlikely to be caused by such an attentional modulation, suggesting that
the early onset of the N2 on congruent no-go primes reflects direct
engagement of frontal inhibition/control mechanisms on these trials.
However, the failure to find a similar early N2 for incongruent go trials is still
problematic for this interpretation.
Experiment 4 showed significant modulation of target-related N2 and P3
components dependent on the unconscious primes, but did not show any
early prime-related effects at frontocentral electrodes. Visual ERP analysis
revealed no significant effects on N1 or P1 amplitude. In addition, only a
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modest lateralised effect was evident with a significant separation based on
prime type from 20 to 50ms after target onset. The absence of early prime-
related frontal ERP effects in experiment 4 again meant that it was not
possible to conclusively state that the unconscious primes were able to
directly initiate inhibition/control mechanisms. However, the absence of any
congruency related ERP effects at electrode Oz also rules out the possibility
that the target-related effects were simply caused by modulation of attention
by the unconscious primes. Moreover, the fact that the targets were
presented in a central location in this experiment, with the primes at lateral
locations, means that priming of attention toward the prime, even if it did
occur, should not influence target processing. The absence of an interaction
between prime type and response mapping for the early lateralised effects
also suggests that they reflected low level visual processing of the lateral
primes and not modulation of spatial attention. These observations strongly
suggest that target-related N2 modulations in this experiment were not
caused by perceptual/attentional priming, but rather that the no-go response
was unconsciously primed. Nevertheless, the failure to show early prime-
related effects means that it is not possible to conclude that, in this
experiment, the unconscious primes directly activated the no-go response.
Experiments 1, 2, and 5 all showed significant early prime-related frontal
modulation, making interpretation of the locus of priming in these
experiments more straightforward. Despite the presence of early visual
effects in these experiments, the finding that no-go prime trials showed
increased negativity over frontocentral electrodes suggests that the
unconscious primes were able to directly initiate the no-go response. The
fact that in each of these experiments the early separations at frontal
electrodes was entirely dependent on prime type (rather than prime
congruency) means that these effects could not have been caused by
attentional modulation for congruent trials. For example, if congruent primes
were successful in alerting attention to the location of the upcoming target,
then an earlier N2 would have been observed only for congruent no-go
primes and not incongruent go primes. The presence of an early N2 and
LRP entirely determined by prime type thus suggests that in each of these
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experiments the prime directly modulated both initial preparation and
inhibition of the motor response.
The visual effects in these experiments likely reflect unconscious detection of
visual features of the targets. Similar effects have recently been described
by Del Cui, Baillet and Dehaene (2007), who show that early visual
responses differentiate subliminal primes. Kiesel, Kunde and Hoffmann
(2007) outline a likely mechanism for unconscious priming effects, which
includes an early identification of relevant features of the prime. They
suggest that unconscious priming effects are caused by activation of action
triggers defined by the particular set of target stimuli. This account allows for
the presence of perceptual facilitation, without direct perceptual priming. The
crucial step in allowing the prime to activate the appropriate response is its
classification as an adequate action trigger. Although this activation is more
likely to occur when the primes are also used as target stimuli (as in the
current experiments) this account can also be extended to account for
unseen primes. For example, Kunde, Kiesel and Hoffmann (2003) used
similar stimuli to those employed by Dehaene et al. (1998) and showed that
when participants were asked to respond to numbers above and below 5
with different hands priming extended to the unseen numbers 2 and 3 only
when 1 and 4 were used as the target stimuli. When 3 and 4 were used as
targets then primes 1 and 2 exerted no priming effect. Additionally Kiesel et
al. (2007) suggest that priming of unseen prime words that are semantically
associated with target words only occurs if the response set is large enough
for participants not to easily remember individual exemplars and thus
mistakenly include certain items as action triggers. For example, they
suggest that once knife, mug and cup have been included as targets, it
seems plausible that spoon would also become an active trigger since
participants are likely to set up a response set for crockery items. While the
debate surrounding the plausibility of truly semantic priming effects is not
directly relevant for the work presented in this thesis, the model outlined by
Kiesel et al. (2007) provides a good account of the likely mechanisms for the
priming effects in the current research.
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Conclusions
Implications of current research
The research described in this thesis shows that, like preparation for a motor
act, inhibition of an impending action can also be initiated unconsciously.
This finding has important implications for the role of consciousness in the
control of action. As described above, there is a great deal of research
associating frontal inhibition/control mechanisms with consciousness. For
example, Dehaene et al. (2003) and Praamstra and Seiss (2005) have
shown using both fMRI and EEG that these mechanisms normally engaged
in resolving response conflict, are not activated when the conflict is
unconscious. In addition, Libet (1985) suggested that while voluntary acts
are initiated in the brain prior to conscious awareness of the decision to act,
consciousness may retain the ability to veto the action. A similar position
was outlined by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) who suggested that
inhibition of a motor response, such as that in the go/no-go task can only
occur in response to a conscious stimulus. This has led to the continued
popularity of Libet's suggestion of conscious "free wont" that consciousness
acts to veto the performance of unwanted actions. While a number of
objections have been made to this possibility on theoretical grounds (ct.
Velmans, 2003), up to now there has been no direct evidence in support of,
or against this assumption. The current research provides empirical
evidence against the assumption that inhibition of an imminent motor
response can only occur consciously. This has important implications for
conscious free will, suggesting that when interacting with our external world,
decisions regarding our actions can be arrived at prior to consciousness of
those decisions.
It is important to note that the current experiments are somewhat different to
Libet's et al.'s (1983) experiment exploring voluntary action. In those
experiments participants were asked to flex their wrist whenever they felt the
urge to do so, and to retrospectively report the time at which they decided to
move. Libet et al. (1983) found that the brain began to prepare the
movement, as measured by the readiness potential, some 300 ms before the
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time at which participants consciously decided to act. In an attempt to
explore the suggestion that consciousness was required to veto an action
Libet et al. (1983) explored the readiness potential in situations where
participants pre-prepared a response and then decided on some trials to veto
that action at the last moment. Libet et al. (1983) found that on these veto
trials, the readiness potential was very similar to that observed in the act
condition. However, it is important to note that Libet provides no statistical
analysis of the difference in RP between the veto condition and the condition
where an action was performed. In addition, he did not record EEG activity
from any other electrodes, such as frontal electrodes where any correlates of
the veto are likely to occur. Since on freely initiated and freely vetoed trials,
no external event would occur with which to time lock the ERP, it is difficult to
explore the veto in such a paradigm. The current research therefore
explored the potential of unconscious primes to initiate the ERP correlates of
withholding an impending action. Importantly, in each of the experiments
described in this thesis, participants were responding to external stimuli
rather than making responses at the time of their choice. However, as
outlined in chapter 1 there is reason to believe that although different to
freely initiated actions, responses to external stimuli are more accurate
representations of our typical interaction with the external world. Despite
this, it is important to note that while the current set of results is relevant to
the question of whether consciousness is required to withhold an impending
action, the experimental paradigm is different to the original one employed by
Libet et al. (1983).
Given the conclusions from the current research that both preparation and
inhibition of a motor act can be initiated without consciousness, it is important
to consider what the role of consciousness might be. Gomes (1998) has
suggested that even if both the initiation of action and a veto have
unconscious brain correlates, consciousness may still have a role in
controlling behaviour since it might not be possible for a veto to occur without
the initial action having entered consciousness. Consistent with this position,
there is evidence to suggest that trial to trial adaptation of behaviour does not
occur in response to an unconscious stimulus. Kunde (2003) explored
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sequential modulation of conflict induced by subliminal primes. Participants
were required to make a left handed response to left pointing arrows and a
right handed response to right pointing arrows. Kunde (2003) was
particularly interested in the effect of the subliminal primes on trial to trial
modulation of behaviour. He found that when the primes were conscious,
trial to trial effects were evident such that the RCE was reduced on trials
where the previous trial was incongruent. This finding shows that detection
of response conflict on one trial was able to trigger control mechanisms to
reduce the effect of this conflict on the subsequent trial. Interestingly, trial to
trial modulation was not evident when the primes were unconscious. This
was despite the fact that the subliminal primes still produced a significant
response congruency effect, indicating that they were modulating behaviour
within a single trial. Thus Kunde's (2003) results suggest that in order to
flexibly adapt ones behaviour in response to previous events, one must be
conscious of those events. In the research outlined in this thesis, all the
behavioural modulation was present within a single trial. Although both
preparation and inhibition of a response were found to be directly initiated by
the subliminal primes, the original decision to act was likely a conscious one.
Since participants were required to make a speeded reaction to a go
stimulus, their default mode was likely to be ready to press the button. This
pre-potent readiness to respond was set up consciously in response to the
experimental instructions in the task. Therefore, even with the current finding
that inhibition of a motor act can occur unconsciously, in order for this
inhibition to occur participants were first required to make a conscious
decision to prepare to press a button on each trial. Therefore, the research
described in this thesis is not inconsistent with the theory that consciousness
is required for cognitive control mechanisms to allow flexible adaptive control
of behaviour. Instead it directly assesses Libet's (1985) claim that
consciousness is required to veto an impending action, showing that contrary
to his claim, inhibition of an imminent response can be initiated
unconsciously.
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Directions for future research
There are a number of ways in which future research might be able to
explore the generality of the current findings to different situations. For
example, in the current research although both go and no-go responses
were found to be directly initiated by subliminal primes, responses were
ultimately triggered by conscious stimuli. Without the presentation of the
target stimuli, the partial activation of go and no-go stimuli would likely have
remained below the threshold to produce overt behaviour. An interesting
way to explore this unconscious activation would be to present unconscious
primes in advance of neutral stimuli that code neither for a go nor a no-go
response. Such an experiment was recently described by Kiesel, Wagener,
Kunde, Hoffmann, Fallgatter and Stocker (2005), who showed that
participants' responses on such free choice trials were influenced by
subliminal stimuli. They explored this modulation in an experiment where
participants were primed to act either with their left or right hand, showing
that the subliminal primes could bias responses on free choice trials such
that 60 percent of responses were compatible with the prime. In addition to
this effect on the decision of which button to press in this experiment, Kiesel
et al. (2005) found that even when participants acted in the opposite direction
to the primes, their reaction times were significantly slower due to an initial
unconscious activation of the primed response hand. An interesting variation
on this experiment would be to explore if such modulation of free choice trials
is evident in a go/no-go task, as this would show that a free decision about
whether or not to continue with an impending action can be influenced
unconsciously.
Another interesting extension of the current research might be to see if
overcoming a pre-potent left or right hand response is influenced
unconsciously. In a sense, the important aspect of Libet's conception of a
veto is that participants need to change their mind about an imminent action.
This may result in inhibition of the action altogether, or selection of an
alternative action. While there is much research exploring the role of
subliminal primes in choice reaction time tasks (Dehaene, 1998; Eimer &
Schlaghecken, 1998; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998), these experiments have an
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equal probability of a stimulus requmnq a left hand response and a right
hand response. One way to build a predominant response hand would be to
increase the proportion of trials in which a response with that hand was
required. Presenting subliminal primes in such a task would allow
exploration of whether unconscious primes are able to influence a decision to
overcome a predominant response with an alternative response, and
whether this process is mediated by frontal control/inhibition mechanisms.
Similarly, to explore the locus of the pnmmq of no-go response in more
detail, it would be interesting to see if early prime-related effects were
evident in response to subliminal primes that were only categorically or
semantically related to targets, and were not visually related. This could be
explored using a variation of the task employed by Dehaene et al. (1998) by
asking participants to make a go response to numbers above five and a no-
go response to numbers below five. By presenting only the numbers 1, 4, 6
and 9 as targets, it would be possible to explore if the numbers 2, 3, 7 and 8
were able to prime the go/no-go decision. This would further confirm that
priming of a no-go response can be directly elicited by an unconscious prime
and not only via perceptual or attentional priming.
New analysis techniques may also provide ways to extend the research
described in this thesis. For example, as new time-frequency and single trial
measures of EEG activity are developed, researchers are closing in on the
neural correlates for consciousness. Some candidates for these neural
correlates have included synchronous high frequency oscillatory EEG activity
(Melloni et aI., 2007) as well as measures of neural complexity in the EEG
signal (Burgess, Rehman, &Williams, 2003). As analysis techniques of EEG
data improve and the precise neural correlates of consciousness are
discovered it may be possible to explore unconscious behaviour without the
need to present subliminal stimuli in advance of target stimuli which
participants are required to respond to. For instance it might be possible to
simply ask participants to make responses dependent on events in the
external world, determine when they became conscious of these events
using EEG markers of conscious awareness, and then compare this to when
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they began preparing responses to the events. Although such an experiment
would still require responses to external stimuli it would allow more direct
examination of whether such responses are made before conscious
awareness of the events leading to the decisions.
In addition, although the poor signal to noise ratio of the LRP makes it
impossible to determine motor readiness in single trial EEG, recent analysis
techniques including independent components analysis have led to the
possibility of extracting ERP components on single trials associated with
preparation and inhibition of a motor response. One candidate for such an
EEG component is the sensorimotor mu (12-15 Hertz) rhythm, which
correlates with preparation and inhibition of motor responses (Chatrain,
Peterson, & Lazarte, 1959). The ability to reliably detect this component on
single trials is currently being utilised in the exploration of possible human-
computer interface systems which allow direct control of external events by
imagining movements with the left or right hand (Pfurtscheller, Brunner,
Schlogl, & Lopes da Silva, 2006). This rhythmic EEG activity could also be
utilised to detect instances where participants began to prepare an action but
did not follow through with the act itself. This would be directly analogous to
the veto situation described by Libet et al. (1983), who mentioned that a
number of participants reported after the experiment that they occasionally
prepared an action but then withheld it at the final moment. Such trials could
not be picked up with conventional ERP analysis due to the low signal to
noise ratio of the RP and LRP, but the successful detection of the
sensorimotor mu on individual trials suggests that this technique might allow
direct examination of such trials by retrospectively classifying acts that were
prepared but not subsequently performed.
New analysis techniques may also help to disentangle some of the difficulties
observed in the current research with overlapping ERP components. This
was evident both in terms of the overlapping motor related activity described
above as well as for the no-go P3 components. Since the no-go N2 and P3
components immediately follow one another it is difficult to determine
whether a reduced N2 reflects modulation of the N2 itself, or overlap from an
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early onsetting P3. In addition to the N2/P3 complex, ACC activity has been
reliably associated with phase resetting of theta oscillations (5-7 Hz; Wang,
Ulbert, Schomer, Marinkovic & Halgren, 2005). Since, as described above
motor activity is typically associated with the higher frequency mu rhythm, as
well as very high frequency gamma activity (Gonzalez et aI., 2006), time
frequency analysis of the current data could provide a way to separate
control mechanisms from motor activation-related mechanisms, since
although their ERP correlates overlap in the time domain, their EEG
correlates may be separable in the frequency domain. Furthermore,
Hanslmayr, Pastotter, Bauml, Gruber, Wimber and Klimesch (2008) recently
showed that increased phase coupling between ACC and pre-frontal cortex
(PFC) was associated with resolution of conflict in a Stroop task. They
suggest that while theta amplitude emanating from ACC is associated with
the detection of conflict, synchronous activity in ACC and PFC may be
associated with engagement of control mechanisms in resolving the conflict
detected by the ACC mechanism. Experiments exploring the role of such
modulation on a within and between trial basis may allow exploration of the
hypothesis outlined above, that while consciousness is not required to simply
inhibit an action it may be involved in allowing flexible adaptive processing of
a changing environment.
Summary
This thesis aimed to explore whether the decision to withhold an impending
motor action can be initiated unconsciously. This issue has important
implications for our understanding of the nature of conscious free will, in
particular in regard to Libet's (1985) suggestion that while consciousness is
not required to begin preparation for action, it may be required to veto an
impending action. In addition, a number of experiments utilising masked
priming have suggested that subliminal primes do not engage frontal control
mechanisms (Dehaene et aI., 1998, Eimer &Schalghecken, 1998, Praamstra
& Seiss, 2005). The research in this thesis aimed to clarify whether this
assertion was also true for inhibition in the go/no-go task. Five experiments
were conducted to explore if the no-go N2 and P3 components could be
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modulated by an unconscious prime. In each experiment there were
significant modulations of target-related N2 and P3 components as a function
of the unconscious prime. Moreover, in three of the experiments, significant
early separations at frontocentral electrodes pointed to the possibility that the
subliminal primes were able to directly engage the frontal inhibition/control
mechanisms indexed by the no-go N2. These findings suggest that like
preparation for action, the decision to withhold an action can be initiated
unconsciously.
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